Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Uma interpretação da psicogênese e da sociogênese do desenvolvimento moral

O objetivo deste estudo volta-se para uma análise a nível teórico,da construção de normas. constitutivas do sistema moral aptas a direcionarem a conduta humana. Três referenciais básicos foram estabelecidos como pla taformas para o estudo: A Crítica da Razão Prática de I. Kant e a avaliação do caráter neces5ário da norma. bem como a dificuldade de transpor para o plano histórico e empírico. critérios de universalidade inerentes ao "imperativo categórico". A categorização dos valores de E. Spranger forneceu elementos para proceder a uma análise da sociogênese das normas, partindo de critérios valorativos. culturalmente estabelecidos, aptos a quantificar conteúdos para a moral. Finalmente. a perspectiva piagetiana ofereceu as bases para uma avaliação da psicogênese como construção formal dos sistemas de regras, que compõem a moral humana. O estudo aqui realizado estabelece seus próprios limites dentro dos três contextos acima selecionados por constituirem uma interpretação prefixada que viza harmonizar tais posiçoes. Estas fronteiras. assim definidas. justificam portanto o caráter circunscrito. e sem pretensões de ser exaustivo na matéria que o presente trabalho se propõe evidenciar.

Negotiating social and moral order in internet relay chat

Although internet chat is a significant aspect of many internet users’ lives, the manner in which participants in quasi-synchronous chat situations orient to issues of social and moral order remains to be studied in depth. The research presented here is therefore at the forefront of a continually developing area of study. This work contributes new insights into how members construct and make accountable the social and moral orders of an adult-oriented Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel by addressing three questions: (1) What conversational resources do participants use in addressing matters of social and moral order? (2) How are these conversational resources deployed within IRC interaction? and (3) What interactional work is locally accomplished through use of these resources? A survey of the literature reveals considerable research in the field of computer-mediated communication, exploring both asynchronous and quasi-synchronous discussion forums. The research discussed represents a range of communication interests including group and collaborative interaction, the linguistic construction of social identity, and the linguistic features of online interaction. It is suggested that the present research differs from previous studies in three ways: (1) it focuses on the interaction itself, rather than the ways in which the medium affects the interaction; (2) it offers turn-by-turn analysis of interaction in situ; and (3) it discusses membership categories only insofar as they are shown to be relevant by participants through their talk. Through consideration of the literature, the present study is firmly situated within the broader computer-mediated communication field. Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and membership categorization analysis were adopted as appropriate methodological approaches to explore the research focus on interaction in situ, and in particular to investigate the ways in which participants negotiate and co-construct social and moral orders in the course of their interaction. IRC logs collected from one chat room were analysed using a two-pass method, based on a modification of the approaches proposed by Pomerantz and Fehr (1997) and ten Have (1999). From this detailed examination of the data corpus three interaction topics are identified by means of which participants clearly orient to issues of social and moral order: challenges to rule violations, ‘trolling’ for cybersex, and experiences regarding the 9/11 attacks. Instances of these interactional topics are subjected to fine-grained analysis, to demonstrate the ways in which participants draw upon various interactional resources in their negotiation and construction of channel social and moral orders. While these analytical topics stand alone in individual focus, together they illustrate different instances in which participants’ talk serves to negotiate social and moral orders or collaboratively construct new orders. Building on the work of Vallis (2001), Chapter 5 illustrates three ways that rule violation is initiated as a channel discussion topic: (1) through a visible violation in open channel, (2) through an official warning or sanction by a channel operator regarding the violation, and (3) through a complaint or announcement of a rule violation by a non-channel operator participant. Once the topic has been initiated, it is shown to become available as a topic for others, including the perceived violator. The fine-grained analysis of challenges to rule violations ultimately demonstrates that channel participants orient to the rules as a resource in developing categorizations of both the rule violation and violator. These categorizations are contextual in that they are locally based and understood within specific contexts and practices. Thus, it is shown that compliance with rules and an orientation to rule violations as inappropriate within the social and moral orders of the channel serves two purposes: (1) to orient the speaker as a group member, and (2) to reinforce the social and moral orders of the group. Chapter 6 explores a particular type of rule violation, solicitations for ‘cybersex’ known in IRC parlance as ‘trolling’. In responding to trolling violations participants are demonstrated to use affiliative and aggressive humour, in particular irony, sarcasm and insults. These conversational resources perform solidarity building within the group, positioning non-Troll respondents as compliant group members. This solidarity work is shown to have three outcomes: (1) consensus building, (2) collaborative construction of group membership, and (3) the continued construction and negotiation of existing social and moral orders. Chapter 7, the final data analysis chapter, offers insight into how participants, in discussing the events of 9/11 on the actual day, collaboratively constructed new social and moral orders, while orienting to issues of appropriate and reasonable emotional responses. This analysis demonstrates how participants go about ‘doing being ordinary’ (Sacks, 1992b) in formulating their ‘first thoughts’ (Jefferson, 2004). Through sharing their initial impressions of the event, participants perform support work within the interaction, in essence working to normalize both the event and their initial misinterpretation of it. Normalising as a support work mechanism is also shown in relation to participants constructing the ‘quiet’ following the event as unusual. Normalising is accomplished by reference to the indexical ‘it’ and location formulations, which participants use both to negotiate who can claim to experience the ‘unnatural quiet’ and to identify the extent of the quiet. Through their talk participants upgrade the quiet from something legitimately experienced by one person in a particular place to something that could be experienced ‘anywhere’, moving the phenomenon from local to global provenance. With its methodological design and detailed analysis and findings, this research contributes to existing knowledge in four ways. First, it shows how rules are used by participants as a resource in negotiating and constructing social and moral orders. Second, it demonstrates that irony, sarcasm and insults are three devices of humour which can be used to perform solidarity work and reinforce existing social and moral orders. Third, it demonstrates how new social and moral orders are collaboratively constructed in relation to extraordinary events, which serve to frame the event and evoke reasonable responses for participants. And last, the detailed analysis and findings further support the use of conversation analysis and membership categorization as valuable methods for approaching quasi-synchronous computer-mediated communication.

"Well, now I'm upset": Moral and social orders in the playground

There is much still to learn about how young children’s membership with peers shapes their constructions of moral and social obligations within everyday activities in the school playground. This paper investigates how a small group of girls, aged four to six years, account for their everyday social interactions in the playground. They were video-recorded as they participated in a pretend game of school. Several days later, a video-recorded excerpt of the interaction was shown to them and invited to comment on what was happening in the video. This conversation was audio-recorded. Drawing on a conversation analysis approach, this chapter shows that, despite their discontent and complaining about playing the game of school, the girls’ actions showed their continued orientation to the particular codes of the game, of ‘no going away’ and ‘no telling’. By making relevant these codes, jointly constructed by the girls during the interview, they managed each other’s continued participation within two arenas of action: the pretend, as a player in a pretend game of school; and the real, as a classroom member of a peer group. Through inferences to explicit and implicit codes of conduct, moral obligations were invoked as the girls attempted to socially exclude or build alliances with others, and enforce their own social position. As well, a shared history that the girls re-constructed has moral implications for present and future relationships. The girls oriented to the history as an interactional resource for accounting for their actions in the pretend game. This paper uncovers how children both participate in, and shape, their everyday social worlds through talk and interaction and the consequences a taken-for-granted activity such as playing school has for their moral and social positions in the peer group.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

Data-driven impostor selection for T-norm score normalisation and the background dataset in SVM-based speaker verification

A data-driven background dataset refinement technique was recently proposed for SVM based speaker verification. This method selects a refined SVM background dataset from a set of candidate impostor examples after individually ranking examples by their relevance. This paper extends this technique to the refinement of the T-norm dataset for SVM-based speaker verification. The independent refinement of the background and T-norm datasets provides a means of investigating the sensitivity of SVM-based speaker verification performance to the selection of each of these datasets. Using refined datasets provided improvements of 13% in min. DCF and 9% in EER over the full set of impostor examples on the 2006 SRE corpus with the majority of these gains due to refinement of the T-norm dataset. Similar trends were observed for the unseen data of the NIST 2008 SRE.

Queensland Aborigines, multiple realities and the social sources of suffering: Psychiatry and moral regions of being (Part 1)

This two part paper considers the experience of a range of magico-religious experiences (such as visions and voices) and spirit beliefs in a rural Aboriginal town. The papers challenge the tendency of institutionalised psychiatry to medicalise the experiences and critiques the way in which its individualistic practice is intensified in the face of an incomprehensible Aboriginal „other‟ to become part of the power imbalance that characterises the relationship between Indigenous and white domains. The work reveals the internal differentiation and politics of the Aboriginal domain, as the meanings of these experiences and actions are contested and negotiated by the residents and in so doing they decentre the concerns of the white domain and attempt to control their relationship with it. Thus the plausibility structure that sustains these multiple realities reflects both accommodation and resistance to the material and historical conditions imposed and enacted by mainstream society on the residents, and to current socio- political realities. I conclude that the residents‟ narratives chart the grounds of moral adjudication as the experiences were rarely conceptualised by local people as signs of individual pathology but as reflections of social reality. Psychiatric drug therapy and the behaviourist assumptions underlying its practice posit atomised individuals as the appropriate site of intervention as against the multiple realities revealed by the phenomenology of the experiences. The papers thus call into question Australian mainstream „commonsense‟ that circulates about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people which justifies representations of them as sickly outcasts in Australian society.

The role of emotional intelligence in moral judgement

In this study we investigated the potential role of emotional intelligence (EI) in moral reasoning (MR). A sample of 131 undergraduate students completed a battery of psychological tests, which included measures of EI, MR and the Big Five dimensions of personality. Results revealed support for a proposed model of the relationship between emotional intelligence, personality and moral reasoning. Specifically, emotional intelligence was found to be a significant predictor of four of the Big Five personality dimensions (extraversion, openness, neuroticism, agreeableness), which in turn were significant predictors of moral reasoning. These results have important implications in regards to our current understanding of the relationships between EI, moral reasoning and personality. We emphasise the need to incorporate the constructs of EI and moral reasoning into a broader, explanatory personality framework.

Leading with moral purpose : insights from community leaders

Leadership has been described as having a moral purpose. This paper argues that theoretical insights from ethical leadership theory and empowerment theory are useful for understanding the work of community leaders. Community leaders tend to be people who are known mainly to their immediate community, work in a voluntary capacity and are committed to a particular goal or cause. The paper begins by referring to Starratt’s (1996) framework that comprises three inter-related ethics: an ethic of care, critique and justice, each of which is said to constitute ethical leadership. It then explores insights from empowerment theory since it is argued that it has some strong connections to ethical leadership. Central to both perspectives is the notion of relationships and ‘power to’ where power is shared and where people work together for change. Based on interviews with nine grassroots voluntary community leaders, this paper contributes to the limited research in the community leadership field by understanding more fully their values, beliefs and leadership practices. It is argued that the insights of ethical leadership and empowerment theory are highly relevant to explain their work and practice. The paper concludes by discussing some implications for leaders in educational settings.

Broad Bean Mottle Virus: Identification, Serology, Host Range, and Occurrence on Faba Bean (Vicia Faba) in West Asia and Norm Africa

One of the faba bean viruses found in West Asia and North Africa was identified as broad bean mottle virus (BBMV) by host reactions, particle morphology and size, serology, and granular, often vesiculated cytoplasmic inclusions. Detailed research on four isolates, one each from Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Syria, provided new information on the virus. The isolates, though indistinguishable in ELISA or gel-diffusion tests, differed slightly in host range and symptoms. Twenty-one species (12 legumes and 9 non-legumes) out of 27 tested were systemically infected, and 14 of these by all four isolates. Infection in several species was symptomless, but major legumes such as chickpea, lentil and especially pea, suffered severely from infection. All 23 genotypes of faba bean, 2 of chickpea, 4 of lentil, 11 out of 21 of Phaseolus bean, and 16 out of 17 of pea were systemically sensitive to the virus. Twelve plant species were found to be new potential hosts and cucumber a new local-lesion test plant of the virus. BBMV particles occurred in faba bean plants in very high concentrations and seed transmission in this species (1.37%) was confirmed. An isolate from Syria was purified and two antisera were produced, one of which was used in ELISA to detect BBMV in faba bean field samples. Two hundred and three out of the 789 samples with symptoms suggestive of virus infection collected in 1985, 1986 and 1987, were found infected with BBMV: 4 out of 70 (4/70) tested samples from Egypt, 0/44 from Lebanon, 1/15 from Morocco, 46/254 from Sudan, 72/269 from Syria and 80/137 from Tunisia. This is the first report on its occurrence in Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. The virus is a potential threat to crop improvement in the region.

The social context of motorcycle riding and the key determinants influencing rider behaviour : a qualitative investigation

Objective: Given the increasing popularity of motorcycle riding and heightened risk of injury or death associated with being a rider, this study explored rider behaviour as a determinant of rider safety and, in particular, key beliefs and motivations which influence such behaviour. To enhance the effectiveness of future education and training interventions, it is important to understand riders’ own views about what influences how they ride. Specifically, this study sought to identify key determinants of riders’ behaviour in relation to the social context of riding including social and identity-related influences relating to the group (group norms and group identity) as well as the self (moral/personal norm and self-identity). ----- ----- Method: Qualitative research was undertaken via group discussions with motorcycle riders (n = 41). Results: The findings revealed that those in the group with which one rides represent an important source of social influence. Also, the motorcyclist (group) identity was associated with a range of beliefs, expectations, and behaviours considered to be normative. Exploration of the construct of personal norm revealed that riders were most cognizant of the “wrong things to do” when riding; among those issues raised was the importance of protective clothing (albeit for the protection of others and, in particular, pillion passengers). Finally, self-identity as a motorcyclist appeared to be important to a rider’s self-concept and was likely to influence their on-road behaviour. ----- ----- Conclusion: Overall, the insight provided by the current study may facilitate the development of interventions including rider training as well as public education and mass media messages. The findings suggest that these interventions should incorporate factors associated with the social nature of riding in order to best align it with some of the key beliefs and motivations underpinning riders’ on-road behaviours.

Out of time: The moral temporality of sex, crime and taboo

This paper discusses the relationship between law and morality. Morality does not necessarily coincide with the law, but it contributes to it. An act may be legal but nevertheless considered to be immoral in a particular society. For example, the use of pornography may be considered by many to be immoral. Nevertheless, the sale and distribution of non-violent, non-child related, sexually explicit material is legal (or regulated) in many jurisdictions. Many laws are informed by, and even created by, morality. This paper examines the historical influence of morality on the law and on society in general. It aims to develop a theoretical framework for examining legal moralism and the social construction of morality and crime as well as the relationship between sex, desire and taboo. Here, we refer to the moral temporality of sex and taboo, which examines the way in which moral judgments about sex and what is considered taboo change over time, and the kinds of justifications that are employed in support of changing moralities. It unpacks the way in which abstract and highly tenuous concepts such as ‘‘desire’’, ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘entertainment’’ may be ‘‘out of time’’ with morality, and how morality shapes laws over time, fabricating justifications from within socially constructed communities of practice. This theoretical framework maps the way in which these concepts have become temporally dominated by heteronormative structures such as the family, marriage, reproduction, and longevity. It is argued that the logic of these structures is inexorably tied to the heterosexual life-path, charting individual lives and relationships through explicit phases of childhood, adolescence and adulthood that, in the twenty-first century, delimit the boundaries of taboo surrounding sex more than any other time in history.