Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

E-learning initiatives in forensic interpretation: report on experiences from current projects and outlook

This paper reports on the purpose, design, methodology and target audience of E-learning courses in forensic interpretation offered by the authors since 2010, including practical experiences made throughout the implementation period of this project. This initiative was motivated by the fact that reporting results of forensic examinations in a logically correct and scientifically rigorous way is a daily challenge for any forensic practitioner. Indeed, interpretation of raw data and communication of findings in both written and oral statements are topics where knowledge and applied skills are needed. Although most forensic scientists hold educational records in traditional sciences, only few actually followed full courses that focussed on interpretation issues. Such courses should include foundational principles and methodology - including elements of forensic statistics - for the evaluation of forensic data in a way that is tailored to meet the needs of the criminal justice system. In order to help bridge this gap, the authors' initiative seeks to offer educational opportunities that allow practitioners to acquire knowledge and competence in the current approaches to the evaluation and interpretation of forensic findings. These cover, among other aspects, probabilistic reasoning (including Bayesian networks and other methods of forensic statistics, tools and software), case pre-assessment, skills in the oral and written communication of uncertainty, and the development of independence and self-confidence to solve practical inference problems. E-learning was chosen as a general format because it helps to form a trans-institutional online-community of practitioners from varying forensic disciplines and workfield experience such as reporting officers, (chief) scientists, forensic coordinators, but also lawyers who all can interact directly from their personal workplaces without consideration of distances, travel expenses or time schedules. In the authors' experience, the proposed learning initiative supports participants in developing their expertise and skills in forensic interpretation, but also offers an opportunity for the associated institutions and the forensic community to reinforce the development of a harmonized view with regard to interpretation across forensic disciplines, laboratories and judicial systems.

Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization

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General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of Constitutional Law

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theroy: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. These two purposes should suggest particular answers to the first three questions.

"Right to Personal Liberty Under the Indian Constitution - With Special Reference to Judicial Process"

The nature and extent of protection secured to personal liberty has been a subject matter of great controversy and debate. The expression "procedure established by law" as a standard of protection for personal liberty has been looked upon as highly unsatisfactory and inadequate. For, unlike the specific attributes of liberty that are separately guaranteed under Art.19, ‘personal liberty‘ as guaranteed by Art.21 does not obligate the .Legislature to comply with the requirements of justice and reasonableness as and when it enchroaches upon that right. Though the concept of ‘personal liberty‘ has received an evolutive and expansive meaning through judicial process, the standard of protection which the judicial process could secure to personal liberty through the interpretation of Art.21 has been far from satisfactory Even after four decades of judicial process in the interpretation of Art.21 the problem of evolving a just and adequate standard of protection for personal liberty in that Article continues to be 21 crucial constitutional issue, craving for a. satisfactory solution. And the present study is a humble attempt to unravel this problem and to Search for a reasonable solution.

O tratamento dos contratos de locação comercial de devedor locatário em recuperação judicial: uma análise à luz das tensões entre o direito material e concursal

Este estudo tem o objetivo de verificar o tratamento dado aos contratos de Locação Comercial de Devedor Locatário em Recuperação Judicial. A lei 11.101/2005 determina, em seus artigos 117 e 119,VII, que os contratos bilaterais não se resolvem pela falência e que na falência do locatário, o administrador judicial pode, a qualquer tempo, denunciar o contrato. Porém, a lei é lacônica a respeito do processo de Recuperação Judicial. Então, o estudo pretende verificar a aplicabilidade dos artigos pertinentes à falência, aos contratos de Devedor submetido ao processo de Recuperação Judicial. Com o intuito de realizar interpretação congruente com a eficiência que se espera da legislação em comento, a metodologia utilizada no trabalho é a da Análise Econômica do Direito, segundo os contornos conferidos pelo autor THOMAS H. JACKSON. Assim, o trabalho aproveita os conceitos do common pool assets e dos executory contracts para auxiliar na compreensão da função dos contratos de locação no Processo de Recuperação Judicial. Nesse sentido, o estudo é importante, pois estabelece parâmetros de interpretação teleológica da legislação concursal, considerando-se as tensões entre o Direito Material e Concursal aplicáveis a hipótese aqui formulada. Então, constatou-se que o tema gera divergência de entendimentos perante a jurisprudência brasileira, no que se refere a possibilidade, ou não, de despejar locatário Devedor em Recuperação Judicial. A controvérsia ronda, principalmente, em torno de duas questões: (a) a aplicação do principio da preservação da empresa, presente no art. 47. da L.11.101/2005 (b) (i)liquidez da ação de despejo por falta de pagamento para fins do artigo 6 da mesma lei. Por fim, o estudo avalia forma pela qual a jurisprudência trata do tema e a sua compatibilidade com a metodologia de Análise Econômica Aplicável ao Direito Concursal.

Direito fundamental ao tempo razoável do processo judicial: limites e possibilidades de concretização no ordenamento jurídico pátrio

This dissertation aims to address the limits and possibilities of realizing the fundamental right to reasonable time of the Brazilian legal system process. From this perspective, we analyze a reasonable time concept for the process, consistent with the civil homeland process; the relationship between efficiency, effectiveness, legal security and reasonable time of adjudication; a formal recognition of the fundamental right to reasonable time of the procedure in the Constitution of 1988; and the immediate applicability of this fundamental right. As indicated, the crisis of the Judiciary and procedural delay are problems directly related to the limits and possibilities of realization of the fundamental right under study. Moreover, we also present some mechanisms that can be used to overcome these problems. The subject was developed based on constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights, an approach that will always have this concern to be based on a methodology which includes the normative and empirical-dogmatic fields, realizing the fundamental right to reasonable time of the process. We adopted as methodological approach the study of this issue in judicial aspect, more specifically in the field of civil procedure. Finally, we weave through a critical and analytical view, our conclusions, which demonstrate the possibilities of overcoming the limits imposed to immediate implementation of the fundamental right to reasonable time of the process in our legal system

Intervenção judicial nas sociedades limitadas em face da liberdade de iniciativa

The judicial intervention in limited liability company goes through several issues of legislative and hermeneutics origin, based considerably on the small importance given to freedom of economic initiative by the participants in the process of formation and application of the law. In addition, Brazilian law, due to incompleteness, inconsistency or lack of valid grounds, put the judge in a procedural delicate situation. Being forced to judge, the judiciary faces severe uncomfortable interpretive situations, of which derive solutions of dubious constitutionality and affecting, significantly, the dynamics of business activity. In this context, and considering the limited liability company as an expression of free enterprise, corresponding to a lawful association of people in order to undertake economically, in exercise of his freedom of contracting and professional action, intended to be offered safe parameters of constitutionality for judicial intervention in limited liability company in the hypothesis of (i) transfer of corporate shares, (ii) attachment of corporate shares, (iii) dismissal of directors, (iv) appointment of judicial stakeholders, (v) exclusion of shareholders and (vi ) trespass. The hypothetical-deductive approach was adopted, building hypotheses to overcome the gaps and unconstitutionality of the law and subjecting them to tests, reviews, and comparisons with hypothetical facts and case law in order to determine the constitutional validity of the proposed solutions. The procedure aimed to reconcile the historical, comparative, dialectical and scientific methods. The roots of temporal institutes were researched as well as current solutions provided by national and compared law. From problematizations point, addressed by the constitutional interpretation of the law and jurisprudence, responses that bring out the unconstitutionality of certain conceptions were headed

La penalidad de la ebriedad en el código penal y en la praxis judicial bonaerense 1878-1888

La sanción del código penal en la provincia de Buenos Aires en el año 1877, fijó en el homicidio la penalidad y determinó las circunstancias del delito mediante la enumeración de los atenuantes y agravantes. El objetivo era contemplar todas las posibilidades del delito para reducir el "arbitrio judicial". Sin embargo, deteniéndonos en los cambios operados en cuanto a la ebriedad en la normativa legal y en la práctica judicial, se puede observar que la función del juez no se redujo únicamente a computar la pena según el delito. A su cargo quedó la apreciación de las pruebas y la interpretación legal. En este sentido, la ley dejó márgenes para considerar a la ebriedad como atenuante o no de la penalidad. Sin embargo, los jueces le negaron tal beneficio al imputado, lo cual marcó una ruptura con respecto al período anterior. Interpretación que estuvo determinada no por un cambio en la percepción sobre el efecto del alcohol como perturbador de la conciencia, sino por ciertos prejuicios que otorgaron una jerarquía y un valor a los motivos que pudieran cegar al trasgresor. Considerada aun como un vicio y no una patología, revelaron la condena a esta práctica social determinando que hechos ya no quedaban comprendidos como circunstancias atenuantes. En definitiva, la ebriedad posibilita apreciar el complejo proceso de codificación que consistió no únicamente en la aplicación literal de la ley sino también en la interpretación que de ella se hiciera.

La penalidad de la ebriedad en el código penal y en la praxis judicial bonaerense 1878-1888

La sanción del código penal en la provincia de Buenos Aires en el año 1877, fijó en el homicidio la penalidad y determinó las circunstancias del delito mediante la enumeración de los atenuantes y agravantes. El objetivo era contemplar todas las posibilidades del delito para reducir el "arbitrio judicial". Sin embargo, deteniéndonos en los cambios operados en cuanto a la ebriedad en la normativa legal y en la práctica judicial, se puede observar que la función del juez no se redujo únicamente a computar la pena según el delito. A su cargo quedó la apreciación de las pruebas y la interpretación legal. En este sentido, la ley dejó márgenes para considerar a la ebriedad como atenuante o no de la penalidad. Sin embargo, los jueces le negaron tal beneficio al imputado, lo cual marcó una ruptura con respecto al período anterior. Interpretación que estuvo determinada no por un cambio en la percepción sobre el efecto del alcohol como perturbador de la conciencia, sino por ciertos prejuicios que otorgaron una jerarquía y un valor a los motivos que pudieran cegar al trasgresor. Considerada aun como un vicio y no una patología, revelaron la condena a esta práctica social determinando que hechos ya no quedaban comprendidos como circunstancias atenuantes. En definitiva, la ebriedad posibilita apreciar el complejo proceso de codificación que consistió no únicamente en la aplicación literal de la ley sino también en la interpretación que de ella se hiciera.

La penalidad de la ebriedad en el código penal y en la praxis judicial bonaerense 1878-1888

La sanción del código penal en la provincia de Buenos Aires en el año 1877, fijó en el homicidio la penalidad y determinó las circunstancias del delito mediante la enumeración de los atenuantes y agravantes. El objetivo era contemplar todas las posibilidades del delito para reducir el "arbitrio judicial". Sin embargo, deteniéndonos en los cambios operados en cuanto a la ebriedad en la normativa legal y en la práctica judicial, se puede observar que la función del juez no se redujo únicamente a computar la pena según el delito. A su cargo quedó la apreciación de las pruebas y la interpretación legal. En este sentido, la ley dejó márgenes para considerar a la ebriedad como atenuante o no de la penalidad. Sin embargo, los jueces le negaron tal beneficio al imputado, lo cual marcó una ruptura con respecto al período anterior. Interpretación que estuvo determinada no por un cambio en la percepción sobre el efecto del alcohol como perturbador de la conciencia, sino por ciertos prejuicios que otorgaron una jerarquía y un valor a los motivos que pudieran cegar al trasgresor. Considerada aun como un vicio y no una patología, revelaron la condena a esta práctica social determinando que hechos ya no quedaban comprendidos como circunstancias atenuantes. En definitiva, la ebriedad posibilita apreciar el complejo proceso de codificación que consistió no únicamente en la aplicación literal de la ley sino también en la interpretación que de ella se hiciera.

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.