When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula

Due to its recent economic success, Brazil is considered an emerging country, but is it an emerging power concerning global environmental governance? This article argues that although Brazil has a sui generis profile, it can only be considered an emerging power in some environmental regimes, such as global climate change. Thus, international relations theory needs more analytical instruments to assess the impact of emerging powers in global environmental governance

Governance of global climate change in the Brazilian Amazon: the case of Amazonian municipalities of Brazil

With regards to the debate about governance of climate change, it should be assumed that the Amazon region plays an important role, as this large area is highly vulnerable to its effects. In this sense, this article aims to discuss how some Amazonian municipalities of Brazil have been taking part in the complexes and multilayered processes of climate governance.

The debate on health in Portugal: governance of health care and the welfare modernization agenda

Comunicação apresentada na "Second Biennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulation and Governance do ECPR Regulation & Governance, com o tema: (Re)Regulation in the Wake of Neoliberalism’ Consequences of Three Decades of Privatization and Market Liberalization, realizada na Universidade de Utrecht, the Netherlands, de 5 a 7 de Junho de 2008.

The price of honour: The corporate governance of Banco Espirito Santo

The Price of Honour is a case study, supported with teaching notes, which describes the events and circumstances surrounding the implosion of one of Portugal’s most systemically important banks - Banco Espírito Santo (BES). The case focuses on BES’s corporate governance and how the Espírito Santo family’s tight control of the bank led to its exploitation. Although the situation caught the attention of the bank’s supervisors, their untimely actions could not prevent BES’s financial health from crumbling only two months after a rights issue. With little leeway, the supervisors put forward a resolution which dramatically ended the bank’s centennial legacy.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.