872 resultados para games of chance


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Bound with this are The games ... by the London and Edinburgh chess clubs. London, 1828; and Remarks on the report of the committee, by W. Lewis. London, 1829.

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Bound with his The games of the match at chess played by the London and Edinburgh chess clubs. London, 1828.

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Classified for chess, p. 11-27.

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Analyses how to calculate damages for the loss of an opportunity by reason of a breach of contract, in the light of the House of Lords judgment in Gregg v Scott concerning clinical negligence. Discusses whether different principles apply to contract claims and torts.

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In this survey we presented several proportional and envy-free cake-cutting algorithms. We also mentioned some interesting open problems.

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This flyer promotes the event "The Dangerous Games of Fantasy, Lecture by Daína Chaviano", cosponsored by the FIU Modern Languages Department and the Cuban Research Institute.

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My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

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Cette thèse de doctorat explore les trajectoires de deux types de déviance, celle de joueurs excessifs (N=100) et celle de délinquants (N=172). Le questionnaire utilisé dans chacun des cas possède un important volet destiné à recueillir des renseignements de manière chronologique par différentes thématiques; la méthode des calendriers d’histoire de vie. L’intérêt d’une analyse de calendrier est qu’elle permet de tenir compte des changements ponctuels de comportement et d’évaluer les effets à court terme de la prise en charge des sujets au cours de leur carrière déviante. La démonstration se base sur trois dimensions des trajectoires : l’intensité de l’engagement, les épisodes d’abstinence volontaire et les épisodes de rechutes. Le résultat majeur de ma thèse montre que les circonstances de vie (facteurs dynamiques) rendent bien compte des dimensions des trajectoires alors que les caractéristiques des individus (facteurs fixes ou statiques) ont souvent très peu de force explicative. Une analyse attentive des effets indirects montre la pertinence de continuer à s’intéresser à ces facteurs. En effet, l’impact des caractéristiques dynamiques est souvent conditionnel à certaines variables statiques. Aucune étude, tant américaine que canadienne, ne s’est penchée sur la dynamique des trajectoires de joueurs excessifs. Le troisième chapitre examine les fluctuations mensuelles des sommes englouties dans les jeux de hasard et d’argent. On s’efforce de comprendre ce qui incite les joueurs à dépenser davantage certains mois et moins à d’autres. Une attention particulière est aussi consacrée aux mois où les joueurs cessent de participer aux jeux de hasard et d’argent et aux facteurs qui favorisent cette abstinence provisoire. Le quatrième chapitre se concentre sur les trajectoires de délinquants. Dans ce cas-ci, la performance criminelle, les revenus illégaux mensuels, mesure l’intensité de l’engagement criminel. On s’intéresse dans ce chapitre aux conditions régissant à la fois les épisodes de réussite criminelle et les épisodes concomitants de désistement temporaire. Les mesures « officielles » de récidive (nouvelle condamnation, nouvelle entrée en thérapie) présentent un problème de chiffre noir (les rechutes effectives sont plus nombreuses que les rechutes connues des autorités officielles). L’intérêt du chapitre cinq est de miser sur une analyse autorévélée des rechutes et du « moment » où ces rechutes se produisent. Le deuxième objectif de cette étude est de comparer les épisodes de rechutes dans ces deux trajectoires de déviance. La logique de ce chapitre suit celles des précédents, on s’intéresse à la dynamique qui entoure ces épisodes, on se demande si elle est similaire au sein des deux trajectoires déviantes.

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El análisis estructural de sectores estratégicos es una metodología que facilita obtener una mejor percepción del entorno, a partir de cuatro herramientas propuestas por los autores de la metodología Restrepo y Rivera; las cuales consisten inicialmente en un análisis de hacinamiento, seguido de un levantamiento del panorama competitivo, continuando con un análisis de las fuerzas del mercado y finalizando con un estudio de competidores. El presente trabajo se apoyó en la anterior metodología, evaluando el sector estratégico de casinos, obteniendo información tanto cualitativa como cuantitativa, reflexionando sobre ella y proponiendo algunas recomendaciones para su mejoramiento.

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This PhD represents my attempt to make sense of my personal experiences of depression through the form of cabaret. I first experienced depression in 2006. Previously, I had considered myself to be a happy and optimistic person. I found the experience of depression to be a shock: both in the experience itself, and also in the way it effected my own self image. These personal experiences, together with my professional history as a songwriter and cabaret performer, have been the motivating force behind the research project. This study has explored the question: What are the implications of applying principles of Michael White’s narrative therapy to the creation of a cabaret performance about depression and bipolar disorder? There is a 50 percent weighting on the creative work, the cabaret performance Mind Games, and a 50 percent weighting on the written exegesis. This research has focussed on the illustration of therapeutic principles in order to play games of truth within a cabaret performance. The research project investigates ways of telling my own story in relation to others’ stories through three re-authoring principles articulated in Michael White’s narrative therapy: externalisation, an autonomous ethic of living and rich descriptions. The personal stories presented in the cabaret were drawn from my own experiences and from interviews with individuals with depression or bipolar disorder. The cabaret focussed on the illustration of therapeutic principles, and was not focussed on therapeutic ends for myself or the interviewees. The research question has been approached through a methodology combining autoethnographic, practice-led and action research. Auto ethnographic research is characterised by close investigation of assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs. The combination of autoethnographic, practice-led, action research has allowed me to bring together personal experiences of mental illness, research into therapeutic techniques, social attitudes and public discourses about mental illness and forms of contemporary cabaret to facilitate the creation of a one-woman cabaret performance. The exegesis begins with a discussion of games of truth as informed by Michel Foucault and Michael White and self-stigma as informed by Michael White and Erving Goffman. These concepts form the basis for a discussion of my own personal experiences. White’s narrative therapy is focused on individuals re-authoring their stories, or telling their stories in different ways. White’s principles are influenced by Foucault’s notions of truth and power. Foucault’s term games of truth has been used to describe the effect of a ‘truth in flux’ that occurs through White’s re-authoring process. This study argues that cabaret is an appropriate form to represent this therapeutic process because it favours heightened performativity over realism, and showcases its ‘constructedness’ and artificiality. Thus cabaret is well suited to playing games of truth. A contextual review compares two major cabaret trends, personal cabaret and provocative cabaret, in reference to the performer’s relationship with the audience in terms of distance and intimacy. The study draws a parallel between principles of distance and intimacy in Michael White’s narrative therapy and relates these to performative terms of distance and intimacy. The creative component of this study, the cabaret Mind Games, used principles of narrative therapy to present the character ‘Jo’ playing games of truth through: externalising an aspect of her personality (externalisation); exploring different life values (an autonomous ethic of living); and enacting multiple versions of her identity (rich descriptions). This constant shifting between distance and intimacy within the cabaret created the effect of a truth in ‘constant flux’, to use one of White’s terms. There are three inter-related findings in the study. The first finding is that the application of principles of White’s narrative therapy was able to successfully combine provocative and empathetic elements within the cabaret. The second finding is that the personal agenda of addressing my own self-stigma within the project limited the effective portrayal of a ‘truth in flux’ within the cabaret. The third finding presents the view that the cabaret expressed ‘Jo’ playing games of truth in order to journey towards her own "preferred identity claim" (White 2004b) through an act of "self care" (Foucault 2005). The contribution to knowledge of this research project is the application of therapeutic principles to the creation of a cabaret performance. This process has focussed on creating a self-revelatory cabaret that questions notions of a ‘fixed truth’ through combining elements of existing cabaret forms in new ways. Two major forms in contemporary cabaret, the personal cabaret and the provocative cabaret use the performer-audience relationship in distinctive ways. Through combining elements of these two cabaret forms, I have explored ways to create a provocative cabaret focussed on the act of self-revelation.