The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period : evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable attention among academician, practitioners as well as policy makers because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that corporations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions, which include corporate debt policy. Earlier study on the agency model of the firm widely recognizes that the managerial ownership and external debt play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also found that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 100 Composite Index companies from Brusa Malaysia between 1998 to 2002 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership which serves effective control mechanism on managerial ownership and corporate debt policy as hypothesized. Findings of such evidence suggest that institutional holding thus have played an important role in managers' strategic management decision and reduce agency conflict. In addition, corporate debt policy too is governed by managerial ownership and exhibited a negative relation.

Managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict using logistic regression approach : evidence from Bursa Malaysia

This paper adopted logistic regression model to examine the relationship between level of managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict which are proxied by level of risk, firms leverage and firms dividend policy. The study covers a period of 5 years from 1997 through 2001. The study is based on the 100 blue-chip stocks, majority of which are derived from CI components. The findings suggest a positive and significant association between level of level of risk at lower level and managerial ownership while a negative and significant association is also evidenced between risk at higher level and managerial ownership concentration. While debt policy which serves as positive monitoring substitute for agency conflict is found to be positive and significant explaining the level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, dividend policies, which also serve as monitoring, substitute to reduce agency conflict between manager and external shareholders do not appear to have any significant impact on managerial ownership. On the other hand, the level of institutional ownership, which serves as external monitoring force, is found to have inverse impact on level of managerial ownership concentration. This is marginally significant at 10 level (p=.12). The findings, in part explain the argument that the managerial ownership help reduce agency conflict between outside equity holders and managers.

Does accounting choice influence US investment in non-US companies? Evidence from US institutional investment in Australian companies

Previous research asserts that companies that choose accounting methods more familiar to investors reduce information asymmetry and increase credibility of their financial statements to those investors, thereby attracting higher levels of foreign investment. This study examines the variation in accounting policies associated with institutional investment in Australian equity. The results suggest that large US institutional holdings in Australian companies are associated with American Depositary Receipt listing and, incrementally, choice of accounting methods that conform to US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Although making accounting choices in compliance with US GAAP is significantly associated with higher levels of institutional ownership in a statistical sense, examination of the specific differences in accounting choices suggests that the differences in informational content are relatively minor.

Fraud, market reaction, and the role of institutional investors in Chinese listed firms

The extent and type of financial fraud committed by listed firms in China, stock market reaction to the detection and announcement of fraud, and the association between institutional ownership and financial fraud are the subjects of this article. Using fraud data from the period between 2001 and 2011, the authors find wide occurrences of fraud and a strong negative market reaction on the announcement date, particularly in cases of serious fraud. Fraud is more likely to occur at firms that have a smaller proportion of independent directors and at poorly performing firms. Firms with higher mutual fund ownership subsequently have fewer incidences of fraud. Our results reports by the authors indicate that ownership by independent institutions, such as mutual funds, serves as an effective monitoring mechanism, deterring fraud and enhancing corporate governance in Chinese capital markets.

Ownership structure, corporate governance and bank performance: Evidence from gcc countries

The paper examines the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on bank performance of GCC counties. Evidence indicates that the extent of the foreign ownership level has a significant positive association with the bank performance. However, concentrated ownership does appear to have a significant negative impact on performance and institutional ownership does not have any significant effect on performance. Other governance variables such as CEO duality and board size appear insignificant impact on performance. These results suggest a need to strengthen the internal control mechanisms within banks of GCC countries.

Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policies in an emerging market: further evidence from CASE 50

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market, in a country undergoing a transitional period. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’ composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt. Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or ratios. Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.

The effects of ownership and stock liquidity on the timing of repurchase transactions

We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership reduces companies' opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases profits from timing OMRs.

Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policies in an emerging market: further evidence from CASE 50

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market, in a country undergoing a transitional period. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’ composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt. Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or ratios. Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.

Accounting Earnings Announcements, Institutional Investor Concentration, and Common Stock Returns

[Excerpt] This study examines the relation between the level of institutional investor ownership and the magnitude of security price variability at quarterly earnings announcement dates. Prior research consistently documents a negative association between firm size and announcement-date return variability. One explanation for this finding is that as more timely, alternative information becomes available on large firms prior to an announcement date, their security prices become informative, thereby reducing the information content of the earnings announcement. Large firms are closely followed by institutional investors. These investors dedicate substantial resources to information search. Therefore, the link between size and information production may be attributable to the influence of institutional investors on the information production process. Because institutional trades can also affect security prices, however, the precise impact of institutional following on the variability of prices at quarterly earnings dates is not evident.

The role of rural land in mixed asset investment portfolios

Rural land has not always been considered as a major long-term investment with both institutional investors and absentee owners in countries such as U.K. and Australia. Although rural land is included in both single asset and mixed asset portfolios in the U.S, it is not at the same levels as either commercial or industrial property. Rural land occupies over 50% of the total area of Australia, and comprises over 115,000 economic farm properties (excludes rural residential, hobby farms and rural lifestyle blocks. However, less than 1.6% of the total economic farm numbers are actually owned by corporate or institutional investors. This low level of corporate involvement in the Australian rural property market has limited both the investment performance research and inclusion of this rural land type in both property and mixed asset investment portfolios. In the U.S. rural land is also the most extensive real estate type based on total area occupied. The United States Department of Agriculture statistics (1998) show that in 1997 there were 2.06 million farms in the U.S., covering 968 million acres, with a total value of $912 billion and generating an annual income of $202 billion. The level of corporate ownership of farms in the U.S. is also higher than the level of corporate farm ownership in Australia. This high level of institutional ownership in rural land in U.S has provided the opportunity for the rural property asset class to be analysed in relation to it’s investment performance and possible role in a mixed asset or mixed property investment portfolio.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Factors Driving Stock Option Grants - Empirical Evidence from Finland

This study contributes to the executive stock option literature by looking at factors driving the introduction of such a compensation form on a firm level. Using a discrete decision model I test the explanatory power of several agency theory based variables and find strong support for predictability of the form of executive compensation. Ownership concentration and liquidity are found to have a significant negative effect on the probability of stock option adoption. Furtermore, I find evidence of CEO ownership, institutional ownership, investment intensity, and historical market return having a significant and a positive relationship to the likelihood of adopting a executive stock option program.

What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?

This paper analyzes factors driving the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. We examine determinants of the scope of plans, exercise price, target group, and dividend protection. The scope is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to proxies for monitoring costs. The scope is also greater in broad-based plans, and in plans with dividend protection. Prior stock return is found to be negatively related to the size of the premium (out-of-the-moneyness), whereas dividend protection increases the premium. The results also suggest that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. Furthermore, the likelihood of granting broad-based plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints, and decreasing in firm size. Broad-based plans are also more likely among firms in growth industries. We find support that the likelihood of dividend protection is decreasing in foreign ownership. In addition, firms paying zero-dividends are less likely to include dividend protection, whereas higher unsystematic risk is associated with a greater likelihood of including dividend protection.

Market reactions to changes in the Nasdaq-100 Index membership

We examine stock market reactions around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. We find a symmetric and transitory price response accompanied by a significant increase in trading volume on the effective date. Firms added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience significant increases in institutional ownership, the number of market makers, and the number of shareholders. In contrast, firms removed from the index show significant decreases in the number of institutional shareholders. Additions to the Nasdaq-100 Index also show significant increases in four liquidity measures, whereas deletions demonstrate significant decreases in two liquidity measures. These changes in liquidity are related to the abnormal return on the announcement day. Taken together, the results suggest support for the price pressure, liquidity, and investor awareness hypotheses.

Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices?

We show that stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more firm-specific information after controlling for corporate governance, earnings quality, institutional ownership and acquisition activity. Further, we show that the relationship is stronger for firms with weak corporate governance suggesting that gender-diverse boards could act as a substitute mechanism for corporate governance that would be otherwise weak. The results are robust to alternative specifications of informativeness and gender diversity and to sensitivity tests controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics and alternative measures of stock price informativeness. We also find that gender diversity improves stock price informativeness through the mechanism of increased public disclosure in large firms and by encouraging private information collection in small firms. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.