Performance benchmarking and incentive regulation – considerations of directing signals for electricity distribution companies

After the restructuring process of the power supply industry, which for instance in Finland took place in the mid-1990s, free competition was introduced for the production and sale of electricity. Nevertheless, natural monopolies are found to be the most efficient form of production in the transmission and distribution of electricity, and therefore such companies remained franchised monopolies. To prevent the misuse of the monopoly position and to guarantee the rights of the customers, regulation of these monopoly companies is required. One of the main objectives of the restructuring process has been to increase the cost efficiency of the industry. Simultaneously, demands for the service quality are increasing. Therefore, many regulatory frameworks are being, or have been, reshaped so that companies are provided with stronger incentives for efficiency and quality improvements. Performance benchmarking has in many cases a central role in the practical implementation of such incentive schemes. Economic regulation with performance benchmarking attached to it provides companies with directing signals that tend to affect their investment and maintenance strategies. Since the asset lifetimes in the electricity distribution are typically many decades, investment decisions have far-reaching technical and economic effects. This doctoral thesis addresses the directing signals of incentive regulation and performance benchmarking in the field of electricity distribution. The theory of efficiency measurement and the most common regulation models are presented. The chief contributions of this work are (1) a new kind of analysis of the regulatory framework, so that the actual directing signals of the regulation and benchmarking for the electricity distribution companies are evaluated, (2) developing the methodology and a software tool for analysing the directing signals of the regulation and benchmarking in the electricity distribution sector, and (3) analysing the real-life regulatory frameworks by the developed methodology and further develop regulation model from the viewpoint of the directing signals. The results of this study have played a key role in the development of the Finnish regulatory model.

Counteracting incentive sensitization in severe alcohol dependence using deep brain stimulation of the nucleus accumbens: clinical and basic science aspects

The ventral striatum / nucleus accumbens has been implicated in the craving for drugs and alcohol which is a major reason for relapse of addicted people. Craving might be induced by drug-related cues. This suggests that disruption of craving-related neural activity in the nucleus accumbens may significantly reduce craving in alcohol-dependent patients. Here we report on preliminary clinical and neurophysiological evidence in three male patients who were treated with high frequency deep brain stimulation of the nucleus accumbens bilaterally. All three had been alcohol dependent for many years, unable to abstain from drinking, and had experienced repeated relapses prior to the stimulation. After the operation, craving was greatly reduced and all three patients were able to abstain from drinking for extended periods of time. Immediately after the operation but prior to connection of the stimulation electrodes to the stimulator, local field potentials were obtained from the externalized cables in two patients while they performed cognitive tasks addressing action monitoring and incentive salience of drug related cues. LFPs in the action monitoring task provided further evidence for a role of the nucleus accumbens in goal-directed behaviors. Importantly, alcohol related cue stimuli in the incentive salience task modulated LFPs even though these cues were presented outside of the attentional focus. This implies that cue-related craving involves the nucleus accumbens and is highly automatic.

Does speed matter? : the impact of the EU membership incentive on rule adoption in minority language rights protection

Denna avhandling tar sin utgångspunkt i ett ifrågasättande av effektiviteten i EU:s konditionalitetspolitik avseende minoritetsrättigheter. Baserat på den rationalistiska teoretiska modellen, External Incentives Model of Governance, syftar denna hypotesprövande avhandling till att förklara om tidsavståndet på det potentiella EU medlemskapet påverkar lagstiftningsnivån avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter. Mätningen av nivån på lagstiftningen avseende minoritetsspråksrättigheter begränsas till att omfatta icke-diskriminering, användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang samt minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen. Metodologiskt används ett jämförande angreppssätt både avseende tidsramen för studien, som sträcker sig mellan 2003 och 2010, men även avseende urvalet av stater. På basis av det \"mest lika systemet\" kategoriseras staterna i tre grupper efter deras olika tidsavstånd från det potentiella EU medlemskapet. Hypotesen som prövas är följande: ju kortare tidsavstånd till det potentiella EU medlemskapet desto större sannolikhet att staternas lagstiftningsnivå inom de tre områden som studeras har utvecklats till en hög nivå. Studien visar att hypotesen endast bekräftas delvis. Resultaten avseende icke-diskriminering visar att sambandet mellan tidsavståndet och nivån på lagstiftningen har ökat markant under den undersökta tidsperioden. Detta samband har endast stärkts mellan kategorin av stater som ligger tidsmässigt längst bort ett potentiellt EU medlemskap och de två kategorier som ligger närmare respektive närmast ett potentiellt EU medlemskap. Resultaten avseende användning av minoritetsspråk i officiella sammanhang och minoriteters språkliga rättigheter i utbildningen visar inget respektive nästan inget samband mellan tidsavståndet och utvecklingen på lagstiftningen mellan 2003 och 2010.

Assessment of tidal volume and thoracoabdominal motion using volume and flow-oriented incentive spirometers in healthy subjects

The objective of the present study was to evaluate incentive spirometers using volume- (Coach and Voldyne) and flow-oriented (Triflo II and Respirex) devices. Sixteen healthy subjects, 24 ± 4 years, 62 ± 12 kg, were studied. Respiratory variables were obtained by respiratory inductive plethysmography, with subjects in a semi-reclined position (45º). Tidal volume, respiratory frequency, minute ventilation, inspiratory duty cycle, mean inspiratory flow, and thoracoabdominal motion were measured. Statistical analysis was performed with Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, t-test and ANOVA. Comparison between the Coach and Voldyne devices showed that larger values of tidal volume (1035 ± 268 vs 947 ± 268 ml, P = 0.02) and minute ventilation (9.07 ± 3.61 vs 7.49 ± 2.58 l/min, P = 0.01) were reached with Voldyne, whereas no significant differences in respiratory frequency were observed (7.85 ± 1.24 vs 8.57 ± 1.89 bpm). Comparison between flow-oriented devices showed larger values of inspiratory duty cycle and lower mean inspiratory flow with Triflo II (0.35 ± 0.05 vs 0.32 ± 0.05 ml/s, P = 0.00, and 531 ± 137 vs 606 ± 167 ml/s, P = 0.00, respectively). Abdominal motion was larger (P < 0.05) during the use of volume-oriented devices compared to flow-oriented devices (52 ± 11% for Coach and 50 ± 9% for Voldyne; 43 ± 13% for Triflo II and 44 ± 14% for Respirex). We observed that significantly higher tidal volume associated with low respiratory frequency was reached with Voldyne, and that there was a larger abdominal displacement with volume-oriented devices.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms

We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.