Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

The cost of granting executive stock options with strike prices adjusted by the cost of capital

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to estimate the cost of granting executive stocks with strike prices adjusted by the cost of capital.

Design/methodology/approach – In the paper a Monte Carlo simulation approach developed in Longstaff and Schwartz is used in conjunction with the subjective valuation model developed in Ingersoll to value these executive stock options that are subject to performance hurdles.

Findings – The paper finds that standard European Black-Scholes-Merton option values overstate the true cost to the firm of granting these executive stock options. The option values also decrease with a higher dividend yield, a higher performance hurdle, a longer vesting period, and a shorter maturity.

Research limitations/implications – While the study in the paper is limited to the valuation of executive options, the methodology can be used to study incentive effects of executive stock options that have a performance hurdle.

Practical implications – The approach used in this paper to estimate the cost of granting executive stock options is a clear improvement over standard European option pricing approaches that often result in biased estimates.

Originality/value – This paper presents a first attempt to integrate the Ingersoll utility-theoretic model and the Longstaff and Schwartz least squares Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate the subjective value and the objective cost of executive stock options with a performance hurdle. This valuation approach will be useful in the study of other types of executive compensation.

Hurdle rate : executive stock options

Executive stock options with a rising strike price are a recent innovation in executive compensation in Australia and New Zealand. These options combine a dividend protection feature and a strike price that increases at a hurdle rate set with reference to a cost of capital estimate. With a constant dividend yield, the strike price becomes a path-dependent function of the stock price and exact analytic valuation becomes intractable. However, path-dependent American options can be valued using a Monte Carlo approach proposed in Longstaff and Schwartz (2001). We examine procedures for valuing these options and compare them with Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) formula valuations.

Corporate governance of executive remuneration with special reference to Bangladesh

This discussion paper focuses on corporate governance issues associated with executive compensation arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence of a sound empirically-based understanding of good corporate governance practices in relation to share-based payment arrangements. The paper provides an overview of issues including the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of regulations affecting executive remuneration. Potential research questions have been framed addressing each of the major issues identified in this paper. It is concluded that corporate regulators should ensure they are familiar with and that they consider best practice models for corporate governance when developing new or revising existing business regulation. It is proposed that further research to remedy this deficiency would enable a more accurate assessment of the impact of management on accounting regulation and the better design and implementation of regulation.

Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing

Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

Essays on Stock Options, Incentives, and Managerial Action

Executive compensation and managerial behavior have received an increasing amount of attention in the financial economics literature since the mid 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of managerial compensation, especially how stock option compensation is linked to the actions undertaken by the management. Furthermore, managerial compensation is continuously and heatedly debated in the media and an emerging consensus from this discussion seems to be that there still exists gaps in our knowledge of optimal contracting. In Finland, the first executive stock options were introduced in the 1980s and throughout the last 15 years it has become increasingly popular for Finnish listed firms to use this type of managerial compensation. The empirical work in the thesis is conducted using data from Finland, in contrast to most previous studies that predominantly use U.S. data. Using Finnish data provides insight of how market conditions affect compensation and managerial action and provides an opportunity to explore what parts of the U.S. evidence can be generalized to other markets. The thesis consists of four essays. The first essay investigates the exercise policy of the executive stock option holders in Finland. In summary, Essay 1 contributes to our understanding of the exercise policies by examining both the determinants of the exercise decision and the markets reaction to the actual exercises. The second essay analyzes the factors driving stock option grants using data for Finnish publicly listed firms. Several agency theory based variables are found to have have explanatory power on the likelihood of a stock option grant. Essay 2 also contributes to our understanding of behavioral factors, such as prior stock return, as determinants of stock option compensation. The third essay investigates the tax and stock option motives for share repurchases and dividend distributions. We document strong support for the tax motive for share repurchases. Furthermore, we also analyze the dividend distribution decision in companies with stock options and find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. We thus document that the cutting of dividends found in previous U.S. studies can be avoided by dividend protection. In the fourth essay we approach the puzzle of negative skewness in stock returns from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. We suggest that negative skewness in stock returns is generated by management disclosure practices and find proof for this. More specifically, we find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when non-scheduled firm specific news is disclosed.

Factors Driving Stock Option Grants - Empirical Evidence from Finland

This study contributes to the executive stock option literature by looking at factors driving the introduction of such a compensation form on a firm level. Using a discrete decision model I test the explanatory power of several agency theory based variables and find strong support for predictability of the form of executive compensation. Ownership concentration and liquidity are found to have a significant negative effect on the probability of stock option adoption. Furtermore, I find evidence of CEO ownership, institutional ownership, investment intensity, and historical market return having a significant and a positive relationship to the likelihood of adopting a executive stock option program.

Acculturation and Global Mindsponge

Much research on acculturation around global experiences has focused on the “type” of overseas experience—e.g. expatriate, repatriate, inpatriate, flexpatriate. The experiences of people in those categories and across various demographics (single/married/divorced; gender; sexual orientation) can differ dramatically. In addition, given the explosion of people working in global business, some global business citizens could well fit into several of those various types of experiences over the course of their careers. In this paper, we propose to push in a somewhat different direction and explore something that for us would be quite new. Rather than focusing on the various categories and their resulting experiences, we take a step back to consider what attributes and ways of thinking a global citizen may need to become better as a global business citizen, regardless of type of experience. The question is less one of “Who am I” than “How can I become better?”. Essentially, we would like to explore what might be required in moving the global citizen from thinking about “global mindset” to “global mindsponge.” When we hear the term mindset, we think of a certain way of thinking that stays rather fixed. So part of the challenge of the paper will be to define and examine what mindsponge might mean in the global context—what does it take to unlearn or squeeze out certain ways of thinking or behaving before absorbing and reshaping new ways of thinking and behaving? Moreover, how might that become part of a natural and regular way of operating, especially in a rapidly changing developing country like Vietnam, in particular? At this early stage, we think of mind sponge as a mechanism that encourages flexibility and receptiveness through a process of using multiple filters and more focus on creativity, or doing things differently to improve an organization or individual performance. Our goal is to develop a basic conceptual framework for “mindsponge,” drawing upon a broad literature review as well as several unstructured interviews, to assess whether the idea of mindsponge helps people perceive that they are more culturally versatile and culturally mobile, regardless of whether they work in or outside of their “home environment.” We hope this would enhance their ability to shape an emerging set of cultural values that erases the divide between “foreign” and “local” cultural differences that so often dominates in emerging economies.

Income differentials and corporate performance

Purpose – This paper seeks to make the case for new research into the perceived fairness and impact of executive pay. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the literature regarding executive compensation and corporate performance and examines the evidence that a more egalitarian approach to pay could be justified in terms of long-term shareholder value. Findings – There would appear to be no evidence to suggest that the growing gap between the pay of executives and that of the average employee generates long-term enterprise value, and it may even be detrimental to firms, if not the liberal capitalist consensus on which the corporate licence to operate is based. Research limitations/implications – The paper outlines a new approach to tracking income differentials with corporate performance through the development of a corporate Gini coefficient “league table”. Social implications – The proposed research is expected to point towards better practice in executive remuneration, and support the growing momentum for a sustainable and enlightened approach to business, in which the key goal is long-term enterprise value based on a fair distribution of the rewards of business. Originality/value – In producing a deeper understanding of the impact of widening income differentials, the paper should be of interest to senior executives in publicly quoted companies as well as press commentators, government officials and academics.

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.

Changing social norms and CEO pay: the role of norms entrepreneurs

This is the third in a series of papers examining different aspects of the CEO compensation debate. This Article will explore attempts by norms entrepreneurs to create or modify social norms. It argues that the relevant social norms are in a state of flux because of the work of norms entrepreneurs, whose efforts might reduce the need for legislative intervention. Several new norms like majority voting for board election, say on pay, smaller multiples for severance packages, and respect for shareholder activists may be emerging due to the work of norms entrepreneurs. Part II analyzes the rich literature on social norms to determine if there are models capable of application to better correlate executive compensation with performance. Despite several problems at the definitional level, it argues that the actions of constituencies relevant to the CEO pay debate might be explained by signaling, esteem, and expressive theories. Further, social norms theories neglecting internalization are deficient; corporate actors undertake self-improvement only when they internalize norms. Part III identifies the work of norms entrepreneurs in creating or changing norms pertaining to CEO compensation, and analyzes the reasons for their success. The examples considered demonstrate the effects of dynamic normative transformations on corporate actors and illustrate the contrast in behavioral changes accompanying resistance and acceptance of new norms. Part IV concludes that norm creation in corporate law is facilitated by the role of groups where membership benefits are dependent on reputation; that directors cannot tradeoff reputation like CEOs, making the deployment of reputational sanctions against them powerful; that behavioral change is more effective when there is norm internalization; and that norms entrepreneurs ought to focus on socializing relevant actors if they aspire to be successful in achieving normative change.

A utilização do valor econômico adicionado como ferramenta de gestão financeira

Lets imagine how should be fine to disclose a new measure form to investigate the businessman performance as if the job done is bringing back to the stockholder, the best results. Also, would be better to exists an executive compensation, by his add value created to the stockholder.The word ¿add value¿ is at the summit point on the financial world, all the companies are involved on creating add value" into the assets.So, the EVA (Economic Value Added) has come, a patented trade mark by a consulting corporation company, the Stern & Stewart Co. as a new indicator of companies performances.This assignment has motivated to running out na empirical research in order to find out the right methodology its qualitys and its differentials."