Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2010 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 9, 2009

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2011 Qualified Allocation Plan, November 29, 2010

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2012 Qualified Allocation Plan, December 8, 2011

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2013 Qualified Allocation Plan, October 9, 2012

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2014 Qualified Allocation Plan, October 2, 2013

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 4% Qualified Allocation Plan, October 6, 2014

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 4% Qualified Allocation Plan, September 7, 2016

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2015 9% Qualified Allocation Plan, October 6, 2014

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2016 9% Qualified Allocation Plan, September 25, 2015

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2017 9% Qualified Allocation Plan, September 23, 2016

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Protecting the most vulnerable in consumer credit transactions

There are two key ways in which the Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code seeks to protect consumers in relation to consumer credit transactions. The first is by means of disclosure regulation where information is required to be disclosed to the consumer before the credit contract is entered into and the second is by way of “safety net” provisions, where contracts can be varied or set aside in the event of hardship, a finding that the transaction was unjust, or a finding of unconscionable fees or charges. This article explores the limitations of both of these means of protection, particularly in the case of vulnerable, low-income consumers. In order to highlight the inadequacies of these forms of consumer protection and the need for regulatory reform, we draw on interviews conducted with 30 low-income consumers who had recently signed a credit contract, focusing on their understanding of information disclosed in the contract, as well as their responses to hypothetical unfair terms and their understanding of their rights, for example in the event of an unjust transaction. These interviews were conducted as part of a joint research project between Brotherhood of St Laurence and Griffith University’s Centre for Credit and Consumer Law, funded by Consumer Affairs Victoria.

National consumer credit laws, financial exclusion and interest rate caps : The case for diversity within a centralised framework

Australia is going through a major reform of consumer credit regulation, with the implementation of a proposal to transfer regulatory responsibility from the State and Territory Governments to the Commonwealth Government. While the broad policy approach is supported, the reform process has missed a significant opportunity to engage directly with issues of financial exclusion and with the potential role of regulation to reduce financial exclusion. The imposition of an interest rate cap can limit the impact of financial exclusion. However, the future of the existing interest rate caps is uncertain, given the diversity of approaches, and the heated debate that surrounds this issue. In the absence of support for regulatory initiatives to increase the availability of low cost, small loans, permitting regulatory diversity on this issue of interest rate caps, within an otherwise centralised regulatory framework., can minimise the impact of financial exclusion on consumers.

Housing supply in Australia : the impact of the availability of development finance

Before the Global Financial Crisis many providers of finance had growth mandates and actively pursued development finance deals as a way of gaining higher returns on funds with regular capital turnover and re-investment possible. This was able to be achieved through high gearing and low presales in a strong market. As asset prices fell, loan covenants breached and memories of the 1990’s returned, banks rapidly adjusted their risk appetite via retraction of gearing and expansion of presale requirements. Early signs of loosening in bank credit policy are emerging, however parties seeking development finance are faced with a severely reduced number of institutions from which to source funding. The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only the best credit risks by way of constrictive credit conditions including: low loan to value ratios, the corresponding requirement to contribute high levels of equity, lack of support in non-prime locations and the requirement for only borrowers with well established track records. In this risk averse and capital constrained environment, the ability of developers to proceed with real estate developments is still being constrained by their inability to obtain project finance. This paper will examine the pre and post GFC development finance environment. It will identify the key lending criteria relevant to real estate development finance and will detail the related changes to credit policies over this period. The associated impact to real estate development projects will be presented, highlighting the significant constraint to supply that the inability to obtain finance poses.

Micro-credit is necessary but not sufficient for entrepreneurs in desperate poverty

Micro-credit has often been used as a poverty alleviation strategy. However, there is little evidence to suggest that micro-credit alone can promote economic activities because micro-credit does not teach anything by itself (Brett 2006; Mayoux 1999; Sievers & Vandenberg 2007). Mistakenly, the focus of micro-credit has been the alleviation of immediate poverty, rather than the development of economic activity that would provide a long term solution. Paraphrasing the age old saying, "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, teach him to fish and you will feed him for a life time" micro-credit enables the fisherman to buy a net, but in many cases does nothing to ensure that he knows how to use it to benefit his family and the community. If the borrower doesn't know how to use the net, he will return to his old way of doing things-but with the added burden of having to pay back the debt. Given the state of extreme poverty experienced by the vast majority of the population in developing countries, borrowed money is often used for purposes other than creating the foundations for a sustainable economic growth. Typical examples of how micro-credit is generally used include covering funeral costs, buying food, medicines, and other similarly important necessities. The main problem that derives from using loans in this way is that apart from not improving living conditions in a sustainable manner, borrowers are also exposed to the risk of over-indebtedness, with its subsequent human and social implications.

Credit rating agencies' roles have to be reassessed

With the disintermediation of the financial markets, credit rating agencies filled the informational need of investors on the creditworthiness of borrowers. They acquired their privileged position in the financial market through their intellectual technology and reputational capital. To a large extent, they have gradually dissipated the authority of state regulators and supervisory authorities with their increasing reliance on credit ratings for regulatory purposes. But the recent credit crisis revives the question on whether states should retake their authorities and how far rating agencies should be subjected to competition, transparency and accountability constraints imposed by the public and the market on state regulators and supervisory authorities. Against this backdrop, this article critically explores the key concerns with credit rating agencies' functions to regulate financial market for further assessment