The economic theory of the firm as a foundation for international business theory

The economic theory of the firm is central to the theory of the multinational enterprise. Recent literature on multinationals, however, makes only limited reference to the economic theory of the firm. Multinationals play an important role in coordinating the international division of labour through internal markets. The paper reviews the economic principles that underlie this view. Optimal internalisation equates marginal benefits and costs. The benefits of internalisation stem mainly from the difficulties of licensing proprietary knowledge, reflecting the view that MNEs possess an ‘ownership’ or ‘firm-specific’ advantage. The costs of internalisation, it is argued, reflect managerial capability, and in particular the capability to manage a large firm. The paper argues that management capability is a complement to ownership advantage. Ownership advantage determines the potential of the firm, and management capability governs the fulfilment of this potential through overcoming barriers to growth. The analysis is applied to a variety of issues, including out-sourcing, geographical dispersion of production, and regional specialisation in marketing.

The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

Towards a theory of the small firm: theoretical aspects and some policy implications

Includes bibliography

The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm

The entrepreneurial theory of the firm argues that entrepreneurship, properly understood, is a crucial but neglected element in explaining the nature and boundaries of the firm. By contrast, the theory of the entrepreneurial firm presumably seeks not to understand the nature and boundaries of "the firm" in general but rather to understand a particular type of firm: one that is entrepreneurial. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the two. After briefly delving for the concept of entrepreneurship in the work of Schumpeter, Kirzner, and (especially) Knight, the paper makes the case for the entrepreneurial theory of the firm. In such a theory, the firm exists as the solution to a coordination problem in a world of change and uncertainty, including Knightian or structural uncertainty. Taking a historical or developmental perspective, the paper then examines the changing nature of the entrepreneurial coordination problem over the life-cycle. In this formulation, "the entrepreneurial firm" is a nascent firm or proto-firm facing a problem of coordinating systemic change in economic capabilities. Lacking (by definition) adequate guidance from existing systems of rules of conduct embedded in markets or organizations, the entrepreneurial firm typically relies on a form of organization Max Weber called charismatic authority. In the end, although there is no such thing as a non-entrepreneurial firm, firms that must solve coordination problems in a world of novelty and systemic change ("entrepreneurial firms") are perhaps the purest case of the entrepreneurial theory of the firm.

Actor-network theory as a theoretical lens and research strategy for investigating firm internationalisation

Totally generalisable theories of firm internationalisation in the post-industrial era of international business, where national barriers are becoming less significant and technology becoming more influential, appear to be illusory. Stepwise or evolutionary models that predict gradual internationalisation are under challenge from empirical evidence of rapid internationalisation such as the phenomenon of the “born global” firm. Similarly, equilibrium models such as the eclectic paradigm have been criticised for being static and unable to account for process and path dependency. In this paper, the information and knowledge assumptions implied in theories of firm internationalisation are outlined and discussed. From this discussion, we suggest that actor-network theory, with its balance between description and explanation, may be a useful theoretical and empirical tool for investigating the complex and heterogeneous process of firm internationalisation whilst creating opportunities for further theory building.

On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on 'direction', that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

Using grounded theory for theory building in operations management research:a study on inter-firm relationship governance

Purpose – Qualitative theory building approaches, such as grounded theory method (GTM), are still not very widespread and rigorously applied in operations management (OM) research. Yet it is agreed that more systematic observation of current industrial phenomena is necessary to help managers deal with their problems. The purpose of this paper is to provide an example to help guide other researchers on using GTM for theory building in OM research. Design/methodology/approach – A GTM study in the German automotive industry consisting of 31 interviews is followed by a validation stage comprising a survey (110 responses) and a focus group. Findings – The result is an example of conducting GTM research in OM, illustrated by the development of the novel collaborative enterprise governance framework for inter-firm relationship governance in the German automotive industry. Research limitations/implications – GTM is appropriate for qualitative theory building research, but the resultant theories need further testing. Research is necessary to identify the transferability of the collaborative enterprise governance concept to other industries than automotive, to other organisational areas than R&D and to product and service settings that are less complex and innovative. Practical implications – The paper helps researchers make more informed use of GTM when engaging in qualitative theory building research in OM. Originality/value – There is a lack of explicit and well-informed use of GTM in OM research because of poor understanding. This paper addresses this deficiency. The collaborative enterprise governance framework is a significant contribution in an area of growing importance within OM.

What can situated learning theory tell us about leading to develop organizational learning capabilities for entrepreneurial performance? lessons from a knowledge-intensive small firm

Although the role of strategic leadership in developing organizational learning capabilities has been examined to a certain extent, the specific behaviors and mechanisms through which these capabilities are developed have not been adequately understood. Paucity of research in this direction is even more conspicuous in a small firm/entrepreneurship context, which has been linked to innovation, economic growth, and employment generation. Reporting on an ethnographic study of a knowledge-intensive, growth-oriented small firm, this article addresses this gap in the literature by integrating strategic leadership and organizational learning theory in an entrepreneurship context. In this undertaking, situated learning theory is used as the major analytical lens, to shed light on how strategic leadership can build organizational learning capabilities that underpin entrepreneurial performance in small firms. Finally, implications for situated learning theory as an organizational learning perspective and leadership practice in an entrepreneurship context are submitted. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.