Engaging in the Crooked Timbre of Humanity: Value Pluralism and Social work

The field of social work ethics is changing. While more established positions, such as utilitarianism and deontology, continue to influence social work thinking and practice, emergent approaches are taking hold, leading to a radical examination of social work as an ethical discipline. To contribute to this unfolding debate, this article examines Isaiah Berlin's notion of value pluralism and its contribution to social work. The argument proceeds by summarising and categorising some of the traditional and emergent theories shaping social work according to metaphors of the ‘head’ (the justice-oriented, rational approaches) and the ‘heart’ (the grounded, particularistic and care-focused approaches). Berlin's value pluralism is then adopted to contend that social work needs to hold both ‘head’ and ‘heart’ ethics in a vital equilibrium to generate the ethics of the ‘hand’ (i.e. the practical response to contested areas of need) and the ‘feet’ (the commitment to change and well-being). These metaphors are then mapped on to a decision-making process and applied to the fraught area of adoption without parental consent

Taking pluralism seriously:Embedded moralities in management accounting and control systems

Professor Norman Macintosh has long been a leading, and at times a dissonant, voice in critical accounting studies, exhibiting an intellectual dexterity seldom encountered in the accounting academy. His work ranges from the application of traditional organizational theories within work organizations to poststructural renderings of capital market exigencies. Here, we consider and extend Professor Macintosh's work contemplating the morality embedded within, and propagated by, management accounting and control systems (macs). We begin with Macintosh (1995) employing structuration theory in investigating the ethics of profit manipulation within large, decentralized corporations. The work highlights the fundamental dialectical contradictions within these work organizations, demonstrates the indeterminacy of traditional ethical reasoning, and shows the extent to which macs provide legitimating underpinnings for management action. We propose to extend the conversation using the tools provided in Macintosh's subsequent work: a Levinasian ethic (Macintosh et al., 2009), and heteroglossic accounting (Macintosh, 2002)—both emerging from his poststructuralist predilections. A Levinasian perspective provides an ontologically grounded ethic, and heteroglossic accounting calls for multiple accountings representing alternative moral voices. A critical dialogic framework is proposed as a theoretic for imagining heteroglossic accounting that takes pluralism seriously by recognizing the reality of irresolvable differences and asymmetric power relationships associated with assorted moral perspectives.

The Pluralism of Human Rights Adjudication

This chapter considers judicial reasoning in ‘human rights’ cases. Are there techniques that courts share, or are different techniques adopted, to decide how human rights, in this broader sense, are protected? The chapter aims to adopt a comparative approach to the examination of this reasoning, through a detailed examination of similar human rights issues in a range of jurisdictions. The aim of the chapter is to examine the similarities and divergences in the reasoning developed by courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. The chapter shows that human rights reasoning involves distinctive and particular forms of legal reasoning, but that its form and content differ significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and over time within jurisdictions. Building upon these findings, the chapter explores what these similarities and differences tell us about the nature, and the direction of travel, of human rights law which comprises notionally universal norms.

Litigating Religions: Human rights, faith and pluralism

These are the podcasts of the three Alberico Gentili Lectures presented at the University of Macerata:

À propos de The Practice of Liberal Pluralism de William Galston : un dialogue avec l’auteur

Document de travail

Cosmopolitan citizenship and pathologies of pluralism

There are two interconnected questions obscured in the contemporary discourse of legal pluralism. The first concerns the legitimacy of the various forms of pluralism. The second concerns their pathology. If we accept that law does not issue from a unitary source, the problem becomes to characterize the kinds of pluralism in which we find ourselves and to discern their principles of legitimacy. It cannot be taken for granted that they are all legitimate, that is to say, that they can both articulate and fulfill founding principles of justification. That leads to the second question. To celebrate all legal pluralism simply by drawing attention to it as anobservable, documented fact, without considering whether that pluralism conduces to the just and the good, is like speaking of the pluralism of the body’s mechanisms without asking whether any given complex of cells is malignant or benign.

What’s wrong with Charles Taylor’s moral pluralism

In political philosophy one often encounters claims on behalf of pluralism, yet there is anything but a consensus over the meaning of this fundamental concept. It is true that there is no single pluralist tradition; rather, there are different pluralist traditions within different domains of practical reason. No one would object, however, to the notion that Isaiah Berlin’s “value pluralism” is a genuine form of meta-ethical pluralism. Charles Taylor is another philosopher who is often called a pluralist, but I shall argue that this is a mistake. One of the central goals of his philosophy is that of reconciling competing aims and ends and this is incompatible with pluralism.

Tacit knowing, moral development and pluralism: thoughts on mentoring, judgment and reform.

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