No right to perform a contract?

Thesis submitted in Trinity Term 2001 for the degree of Master of Philosophy, Worcester College, Oxford

Contract law

Livro editado para celebrar dos 10 anos da Faculdade de Direito da UNL

Contract-program evaluation: Impact of the DRG classification system on hospitals' outputs

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Psychological contract in non-governmental organizations

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Taxonomic guide to the polychaetes of the northern Gulf of Mexico / prepared by Joan M. Uebelacker and Paul G. Johnson, editors ; prepared under MMS contract 14-12-001-29091 for Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior.

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Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

China´s new labour contract law: no harm to employment?

In January 2008, China imposed a new labour contract law. This new law is the most significant reform to the law of employment relations in mainland China in more than a decade. The paper provides a theoretical framework on the inter-linkages between labour market regulation, option value and the choice and timing of employment. All in all, the paper demonstrates that the Labour Contract Law in it´s own right will have only small impacts upon employment in the fast-growing Chinese economy. On the contrary, induced increasing unit labour costs represent the real issue and may reduce employment.

Policy Shocks and Contract Renegotiation: Who Gets Raked Over the Coals?

Changes in climate policy have large influence on businesses. Firms anticipate and respond to such changes, but what if they have already engaged in a longterm relationship with other firms or customers at the time of policy change? For example, coal supply to power stations is typically based on long-term contracts, while the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship may well be affected substantially by climate regulations. However, there has been little evidence on whether or how firms amend their contractual agreements in response to a change in policy.

Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency

We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours’ remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.

Consultant Contract 2004 - Frequently Asked Questions (PDF 180 KB)

Consultant Contract 2004 - Frequently Asked Questions

New Consultant Contract 2004 (PDF 198 KB)

New Consultant Contract 2004

GP Contract - The New GP Contract - What It Means To You

GP Contract - The New GP Contract - What It Means To You