Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Alternatives to peace keeping in Korea: the role of non-state actors and face-to-face encounters

Korea is one of the world's most volatile areas, not least because traditional UN mediation and peacekeeping missions are impossible. Having intervened in the Korean War on behalf of the southern side, the UN is a party to the conflict, rather than a neutral arbiter. The situation is particularly problematic because political interactions are characterized by a high degree of state-control over security policy. In both parts of the peninsula the state has, at least until recently, exercised the exclusive right to deal with the opponent on the other side of the hermetically divided peninsula. Given these domestic and international constrains, alternative approaches to conflict resolution are urgently needed. The recently proliferating literature on human security offers possible solutions, for it urges policy makers to view security beyond the conventional military-based defence of the state and its territory. Using such a conceptual framework, the essay assesses the potential significance non-state interactions between North and South, particularly those that promote communication, information exchange and face-to-face encounters. Even though these interactions remain limited, they are of crucial importance, for they provide an opportunity to reduce the stereotypical threat images that continue to fuel conflict on the peninsula.

Governance in foreign policy-making in Germany and Poland and Polish-German relations:the role of non-state actors

This thesis examines the influence of non-state actors on Polish-German relations by considering foreign policy-making towards Poland in Germany and vice versa. The approach chosen for this thesis is interdisciplinary and takes into consideration literature from domestic politics (Area Studies), Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations (IR). The thesis argues that IR, by purely looking into the quality of inter-state relations, too often treats these relations as a result of policies emanating from the relevant governments, without considering the policies’ background. Therefore, the thesis argues that it is necessary to engage with the domestic factors which might explain where foreign policies come from. It points out that non-state actors influence governments’ choices by supplying resources, and by cooperating or competing with the government on an issue at stake. In order to determine the degree of influence that non-state actors can have on foreign policymaking two variables are examined: the institutionalisation of the state relations in question; and the domestic structures of the relevant states. Specifically, the thesis examines the institutionalisation of Polish-German relations, and examines Germany’s and Poland’s domestic structures and their effect on the two states’ foreign policy-making in general. Thereafter, the thesis uses case studies in order to unravel the influence of non-state actors on specific foreign policies. Three case studies are examined in detail: (i) Poland’s EU accession negotiations with regard to the free movement of capital chapter of the acquis communautaire; (ii) Germany’s EU 2004 Eastern Enlargement negotiations with regard to the free movement of workers chapter of the acquis communautaire; and (iii) Germany’s decision to establsh a permanent exhibition in Berlin that will depict the expulsions of millions of Germans from the East following WWII.

Comparative Analysis of State and Non-State Higher Educational Institutions in Terms of their Adaptation to New Societal Conditions in Post-Soviet Russia

The present paper investigates post-Soviet non-state and state higher educational institutions in terms of students’ perceptions of school curriculum, quality of teaching, available educational resources and overall organization in their higher educational institutions.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Shadow policing: the boundaries of community-based ‘policing’ in Northern Ireland

The intention of this article is to provide a structural and operational analysis of policing beyond the police in Northern Ireland. While the polity enjoys low levels of ‘officially’ recorded crime as part of its post-conflict status, little empirical analysis exists as to the epistemological roots of security production outside that of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The empirical evidence presented seeks to establish that beyond more prominent analyses related to paramilitary ‘policing’, the country is in fact replete with a substantial reservoir of legitimate civil society policing – the collective mass of which contributes to policing, community safety and quality of life issues. While such non-state policing at the level of locale was recognised by the Independent Commission for Policing, structured understandings have rarely permeated governmental or academic discourse beyond anecdotal contentions. Thus, the present argument provides an empirical assessment of the complex, non-state policing landscape beyond the formal state apparatus; examines definitions and structures of such community-based policing activities; and explores issues related to co-opting this non-state security ‘otherness’ into more formal relations with the state.

Diversifying From Within: Community Policing and the Governance of Security in Northern Ireland

The subtle and complex nature of Northern Ireland's transitional landscape presents acute difficulties for the community policing concept. As the core to the police reforms in the country, its implementation has faltered in the face of institutional inertia within the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). This has been further exacerbated by a failure of the police to adequately increase the co-production of security through improved engagement and utilization of Northern Ireland's diverse community infrastructures. This paper will assess the delivery of community policing by the PSNI, while exploring their engagement with Northern Ireland's grass-roots community organizations, and specifically those involved with the governance of security at the local level. Thus, through a framework of adaptation, engagement and delivery of community policing by the PSNI within the unique context of Northern Ireland's security ‘otherness’, the paper will explore the key issues to police–community interaction associated with the broader vision of the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) on community policing.

‘State failure’ and the extraterritorial use of force in self-defence against non-state actors

The thesis is first and foremost the examination of the notion and consequences of ‘state failure’ in international law. The disputes surrounding criteria for creation and recognition of states pertain to efforts to analyse legal and factual issues unravelling throughout the continuing existence of states, as best evidenced by the ‘state failure’ phenomenon. It is argued that although the ‘statehood’ of failed states remains uncontested, their sovereignty is increasingly considered to be dependent on the existence of effective governments. The second part of this thesis focuses on the examinations of the legal consequences of the continuing existence of failed states in the context of jus ad bellum. Since the creation of the United Nations the ability of states to resort to armed force without violating what might be considered as the single most important norm of international law, has been considerably limited. State failure and increasing importance of non-state actors has become a greatly topical issue within recent years in both scholarship and the popular imagination. There have been important legal developments within international law, which have provoked much academic, and in particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis contributes to this commentary. Despite the fact that the international community continues to perpetuate a notion of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric system of international law to exist, when dealing with practical and political realities of state failure, international law may no longer consider external sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement to statehood. Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is whether the implicit and explicit invocation of the state failure provides sufficient legal basis for the intervention in self-defence against non-state actors in located in failed states. It has been argued that state failure has a profound impact, the extent of which is yet to be fully explored, on the modern landscape of peace and security.

Level of implementation of best practice policies for creating healthy food environments: assessment by state and non-state actors in Thailand

OBJECTIVE: To determine and compare the level of implementation of policies for healthy food environments in Thailand with reference to international best practice by state and non-state actors.
DESIGN: Data on the current level of implementation of food environment policies were assessed independently using the adapted Healthy Food Environment Policy Index (Food-EPI) by two groups of actors. Concrete actions were proposed for Thai Government. A joint meeting between both groups was subsequently held to reach consensus on priority actions.
SETTING: Thailand.
SUBJECTS: Thirty state actors and twenty-seven non-state actors.
RESULTS: Level of policy implementation varied across different domains and actor groups. State actors rated implementation levels higher than non-state actors. Both state and non-state actors rated level of implementation of monitoring of BMI highest. Level of implementation of policies promoting in-store availability of healthy foods and policies increasing tax on unhealthy foods were rated lowest by state and non-state actors, respectively. Both groups reached consensus on eleven priority actions for implementation, focusing on food provision in public-sector settings, food composition, food promotion, leadership, monitoring and intelligence, and food trade.
CONCLUSIONS: Although the implementation gaps identified and priority actions proposed varied between state and non-state actors, both groups achieved consensus on a comprehensive food policy package to be implemented by the Thai Government to improve the healthiness of food environments. This consensus is a platform for continued policy dialogue towards cross-sectoral policy coherence and effective actions to address the growing burden of non-communicable diseases and obesity in Thailand.

Non-apologies and prolonged silences in post-conflict settings: The case of post-colonial Cyprus

Despite the growing use of apologies in post-conflict settings, cases of non-apology remain unaddressed and continue to puzzle scholars. This article focuses on the absence of apology by non-state and anti-state actors by examining the case of the Cypriot armed group EOKA, which has refused to offer an apology to the civilian victims of its ‘anti-colonial’ struggle (1955–1959). Using field data and parliamentary debates, and drawing on comparisons, this article analyses the factors that contributed to a lack of apology. It is argued that the inherited timelessness of Greek nationalism, and the impression of a perpetual need for defence, set up textbook conditions for the development of a hegemonic discourse and prevented an apology for human rights violations.