Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU reform proposals. CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015

After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour.

Megmenthető-e az euróövezet? (Can the eurozone be saved?)

Az euró válságának szélesebb globális összefüggései vannak, mind a kiváltó okait, mind a nemzetközi pénzügyi rendszer működésének hiányosságait illetően. Az európai monetáris integráció szilárd reálgazdasági alapokon nyugszik. Az euró teljesítménye mind az árstabilitás, mind az árfolyamok ingadozása tekintetében megfelelőnek tekinthető. Az euróválság szuverénadósság-válság, és leginkább a zóna egyes (déli) országait érinti. Az euróválság okai többrétűek: ezek között az eurózóna hibás konstrukcióját, téves koncepcionális feltételezéseit, a politikai kompromisszumokkal folyamatosan megnyomorított működését említhetjük leginkább. A közös pénz önmagában nem oka a válságnak és nem is bűvös ellenszer. A hibás gazdaságpolitikáért belül ugyanúgy bűnhődni kell, mint kívül. Görögország, vagy Írország elsősorban nem azért került válságba, mert tagjai az eurózónának, hanem mert hibás gazdaságpolitikát folytattak. Nem zárható ki az eurózóna szétesése, de kicsi az esélye. / === / The euro crisis has broad global connections, both in terms of deficiencies of the international monetary system, and of the crisis of the global financial markets. The European monetary integration is based on strong real-economic foundations. The performance of the euro has been satisfactory both in terms of price and exchange rate stability. The present crisis is a sovereign debt crisis, and it is concentrated mainly on some Southern members. The causes of the crisis are manifold: wrong institutional and policy structures, mistaken conceptual assumptions, and the distortion of its operation by continuous political compromises. The contradictions between common monetary policy and the national fiscal policies, the failure of disciplining role of the markets, the weakness of control of national fiscal policies, the dangers of "one size fits all" monetary policy, the failure of finding the proper national policy mixes, particularly in terms of income and structural policies, and the underestimation of social and cultural differences, can be particularly stressed. The common monetary policy failed to secure the necessary equilibrium among liquidity, stability and growth. Greece and Ireland got in crisis not because they are members of the euro zone, but because of their mistaken economic policies. The collapse of the euro zone cannot be excluded, but the chances of it are limited.

Why did London become the main money market? Monetary Policy, Arbitrage and European Money Market Integration in 18th century

How did the leading capital market start to attract international bullion? Why did London become the main money market? Monetary regulations, including the charges for minting money and the restrictions on bullion exchange, have played the key role in defining the direction of the flow of international bullion. Countries that abolished minting charges and permitted the free movement of bullion were able to attract international bullion, and countries that applied minting taxes suffered an outflow of bullion. In these cases monetary authorities tried to limit bullion movement through prohibitions on domestic bullion exchange at a free price, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions on bullion exports. The paper illustrates the logic of international monetary flow in the 18th century, using empirical evidence for England, France and Spain. The first section defines and measures monetary policy, and the second section introduces minting charges into the arbitrage equation in order to explain the logic of bullion flow between the pairs of nations England-France, England-Spain and France-Spain. The conclusion emphasises the importance of monetary policy in the creation of leading money markets.

Effects of a monetary union on a small peripheral country: Stabilization and competitiveness in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

EMU, EU, Market Integration and Consumption Smoothing

We take a new approach to the study of the impact of EMU on consumption smoothing. Rather than relying on inferences based on the behavior of consumption levels or growth, we focus on consumption volatility and therefore on smoothing more directly. Consequently, we find that even though EMU tends to smooth consumption, it is not through cross-country property and claims. Rather it comes through the promotion of the tradability of goods, capital in particular: specifically, the encouragement of price competition, contestable home markets, ability to borrow and buy insurance at home, and the harmonization of regulations. Some of the consumption smoothing may also depend on EU membership rather than EMU as such but EMU adds to it. As a fundamental part of the analysis, the paper uses a new index of currency union which focuses on the ratio of trade with other countries sharing the same currency relative to total foreign trade.

A fractionally integrated approach to monetary policy and inflation dynamics

This paper relaxes the standard I(0) and I(1) assumptions typically stated in the monetary VAR literature by considering a richer framework that encompasses the previous two processes as well as other fractionally integrated possibilities. First, a timevarying multivariate spectrum is estimated for post WWII US data. Then, a structural fractionally integrated VAR (VARFIMA) is fitted to each of the resulting time dependent spectra. In this way, both the coefficients of the VAR and the innovation variances are allowed to evolve freely. The model is employed to analyze inflation persistence and to evaluate the stance of US monetary policy. Our findings indicate a strong decline in the innovation variances during the great disinflation, consistent with the view that the good performance of the economy during the 80’s and 90’s is in part a tale of good luck. However, we also find evidence of a decline in inflation persistence together with a stronger monetary response to inflation during the same period. This last result suggests that the Fed may still play a role in accounting for the observed differences in the US inflation history. Finally, we conclude that previous evidence against drifting coefficients could be an artifact of parameter restriction towards the stationary region. Keywords: monetary policy, inflation persistence, fractional integration, timevarying coefficients, VARFIMA. JEL Classification: E52, C32

Term structure of interest rates. European financial integration

In this paper we estimate, analyze and compare the term structures of interest rates in six different countries over the period 1992-2004. We apply the Nelson-Siegel model to obtain the term structures of interest rates at weekly intervals. A total of 4,038 curves are estimated and analyzed. Four European Monetary Union countries¿Spain, France, Germany and Italy¿are included. The UK is also included as a European non-member of the Monetary Union. Finally the US completes the analysis. The goal is to determine the differences in the shapes of the term structure of interest rates among these countries. Likewise, we can determine the most usual term structure shapes that appear for each country.*****

Term structure of interest rates. European financial integration

In this paper we estimate, analyze and compare the term structures of interest rates in six different countries over the period 1992-2004. We apply the Nelson-Siegel model to obtain the term structures of interest rates at weekly intervals. A total of 4,038 curves are estimated and analyzed. Four European Monetary Union countries¿Spain, France, Germany and Italy¿are included. The UK is also included as a European non-member of the Monetary Union. Finally the US completes the analysis. The goal is to determine the differences in the shapes of the term structure of interest rates among these countries. Likewise, we can determine the most usual term structure shapes that appear for each country.*****

Financial integration and TARGET2-Securities – A stakeholder approach

The purpose of this study was to analyze how different stakeholders, such as the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Central Securities Depositories Association, the Bank of International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund, have influenced the European financial integration in the area of securities clearing and settlement since the introduction of the single currency. The results show that the contribution differs from stakeholder to another and can take the form of standards and recommendations, legislation, research and publications, risk analysis etc. The Eurosystem has been particularly active in this area by proving and planning central bank services, such as TARGET2, CCMB2 and T2S. Along the way the development has and continues to face challenges that need to be solved by European authorities. Coordination is a key factor for the future as we have seen during the recent financial turmoil.

Neural basis of the undermining effect of monetary reward on intrinsic motivation

Contrary to the widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward incentives, some studies have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward can actually undermine a person's intrinsic motivation to engage in a task. This “undermining effect” has timely practical implications, given the burgeoning of performance-based incentive systems in contemporary society. It also presents a theoretical challenge for economic and reinforcement learning theories, which tend to assume that monetary incentives monotonically increase motivation. Despite the practical and theoretical importance of this provocative phenomenon, however, little is known about its neural basis. Herein we induced the behavioral undermining effect using a newly developed task, and we tracked its neural correlates using functional MRI. Our results show that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the number of voluntary engagements in the task. We found that activity in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system underlies the undermining effect through the integration of extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value.

Financial integration and public financial institutions

This article highlights the problems associated with the existence of financiai institutions owned by a State which is a member of a federation. We show that these financiai institutions allow the States to transfer deficits to the federal government. This possibility creates incentives to higher deficits at State and federal leveis, implying an inefficiently high inflation rate. The main policy implication is that stabilization policies are more difficult to be implemented in countries such as Brazil, and Argentina which allow the members of the federation to own financiai institutions. A second policy implication is that Economic Blocks such as the European Community or Mercosur should not allow regional central banks if they create a monetary authority to help the members in financiai difficulty.

Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010-2011: Internacional integration and macroeconomic policy challenges amid global economic turmoil

Includes bibliography

Regional integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate regime in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Regional integration in Latin America and dynamic gains from macroeconomic cooperation

Includes bibliography