Design pédagogique et jeux vidéo : recherche exploratoire pour le développement d’un modèle soutenant le design pédagogique dans les jeux vidéo non éducatifs

Le design pédagogique dans les jeux vidéo non éducatifs est une discipline en mal de définitions et de méthodes. Contrairement à celui que l’on trouve dans les écoles ou autres institutions de formation, le design pédagogique pour les jeux vidéo non éducatifs est fait par des designers de jeux qui n’ont souvent aucune formation en enseignement. Un modèle de design pédagogique pour les jeux vidéo non éducatifs est donc développé dans ce mémoire, à partir d’une recherche exploratoire utilisant l’analyse de contenu de jeux vidéo et les théories de la science de l’éducation. Étant donné les ressources limitées disponibles pour le développement du modèle, la présente recherche pourra servir de base à la construction d’un modèle plus élaboré sur un sujet semblable, offrira des pistes intéressantes de recherche sur l’enseignement par le jeu et pourra soutenir les designers de jeu lors de la planification du design pédagogique dans leurs jeux.

Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem µa la Cournot

In this paper, we consider an exchange economy µa la Shitovitz (1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and known as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. We show, with an example, that even when atoms are countably in¯nite, any Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocation of the game is not a Walras equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy. Accordingly, in the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we par- tially replicate the mixed exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms, without a®ecting the atomless part, and ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market games associated with the partially replicated exchange economies approximates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange economy.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Conocer las emociones a través de juegos: ayuda para los futuros docentes en la toma de decisiones

Introducción. El objetivo de este estudio fue proporcionar orientaciones para ayudar a profesionales de la educación física a tomar decisiones en torno a las emociones que produjeron diferentes juegos deportivos clasificados en cuatro dominios de acción motriz (psicomotor, cooperación, oposición y cooperación/oposición). Método. La muestra correspondió a 284 estudiantes universitarios de educación física y de educación primaria (INEFC, Facultad de Educación, Universidades de Lleida y de Barcelona, España). A través de un diseño cuasi-experimental los estudiantes indicaron en un cuestionario validado la intensidad sentida en trece emociones tras participar en cada juego. El análisis de los datos se realizó a través de los árboles de clasificación. Resultados. La comparación de los resultados en los diferentes dominios de acción motor mostró que los juegos cooperativos fueron los que activaron emociones positivas más intensas entre los estudiantes. En los juegos no competitivos de cooperación los resultados en emociones positivas fueron 18.3 % más elevados que en los juegos competitivos. Conclusión. Los resultados sugieren que el tipo de juegos a elegir es la primera decisión importante que debería plantearse para educar emociones en los estudiantes. Cada dominio de acción motriz está asociado a la producción de diferentes tipos de emoción.

The relation between video game violence and aggression

Experimental research has shown that playing violent video games produces higher levels of aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and aggressive behavior (in the short-term) than non-violent video games (see Anderson, Gentile & Buckley, 2007). However, there are two major limitations with these studies. First, the majority of experimental studies that have compared the effects of violent versus non-violent video games on aggression have failed to equate these games in terms of competitiveness, difficulty, and pace of action. Thus, although the common finding is that violent video games produce higher levels of aggression than nonviolent video games, other unmatched factors beyond the actual violent content may be responsible for the elevated levels of aggression. Second, previous experimental studies have tended to use a measure of aggression that may also measure competitiveness, leading to questions about whether violent video games are related to aggression or competitiveness. The present thesis addressed these two issues by fIrst equating a violent and non-violent video game on competitiveness, difficulty and pace of action in Experiment I , and then comparing the effect of each game on aggressive behavior using an unambiguous measure of aggressive behavior (i.e., the Hot Sauce Paradigm). We found that video game violence was not sufficient to elevate aggressive behavior compared to a non-violent video game. Practical implications and directions for future research are discussed.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Comparative advantage in demand: Experimental evidence of preferences for genetically modified food in the United States and European Union

The United States (US) exports more than US$6 billion in agricultural commodities to the European Union (EU) each year, but one issue carries the potential to diminish this trade: use of biotechnology in food production. The EU has adopted more stringent policies towards biotechnology than the US. Understanding differences in European and American policies towards genetically modified (GM) foods requires a greater understanding of consumers' attitudes and preferences. This paper reports results from the first large-scale, cross-Atlantic study to analyse consumer demand for genetically modified food in a non-hypothetical market environment. We strongly reject the frequent if convenient assumption in trade theory that consumer preferences are identical across countries: the median level of compensation demanded by English and French consumers to consume a GM food is found to be more than twice that in any of the US locations. Results have important implications for trade theory, which typically focusses on differences in specialization, comparative advantage and factor endowments across countries, and for on-going trade disputes at the World Trade Organization.

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2007: 2008 trends

Includes bibliography

Context-sensitive analysis without calling-context

Since Sharir and Pnueli, algorithms for context-sensitivity have been defined in terms of 'valid' paths in an interprocedural flow graph. The definition of valid paths requires atomic call and ret statements, and encapsulated procedures. Thus, the resulting algorithms are not directly applicable when behavior similar to call and ret instructions may be realized using non-atomic statements, or when procedures do not have rigid boundaries, such as with programs in low level languages like assembly or RTL. We present a framework for context-sensitive analysis that requires neither atomic call and ret instructions, nor encapsulated procedures. The framework presented decouples the transfer of control semantics and the context manipulation semantics of statements. A new definition of context-sensitivity, called stack contexts, is developed. A stack context, which is defined using trace semantics, is more general than Sharir and Pnueli's interprocedural path based calling-context. An abstract interpretation based framework is developed to reason about stack-contexts and to derive analogues of calling-context based algorithms using stack-context. The framework presented is suitable for deriving algorithms for analyzing binary programs, such as malware, that employ obfuscations with the deliberate intent of defeating automated analysis. The framework is used to create a context-sensitive version of Venable et al.'s algorithm for analyzing x86 binaries without requiring that a binary conforms to a standard compilation model for maintaining procedures, calls, and returns. Experimental results show that a context-sensitive analysis using stack-context performs just as well for programs where the use of Sharir and Pnueli's calling-context produces correct approximations. However, if those programs are transformed to use call obfuscations, a contextsensitive analysis using stack-context still provides the same, correct results and without any additional overhead. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011.

Foundations of macroeconomic policy coordination: fostering dialogue as a policy tool in Latin America

Includes bibliography

As múltiplas fontes de renda e a pluriatividade nos bairros Aeroporto, Cedro, Córrego da Onça, Ponte Alta e Gramado no município de Presidente Prudente-SP

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Defining Europe's Capital Markets Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/12, 13 November 2014

The new European Commission has signalled that it will work to create a ‘capital markets union’. This is understood as an agenda to expand the non-bank part of Europe’s financial system, which is currently underdeveloped. The aim in the short term is to unlock credit provision as banks are deleveraging, and in the longer term, to favour a more diverse, competitive and resilient financial system. Direct regulation of individual non-bank market segments (such as securitisation, private placements or private equity) might be useful at the margin, but will not per se lead to significant capital markets development or the rebalancing of Europe’s financial system away from the current dominance by banks. To reach these goals, the capital markets union agenda must be broadened to address the framework conditions for the development of individual market segments. Six possible areas for policy initiative are, in increasing order of potential impact and political difficulty: regulation of securities and specific forms of intermediation; prudential regulation, especially of insurance companies and pension funds; regulation of accounting, auditing and financial transparency requirements that apply to companies that seek external finance; a supervisory framework for financial infrastructure firms, such as central counterparties, that supports market integration; partial harmonisation and improvement of insolvency and corporate restructuring frameworks;and partial harmonisation or convergence of tax policies that specifically affect financial investment.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.