Negative investment in China: financing constraints and restructuring versus growth

This paper attempts to address a puzzle in China’s investment pattern: despite high aggregate investment and remarkable economic growth, negative net investment is commonly found at the microeconomic level. Using a large firm-level dataset, we test three hypotheses to explain the existence and extent of negative investment in each ownership group: what we term the efficiency (or restructuring) hypothesis, the (lack of) financing hypothesis, and the (slow) growth hypothesis. Our panel data probit estimations shows that negative investment by state-owned firms can be explained mainly by inefficiency: owing to over-investment or mis-investment in the past, these firms have had to restructure and to get rid of obsolete capital in the face of increasing competition and hardening budgets. The financing explanation holds for private firms, which have had to divest in order to raise capital. However, rapid economic growth weighs against both effects in all types of firms, with a larger impact for firms in the private and foreign sectors. A tobit model, estimated to examine the determinants of the amount of negative investment, yields similar conclusions.

Investment and financing constraints in China: does working capital management make a difference?

We use a panel of over 120,000 Chinese firms of different ownership types over the period 2000-2007 to analyze the linkages between investment in fixed and working capital and financing constraints. We find that those firms characterized by high working capital display high sensitivities of investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS) and low sensitivities of investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FKS). We then construct and analyze firm-level FKS and WKS measures and find that, despite severe external financing constraints, those firms with low FKS and high WKS exhibit the highest fixed investment rates. This suggests that good working capital management may help firms to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on fixed investment.

Does the EU financing system contribute to shadow economic activity?

Financial contributions to the EU budget depend basically on official GDP. This means that countries with higher shadow economic activity contribute less than they should contribute in a system based on actual GDP and therefore could reduce their incentive to fight against such activities. In this paper we investigate if the EU financing system really has an influence on the intensity with which governments in EU member states fight against shadow economic activity. We find that the EU net contributors significantly fight more intensively against shadow economic activity while EU net receivers significantly fight less. As a result, shadow economic activity is higher in net receiver and lower in net contributor countries than it were in comparison with a scenario of nationally balanced EU funding. Quantitatively and averaged over the time period 2001-2007, the diagnosed effect amounts to a stimulation of hidden economic activity by almost 10% for particular economies. JEL classification: C31, D63, F33, H21, H26. Keywords: EU financing system, shadow economy, tax auditing.

Report of the Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector

  Report of the Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector Download this document (PDF 4.77mb) Alternatively, there is a lower resolution version available (PDF 2.31mb) Related Documents Resource Allocation, Financing and Sustainability in Health Care Evidence for the Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector (Volume I) – PDF, 4.25mbAlternatively, a Lower Resolution version is available – PDF, 2.23mb Resource Allocation, Financing and Sustainability in Health Care Evidence for the Expert Group on Resource Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector (Volume II) – PDF 4.87mbAlternatively, a Lower Resolution version is available – PDF, 2.65mb Presentation by Professor, Frances Ruane Director , ESRI and Chair of the Expert Group. PDF 235KB Presentation by Professor Charles Normand, a member of the Expert Group. PDF 32KB

The effect of patient, provider and financing regulations on the intensity of ambulatory physical therapy episodes : a multilevel analysis based on routinely available data

Background: Many studies have found considerable variations in the resource intensity of physical therapy episodes. Although they have identified several patient-and provider-related factors, few studies have examined their relative explanatory power. We sought to quantify the contribution of patients and providers to these differences and examine how effective Swiss regulations are (nine-session ceiling per prescription and bonus for first treatments). Methods: Our sample consisted of 87,866 first physical therapy episodes performed by 3,365 physiotherapists based on referrals by 6,131 physicians. We modeled the number of visits per episode using a multilevel log linear regression with crossed random effects for physiotherapists and physicians and with fixed effects for cantons. The three-level explanatory variables were patient, physiotherapist and physician characteristics. Results: The median number of sessions was nine (interquartile range 6-13). Physical therapy use increased with age, women, higher health care costs, lower deductibles, surgery and specific conditions. Use rose with the share of nine-session episodes among physiotherapists or physicians, but fell with the share of new treatments. Geographical area had no influence. Most of the variance was explained at the patient level, but the available factors explained only 4% thereof. Physiotherapists and physicians explained only 6% and 5% respectively of the variance, although the available factors explained most of this variance. Regulations were the most powerful factors. Conclusion: Against the backdrop of abundant physical therapy supply, Swiss financial regulations did not restrict utilization. Given that patient-related factors explained most of the variance, this group should be subject to closer scrutiny. Moreover, further research is needed on the determinants of patient demand.

Amazon Fund: financing deforestation avoidance

The Amazon Fund, created in 2008 by the Brazilian Federal Government, is managed by Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). It is a pioneering initiative to fundraise and manage financial resources to cut back deforestation and support sustainable development for 30 million inhabitants in the Amazon Biome. The Amazon Fund has already received more than R$ 1.7 billion in grants (about USD 787 million). This essay analyzes the Amazon Fund's governance and management with focus on its operation and from its stakeholders' perspectives. A combination of research methods includes: documental research, in-depth interviews, and speech analysis. The study offers a comparative analysis of strengths and weaknesses related to its governance. Furthermore, it proposes ways to improve its management towards greater effectiveness. The essay also includes an assessment of the government of Norway, a major donor to the fund. The governments of Norway and Germany, in partnership with Brazil, reveal how important it is to experiment with new means of international cooperation to successfully reduce greenhouse gas emissions through rainforest preservation.

Iowa Water Pollution Control Works and Drinking Water Facilities Financing Programs (Joint Programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources), June 30, 2002

State Agency Audit Report State Revolving Fund - Clean Water & Drinking Programs

Iowa Water Pollution Control Works and Drinking Water Facilities Financing Programs (Joint Programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources), Independent Auditor's Reports Financial Statements and Supplemental Information Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2003

State Agency Audit Report

Iowa Water Pollution Control Works and Drinking Water Facilities Financing Programs, (Joint Programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and The Iowa Department of Natural Resources), Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2004

State Audit Reports

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Iowa Water Pollution Control Works and Drinking Water Facilities Financing Programs, (Joint Programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources), Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2005

State Audit Reports

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Zero-Percent Financing" Can Cost You Plenty!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: ""Zero-Percent Financing" Can Cost You Plenty!