Fighting by sleep-deprived rats as a possible manifestation of panic: effects of sodium lactate

Increased fighting is an effect of desynchronized sleep deprivation (DSD) in rats, and recently this behavior has been suggested to be spontaneous panic and equivalent to panic disorder. In the present study we tested this hypothesis by evaluating the effect of sodium lactate on this aggressiveness, because this substance is recognized to induce spontaneous panic attacks in patients. A total of 186 male albino Wistar rats, 250-350 g, 90-120 days of age, were submitted to DSD (multiple platform method) for 0, 4, or 5 days. At the end of the deprivation period the rats were divided into subgroups respectively injected intraperitoneally with 1.86, 2.98 and 3.72 g/kg of 1 M sodium lactate, or 1.86 and 3.72 g/kg of 2 M sodium lactate. The control animals were submitted to the same procedures but received equivalent injections of sodium chloride. Regardless of DSD time, sleep-deprived animals that received sodium lactate presented a significantly higher mean number of fights (0.13 ± 0.02 fights/min) and a longer mean time spent in confrontation (2.43 ± 0.66 s/min) than the controls (0.01 ± 0.006 fights/min and 0.12 ± 0.07 s/min, respectively; P<0.01, Student t-test). For the sodium lactate group, concentration of the solution and time of deprivation increased the number of fights, with the mean number of fights and mean duration of fighting episodes being greater with the 2.98 g/kg dose using 1 M lactate concentration. These results support the hypothesis that fighting induced by DSD is probably a spontaneous panic manifestation. However, additional investigations are necessary in order to accept this as a promising animal model for studies on panic disorder.

Boar Presence Reduces Fighting in Mixed Slaughter-Weight Pigs

The article studies the presence of boars in reducing fighting in the groups of pigs therefore reducing skin blemishes.

Fighting strategies in two species of fig wasp

Although theory exists concerning the types of strategies that should be used in contests over resources, empirical work explicitly testing its predictions is relatively rare. We investigated male fighting strategies in two nonpollinating. g wasp species associated with Ficus rubiginosa figs. In Sycoscapter sp. A, males did not assess each other before or during fights over mating opportunities. Instead,fights continued until the loser reached an energetic cost threshold that was positively correlated with its body size (fighting ability) and retreated. In Philotrypesis sp. B, pre fight assessment was indicated, with males attacking competitively inferior rivals to remove them from the competitor pool ( they then continued to do so until they reached a cost threshold that was again positively correlated with body size). Using data on species ecology, we discuss our findings with respect to theory on when different fighting strategies should evolve. We argue that the type of strategy used by a. g wasp species is determined by its relative benefits in terms of inclusive fitness. (c) 2008 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Fighting skin cancer with prodrugs

Excessive exposure to uv light initiates melanoma in the skin. Tumour-specific enzymes are hijacked to deliver anticancer drugs.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

Fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the nature of the Islamist threat and the effectiveness of US counterterrorism strategy

This paper evaluates the US’ perception of and response to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operating in Yemen. It evaluates the empirical evidence on which the present understanding of the group is based, the implications of the socio-political context in which it operates, and the uneasy position of the Yemeni government in the war against terror as it has been affected by US policy from the early 1990s to the present. In the contested Yemeni state, AQAP is competing for political legitimacy and is increasingly dependent on public support. The US’ kill-or-capture response, the “on-off” nature of its support that has made Yemen vulnerable to the influence of al-Qaeda in the past, and the actions of the Yemeni government itself, which depends on the continued existence of the threat to secure financial support vital for political survival, means that none of the measures being taken has the potential to defeat AQAP.