Hégémonie du modèle de l'autisme: carrefour epistémologique entre médecine, familles et politique [Hegemonic model of autism: epistemological crossroads between medicine, family and politics].

The aim of this article is to make a contribution to the regional reflection with regard to autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) at a key moment in which the authorities are requested by the users, professionals in the fields of health, pedagogy and education to put forward a structured answer to a multitude of expressed needs. The question for the creation of a competence pole of an academic tertiary level is posed in order to advise in the best possible way the families who do not know how to orient themselves in the maze and contradictions of the proposed solutions and to help the professionals who are submerged by an ever increasing demand of services exceeding the means of the existing institutions and who cannot justify their choices among the various existing theoretical and scientific models.

Europa als ulls dels Annales (1093-1933)

During this first third of this century, the continent of Europe witnessed far-reaching territorial transformations in the nineteenth century model. To some extent, the setting wich had inspired the epistemological structure of the French regional school was being replaced by one in which -at least to externa1 appearances- the relationship between the physical environment and human activities was much less evident. The adaptation of the theoretical and methodological context to the new Europe seems to take the form of a non-lineal evolution, for in the latter years of the period examined, evolutionary tendencies indicate a return to the more classical model. In this way, the growing interest which the publication had shown in Atlantic Europe and topics of a more economic nature, was truncated. The traditional settings --especially the Mediterranean- came to the fore again and interest in rural societies was renewed. Likewise, the monographic studies which had demonstrated distinct functional objectives in the midtwenties, recovered elements of ecological explanation, and the search for the relationship between environment and society

Epistemological tensions between linguistic description and ordinary speakers' intuitive knowledge: examples from French verb morphology

In this article, I address epistemological questions regarding the status of linguistic rules and the pervasive--though seldom discussed--tension that arises between theory-driven object perception by linguists on the one hand, and ordinary speakers' possible intuitive knowledge on the other hand. Several issues will be discussed using examples from French verb morphology, based on the 6500 verbs from Le Petit Robert dictionary (2013).

Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.

Analysis of metabolites from plants of the Swartzia genus using chemical indexes: evolutionary tendencies

The chemical indexes, suggested by Gottlieb et al., have not been used before regarding evolutionary tendency of species in the Swartzia genus. However, the importance of this work encouraged for an analysis of the Swartzia genus using the metabolites isolated from nine species. The analysis, based on calculated chemical indexes, provided an evolutionary tendency for these plants, which correlates with the classification based on morphological analysis.

Epistemological anarchism of Paul Karl Feyerabend and medical education

The thoughts of the philosopher Paul Karl Feyerabend brought important contributions to the debate on Science in the 20th century. Most recently his views about non-existence of a single method for doing science have been employed to rethink science education and propose the use of multiple methods for effective teaching-learning process. This article employs the theoretical framework of the author expressed in the book Against Method, 1977, about the epistemological anarchism and the methodological pluralism and uses it in the contemporary discussion of medical education.