Interior of the Konservenfabrik E. Arnold und Co. (Arnold and Co. canned goods factory); Fuerth, Bavaria Business Establishments; Factories

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Interior of the Konservenfabrik E. Arnold und Co. (Arnold and Co. canned goods factory); Fuerth, Bavaria Business Establishments; Factories

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How social preferences shape incentives in (experimental) markets for credence goods

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximising quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness with respect to heterogeneity in social preferences as a possible cause of this and conduct new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers’ social preference types. Our results confirm the assumed heterogeneity in social preferences and provide strong support for our explanation of the failure of verifiability to increase efficiency.

Predicting price-tag for customized goods

We discuss a dynamic pricing model which will aid automobile manufacturer in choosing the right price for customer segment. Though there is oligopoly market structure, the customers get "locked" into a particular technology/company which virtually makes the situation akin to a monopoly. There are associated network externalities and positive feedback. The key idea in monopoly pricing lies in extracting the customer surplus by exploiting the respective elasticities of demand. We present a Walrasian general equilibrium approach to determine the segment price. We compare the prices obtained from optimization model with that from Walrasian dynamics. The results are encouraging and can serve as a critical factor in Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and thereby effectively manage the lock-in.

Environmental evaluation of localising production as a strategy for sustainable development: a case study of two consumer goods in Jamaica

The objective of this study was to compare the life-cycle environmental impacts of changed production structures for two consumer goods (high-density polyethylene (HDPE) shopping bags and beds) in Jamaica. A scenario technique was used to construct three alternative production structures for each product; each scenario reflecting an increase in local production in Jamaica which depended on an increased supply of input materials which may be sourced: (1) externally from overseas suppliers, (2) from post-consumer recycling, and (3) locally on the island of Jamaica. These three constructed scenarios were then compared to the existing supply chain or reference scenarios of the products. The results showed that for both case products the recycling scenario was most preferable for localising production, resulting in the lowest environmental impact. This was because the production of raw materials accounted for the largest effect on total environmental impact. As such, the most immediate environmental improvements were realised by lowering the production of virgin materials. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Mergers in Durable Goods Industries

Revised 2008-11.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, pp. 691-701.

Non-Stationary Demand in a Durable Goods Monopoly

In a context where demand for the services of a durable good changes over time, and this change may be uncertain, the paper shows that social welfare may be higher when the monopolist seller can commit to any future price level she wishes than when she cannot. Moreover, the equilibrium under a monopolist with commitment power may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under a monopolist without commitment ability. These results affect the desired regulation of a durable goods monopolist in this context.

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).

The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: the Case of Climate Policy

33 p.