An experimental investigation of moral commitments

This thesis explored the impact of non-contractual agreements in economic decisions. These statements of intent serve as a commitment device in strategic decisions and have been found to be an effective alternative to strong regulations in promoting social behaviour. Three studies have been undertaken using conceptual and methodological approaches from Behavioral and Experimental Economics. The first study explored in a public good setting the effect of public statements about intended social behaviour. The second study tested whether promises can help to promote co-operation in environments with uncertain choice options. The third study investigated a possible application of statement of intent and tested the effect of payment promises in a tax setting.

Reference groups and product line decisions: An experimental investigation of limited editions and product proliferation

Some luxury goods manufacturers offer limited editions of their products, whereas some others market multiple product lines. Researchers have found that reference groups shape consumer evaluations of these product categories. Yet little empirical research has examined how reference groups affect the product line decisions of firms. Indeed, in a field setting it is quite a challenge to isolate reference group effects from contextual effects and correlated effects. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious model that allows us to study how reference groups influence firm behavior and that lends itself to experimental analysis. With the aid of the model we investigate the behavior of consumers in a laboratory setting where we can focus on the reference group effects after controlling for the contextual and correlated effects. The experimental results show that in the presence of strong reference group effects, limited editions and multiple products can help improve firms' profits. Furthermore, the trends in the purchase decisions of our participants point to the possibility that they are capable of introspecting close to two steps of thinking at the outset of the game and then learning through reinforcement mechanisms. © 2010 INFORMS.

Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants sequentially guess which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed participants. In the second experiment, participants' beliefs about the chosen state are elicited. In equilibrium, low informed players who observe an established pattern of identical guesses herd without regard to their private information whereas high informed players always guess according to their private information. Equilibrium behavior implies that information cascades emerge in the group of low informed participants, the belief based solely on cascade guesses is stationary, and information cascades are systematically broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. Experimental results show that the behavior of low informed participants is qualitatively in line with the equilibrium prediction. Information cascades often emerge in our experiments. The tendency of low informed participants to engage in cascade behavior increases with the number of identical guesses. Our main finding is that information cascades are not fragile. The behavior of high informed participants differs markedly from the equilibrium prediction. Only one-third of laboratory cascades are broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. The relative frequency of cascade breaks is 15% for the situations where five or more identical guesses are observed. Participants' elicited beliefs are strongly consistent with their own behavior and show that, unlike in equilibrium, the more cascade guesses participants observe the more they believe in the state favored by those guesses.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

The use of non-hypothetical experimental markets for measuring the acceptance of genetically modified foods

The findings from a study measuring consumer acceptance of genetically modified (GM) foods are presented. The empirical data were collected in an experimental market, an approach used extensively in experimental economics for measuring the monetary value of goods. The approach has several advantages over standard approaches used in sensory and marketing research (e.g., surveys and focus groups) because of its non-hypothetical nature and the realism introduced by using real goods, real money, and market discipline. In each of three US locations, we elicited the monetary compensation consumers required to consume a GM food. Providing positive information about the benefits of GM food production, in some cases, reduced the level of monetary compensation demanded to consume the GM food. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.

Experimental results for Myopic Loss Aversion

This data is experimental results of "Myopic Loss Aversion: An Experimental Analysis for the Flexibility of Investment and the Frequency of Information Feedback Using Two Period Binomial Stock Model".

Tax morale affects tax compliance : evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

Our working hypotheses is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behaviour have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioural issue. Its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demondtrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.

Perceptions of fairness and allocation systems

This paper explores the conditions of acceptability of differing allocation systems under scarcity and evaluates what makes a price system more or less fair. We find that fairness in an allocation arrangement depend on the institutional settings inherent in the situation, such as information, transparency and competition and the perceived institutional quality e.g., fiscal exchange and institutional trust). Results also indicate that the solution “weak people first” is seen as the fairest approach to an excess demand situation, followed by “first come, first serve”, the price system and an auction system. On the other hand, a random procedure or an allocation through the government is not perceived to be fair. Moreover, economics students seemed to be less sceptical towards the price system than other subjects although we observe that female students are more sceptical than male students.

Interaction of natural survival instincts and internalized social norms exploring the Titanic and Lusitania disasters

To understand human behavior, it is important to know under what conditions people deviate from selfish rationality. This study explores the interaction of natural survival instincts and internalized social norms using data on the sinking of the Titanic and the Lusitania. We show that time pressure appears to be crucial when explaining behavior under extreme conditions of life and death. Even though the two vessels and the composition of their passengers were quite similar, the behavior of the individuals on board was dramatically different. On the Lusitania, selfish behavior dominated (which corresponds to the classical homo oeconomicus); on the Titanic, social norms and social status (class) dominated, which contradicts standard economics. This difference could be attributed to the fact that the Lusitania sank in 18 minutes, creating a situation in which the short-run flight impulse dominates behavior. On the slowly sinking Titanic (2 hours, 40 minutes), there was time for socially determined behavioral patterns to re-emerge. To our knowledge, this is the first time that these shipping disasters have been analyzed in a comparative manner with advanced statistical (econometric) techniques using individual data of the passengers and crew. Knowing human behavior under extreme conditions allows us to gain insights about how varied human behavior can be depending on differing external conditions.

Comment on “The spreading of disorder”

Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2008) conduct six interesting field experiments and report that their results provide evidence of the broken windows theory. Such an analysis is highly relevant as the (broken windows) theory is both controversial and lacking empirical support. Keizer et al.’s key aim was to conceptualize a disorderly setting in such a way that it is linked to a process of spreading norm violation. The strength of the study is the exploration of cross-norm inhibition effects in a controlled field experimental environment. Their results show that if norm violating behavior becomes more common, it negatively affects compliance in other areas. Nevertheless, this comment paper discusses several shortcomings or limitations and provides new empirical evidence that deals with these problems.

Behavioural evidence for social preferences

A central topic in economics is the existence of social preferences. Behavioural economics in general has approached the issue from several angles. Controlled experimental settings, surveys, and field experiments are able to show that in a number of economic environments, people usually care about immaterial things such as fairness or equity of allocations. Findings from experimental economics specifically have lead to large increase in theories addressing social preferences. Most (pro)social phenomena are well understood in the experimental settings but very difficult to observe 'in the wild'. One criticism in this regard is that many findings are bound by the artificial environment of the computer lab or survey method used. A further criticism is that the traditional methods also fail to directly attribute the observed behaviour to the mental constructs that are expected to stand behind them. This thesis will first examine the usefulness of sports data to test social preference models in a field environment, thus overcoming limitations of the lab with regards to applicability to other - non-artificial - environments. The second major contribution of this research establishes a new neuroscientific tool - the measurement of the heart rate variability - to observe participants' emotional reactions in a traditional experimental setup.

Heart beats and economic decisions : Observing mental stress in the ultimatum bargaining game

One aim of experimental economics is to try to better understand human economic decision making. Early research of the ultimatum bargaining game (Gueth et al., 1982) revealed that other motives than pure monetary reward play a role. Neuroeconomic research has introduced the recording of physiological observations as signals of emotional responses. In this study, we apply heart rate variability (HRV) measuring technology to explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of proposers and responders in the ultimatum bargaining game. Since this technology is small and non-intrusive, we are able to run the experiment in a standard experimental economic setup. We show that low o�ers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder, as both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.

Heartbeat and economic decisions : observing mental stress among proposers and responders in the ultimatum bargaining game

The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), a widely used method in experimental economics, clearly demonstrates that motives other than pure monetary reward play a role in human economic decision making. In this study, we explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of both responders and proposers in an ultimatum bargaining game using heart rate variability (HRV), a small and nonintrusive technology that allows observation of both sides of an interaction in a normal experimental economics laboratory environment. We find that low offers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder; that is, both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.