Explaining the multiparty systems of Western Europe prior to the adoption of proportional representation

The literature has difficulty explaining why the number of parties in majoritarian electoral systems often exceeds the two-party predictions associated with Duverger’s Law. To understand why this is the case, I examine several party systems in Western Europe before the adoption of proportional representation. Drawing from the social cleavage approach, I argue that the emergence of multiparty systems was because of the development of the class cleavage, which provided a base of voters sizeable enough to support third parties. However, in countries where the class cleavage became the largest cleavage, the class divide displaced other cleavages and the number of parties began to converge on two. The results show that the effect of the class cleavage was nonlinear, producing the greatest party system fragmentation in countries where class cleavages were present – but not dominant – and smaller in countries where class cleavages were either dominant or non-existent.

In Defiance of Duverger: The Class Cleavage and the Emergence of District-Level Multiparty Systems in Western Europe

At its core, Duverger’s Law—holding that the number of viable parties in first-past-the-post systems should not exceed two—applies primarily at the district level. While the number of parties nationally may exceed two, district-level party system fragmentation should not. Given that a growing body of research shows that district-level party system fragmentation can indeed exceed two in first-past-the-post systems, I explore whether the major alternative explanation for party system fragmentation—the social cleavage approach—can explain such violations of Duverger’s Law. Testing this argument in several West European elections prior to the adoption of proportional representation, I find evidence favouring a social cleavage explanation: with the expansion of the class cleavage, the average district-level party system eventually came to violate the two-party predictions associated with Duverger’s Law. This suggests that sufficient social cleavage diversity may produce multiparty systems in other first-past-the-post systems.

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages, and Experience with Democracy

Recent studies show the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages, and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.

Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems

In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.

Political transition and structural politicisation : The long shadow of Taiwan's one-party legacy

Väitöskirjatutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Taiwanin politiikkaa ensimmäisen vaalien kautta tapahtuneen vallanvaihdon jälkeen (2000) yhteiskunnan rakenteellisen politisoitumisen näkökulmasta. Koska Taiwanilla siirryttiin verettömästi autoritaarisesta yksipuoluejärjestelmästä monipuoluejärjestelmään sitä on pidetty poliittisen muodonmuutoksen mallioppilaana. Aiempi optimismi Taiwanin demokratisoitumisen suhteen on sittemmin vaihtunut pessimismiin, pitkälti yhteiskunnan voimakkaasta politisoitumisesta johtuen. Tutkimuksessa haetaan selitystä tälle politisoitumiselle. Yhteiskunnan rakenteellisella politisoitumisella tarkoitetaan tilannetta, jossa ”poliittisen” alue kasvaa varsinaisia poliittisia instituutioita laajemmaksi. Rakenteellinen politisoituminen muuttuu helposti yhteiskunnalliseksi ongelmaksi, koska siitä usein seuraa normaalin poliittisen toiminnan (esim. lainsäädännän) jähmettyminen, yhteiskunnan jyrkkä jakautuminen, alhainen kynnys poliittisille konflikteille ja yleisen yhteiskunnallisen luottamuksen alentuminen. Toisin kuin esimerkiksi Itä-Euroopassa, Taiwanissa entinen valtapuolue ei romahtanut poliittisen avautumisen myötä vaan säilytti vahvan rakenteellisen asemansa. Kun valta vaihtui ensimmäisen kerran vaalien kautta, vanha valtapuolue ei ollut valmis luovuttamaan poliittisen järjestelmän ohjaksia käsistään. Alkoi vuosia kestänyt taistelu järjestelmän hallinnasta vanhan ja uuden valtapuolueen välillä, jossa yhteiskunta politisoitui voimakkaasti. Tutkimuksessa Taiwanin yhteiskunnan politisoituminen selitetään useiden rakenteellisten piirteiden yhteisvaikutuksen tuloksena. Tällaisia politisoitumista edistäviä rakentellisia piirteitä ovat hidas poliittinen muutos, joka säilytti vanhat poliittiset jakolinjat ja niihin liittyvät vahvat edut ja intressit; sopimaton perustuslaki; Taiwanin epäselvä kansainvälinen asema ja jakautunut identiteetti; sekä sosiaalinen rakenne, joka helpottaa ihmisten nopeaa mobilisointia poliittiisiin mielenilmauksiin. Tutkimuksessa kiinnitetään huomiota toistaiseksi vähän tutkittuun poliittiseen ilmiöön, joidenkin demokratisoituvien yhteiskuntien voimakkaaseen rakenteelliseen politisoitumiseen. Tutkimuksen pääasiallinen havainto on, että yksipuoluejärjestelmän demokratisoituminen kantaa sisällään rakenteellisen politisoitumisen siemenen, jos entinen valtapuolue ei romahda demokratisoitumisen myötä.

Centres, Peripheries and Party Systems: nested secession processes in Great Britain and Ireland

The seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, which explores how party systems evolved organically from nineteenth-century roots, has generally been applied in states which have enjoyed a long-standing territorial identity. Their model's emphasis on stability and predictability can, however, be reconciled with circumstances where the very identity of the state itself is an issue. This article explores the capacity of the model to explain party divisions in three nested contexts: the pre-1922 United Kingdom, which encountered problems with its Celtic peripheries, and especially with Ireland; independent Ireland, where a unique party system developed, largely in response to a broader historical and geographical context; and Northern Ireland, where party politics fossilised in the 1880s, and began to unfreeze only in the 1970s. The article argues that the Lipset–Rokkan model casts valuable light on these processes, which in turn contribute to the theoretical richness of the model.

The waning of the two giants: the electoral decline of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Communist Party

Italy is currently experiencing profound political change. One aspect of this change involves the decline in electoral support for the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), now the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). Signs of the electoral decline of both parties began to appear in the late 1970s and early 1980s and accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The pr imar y purpos e of th is thes is is to expla i n the electoral decline of the DC and PCI/PDS in the last decade. The central question being addressed in this thesis is the following: What factors contributed to the decline in electoral support for the DC and PCI? In addition, the thesis attempts to better comprehend the change in magni tude and direction of the Italian party system. The thesis examines the central question within an analytical framework that consists of models explaining electoral change in advanced industrial democracies and in Italy. A review of the literature on electoral change in Italy reveals three basic models: structural (socioeconomic and demographic factors), subcultural (the decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures), and pol i tical (factors such as party strategy, and the crisis and collapse of communism in iv Eastern Europe and the former soviet Union and the end to the Cold War). Significant structural changes have occurred in Italy, but they do not invariably hurt or benefit either party. The Catholic and Communist subcultures have declined in size and strength, but only gradually. More importantly, the study discovers that the decline of communism and party strategy adversely affected the electoral performances of the DC and PC!. The basic conclusion is that political factors primarily and directly contributed to the decline in electoral support for both parties, while societal factors (structural and subcultural changes) played a secondary and indirect role. While societal factors do not contribute directly to the decline in electoral support for both parties, they do provide the context within which both parties operated. In addition, the Italian party system is becoming more fragmented and traditional political parties are losing electoral support to new political movements, such as the Lega Nord (LN-Northern League) and the Rete (Network). The growing importance of the North-South and centre-periphery cleavages suggests that the Italian party system, which is traditionally based on religious and ideological cleavages, may be changing.

Perú - Partidos y outsiders. El proceso electoral peruano de 2006

El proceso electoral peruano del 2006 ha legitimado dos formas de hacer política: la política partidarizada que toma como base a los partidos más antiguos del sistema político (los mismos que han logrado reposicionarse luego de la década fujimorista); y la política del outsider antipartidario que toma como base un discurso crítico de la clase política y deja en un segundo plano la construcción de una propuesta orgánica e institucional. La política partidarizada subsiste a pesar de la prédica antipolítica del régimen fujimorista y del sistema partidario que colapsó en los noventa. Del mismo modo, la política del outsider permanece vigente a pesar de las reformas institucionales (Ley de Partidos Políticos) que se implementaron para evitar la fragmentación política y la incursión exitosa de estos nuevos políticos. Se establece así un “régimen de convivencia” luego de un período transicional inconcluso, que implementó tímidamente las reformas institucionales que no consiguieron fortalecer el sistema, y que estuvo signado por una constante inestabilidad política y conflictividad social.-----The 2006 Peruvian election process has legitimized two ways of going about politics: either a ‘partyist’ (or ‘partisan’) approach based on the older and more traditional parties of the political system (the same ones that have managed to reposition themselves after Fujimori’s decade), or the ‘outsider’s’ anti-party (or ‘anti-partisan’) approach which is based on a critical discourse of the extant political class, pushing aside the building-up of an institutional and organic proposal. The former type of politics survives in spite of the fervent anti-politics discourse of Fujimori’s regime and of the conspicuous collapse of the party system in the 1990’s. In much the same way, the outsiders’ politics remains in force in spite of institutional reforms (Ley de Partidos Políticos or “Political Parties Act”) which were implemented to avoid political fragmentation and/or the successful foray into the political arena of these new politicians. Thus, a “coexistence regime” has been established after an unfinished transitional period during which, very timidly, institutional reforms were implemented though they never really strengthened the system, and a regime which was marked by constant political instability and social upheaval.

In the shadow of Grexit: the Greek election of 17 June 2012

This article provides an overview and analysis of the Greek June 2012 elections. Placing the elections within the broader framework of the Greek socio-political and economic context, it discusses the electoral campaign and results, juxtaposing them to the 6 May electoral round. The election results confirmed many of the trends of the previous round, including electoral volatility, the fragmentation of the party system and the rise of anti-establishment forces. The main difference was the entrenchment of the pro- versus anti- bailout division and the prominence of the question of Greece’s continued Eurozone membership.

Breaching the social contract: crises of democratic representation and patterns of extreme right party support

Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to fascism experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-WWII Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by (a) carrying out a controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain and (b) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis, i.e. economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse.

The Conflict between Basescu and Tariceanu – A Governmental System Viewpoint

Semi-presidential systems of democratic governance risk ending up in a stalemate when it is not clear which of the two „heads” – head of State or head of Government – shall take the lead. The current political situation in Romania features some of the commonly observed characteristics of such an institutional blockade. However, after addressing these formal aspects of political Romania, the author argues for not forgetting to take into account the informal, actor-related factors. The nature of the Romanian political parties and party system seems to hinder the finding of a consensus needed to exit the self-imposed blockade. More specifically, it is the Democratic Party (PD) that is the key to understanding the recent developments. The Government of April the third has yet to prove its efficiency.

Ordnung muss nicht sein. Developments on the German political scene. OSW Commentary No. 55, 2011-06-27

The results of parliamentary elections in seven German federal states, ongoing since early 2011, show the collapse of the existing order on the German political scene, both on a national level and on the level of the individual federal states. So far, the federal states have been governed by one of the catch-all parties1 – i.e. the Christian Democrats or Social Democrats – in coalitions with smaller partners – the FDP and the Greens, respectively2. This year’s elections have fully revealed the extent of social transformation in Germany and its impact on voting preferences and the hitherto stable party system in this country. The largest and most popular parties so far – the CDU and the SPD – are losing the voters’ confidence and support, whereas the parties associated with protest movements (such as the Greens) are gaining prominence. Moreover, the German political scene is undergoing increasing fragmentation, as new small, local groups are appearing who have no political aspirations at the federal level but who are attractive to voters acting as successful groups of common cause. The changes in the existing balance of power on the German political scene are being sped up by the specific features of the federal system. Elections to the parliaments of the federal states are held at regular intervals which increasingly affects policies on the national level. The key decisions that concern domestic and foreign affairs are made under the pressure of constant election campaigns.

Age, Period and Cohort effects in the Decline of Party Identification in Germany

Party identification traditionally is seen as an important linkage mechanism, connecting voters to the party system. Previous analyses have suggested that the level of party identity is in decline in Germany, and in this article, we first expand previous observations with more recent data. These suggest that the erosion of party identity continues up to the present time. An age-period-cohort analysis of the panel data of the SOEP panel suggests that period effects are significantly negative. Furthermore, it can be observed that throughout the 1992-2009 observation period, education level and political interest have become more important determinants of party identity. Contrary to some of the literature, therefore, it can be shown that the loss of party identity is concentrated among groups with lower levels of political sophistication, indicating that the socio-economic profile of the group with a sense of party identification has become more distinct compared to the population as a whole. In the discussion, we investigate the theoretical and democratic consequences of this trend.