On the Complexity of Strong and Epistemic Credal Networks

Credal networks are graph-based statistical models whose parameters take values on a set, instead of being sharply specified as in traditional statistical models (e.g., Bayesian networks). The result of inferences with such models depends on the irrelevance/independence concept adopted. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of inferences under the concepts of epistemic irrelevance and strong independence. We strengthen complexity results by showing that inferences with strong independence are NP-hard even in credal trees with ternary variables, which indicates that tractable algorithms, including the existing one for epistemic trees, cannot be used for strong independence. We prove that the polynomial time of inferences in credal trees under epistemic irrelevance is not likely to extend to more general models, because the problem becomes NP-hard even in simple polytrees. These results draw a definite line between networks with efficient inferences and those where inferences are hard, and close several open questions regarding the computational complexity of such models.

Computing lower and upper expectations under epistemic independence

This paper investigates the computation of lower/upper expectations that must cohere with a collection of probabilistic assessments and a collection of judgements of epistemic independence. New algorithms, based on multilinear programming, are presented, both for independence among events and among random variables. Separation properties of graphical models are also investigated.

A Syntactic Approach to Revising Epistemic States with Uncertain Inputs

Revising its beliefs when receiving new information is an important ability of any intelligent system. However, in realistic settings the new input is not always certain. A compelling way of dealing with uncertain input in an agent-based setting is to treat it as unreliable input, which may strengthen or weaken the beliefs of the agent. Recent work focused on the postulates associated with this form of belief change and on finding semantical operators that satisfy these postulates. In this paper we propose a new syntactic approach for this form of belief change and show that it agrees with the semantical definition. This makes it feasible to develop complex agent systems capable of efficiently dealing with unreliable input in a semantically meaningful way. Additionally, we show that imposing restrictions on the input and the beliefs that are entailed allows us to devise a tractable approach suitable for resource-bounded agents or agents where reactiveness is of paramount importance.

A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states

Belief revision performs belief change on an agent’s beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey’s rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey’s rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates C1 and C2.

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism

According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy.

The Role of Epistemic Monitoring in Language Comprehension

In der psycholinguistischen Forschung ist die Annahme weitverbreitet, dass die Bewertung von Informationen hinsichtlich ihres Wahrheitsgehaltes oder ihrer Plausibilität (epistemische Validierung; Richter, Schroeder & Wöhrmann, 2009) ein strategischer, optionaler und dem Verstehen nachgeschalteter Prozess ist (z.B. Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993; Herbert & Kübler, 2011). Eine zunehmende Anzahl an Studien stellt dieses Zwei-Stufen-Modell von Verstehen und Validieren jedoch direkt oder indirekt in Frage. Insbesondere Befunde zu Stroop-artigen Stimulus-Antwort-Kompatibilitätseffekten, die auftreten, wenn positive und negative Antworten orthogonal zum aufgaben-irrelevanten Wahrheitsgehalt von Sätzen abgegeben werden müssen (z.B. eine positive Antwort nach dem Lesen eines falschen Satzes oder eine negative Antwort nach dem Lesen eines wahren Satzes; epistemischer Stroop-Effekt, Richter et al., 2009), sprechen dafür, dass Leser/innen schon beim Verstehen eine nicht-strategische Überprüfung der Validität von Informationen vornehmen. Ausgehend von diesen Befunden war das Ziel dieser Dissertation eine weiterführende Überprüfung der Annahme, dass Verstehen einen nicht-strategischen, routinisierten, wissensbasierten Validierungsprozesses (epistemisches Monitoring; Richter et al., 2009) beinhaltet. Zu diesem Zweck wurden drei empirische Studien mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten durchgeführt. Studie 1 diente der Untersuchung der Fragestellung, ob sich Belege für epistemisches Monitoring auch bei Informationen finden lassen, die nicht eindeutig wahr oder falsch, sondern lediglich mehr oder weniger plausibel sind. Mithilfe des epistemischen Stroop-Paradigmas von Richter et al. (2009) konnte ein Kompatibilitätseffekt von aufgaben-irrelevanter Plausibilität auf die Latenzen positiver und negativer Antworten in zwei unterschiedlichen experimentellen Aufgaben nachgewiesen werden, welcher dafür spricht, dass epistemisches Monitoring auch graduelle Unterschiede in der Übereinstimmung von Informationen mit dem Weltwissen berücksichtigt. Darüber hinaus belegen die Ergebnisse, dass der epistemische Stroop-Effekt tatsächlich auf Plausibilität und nicht etwa auf der unterschiedlichen Vorhersagbarkeit von plausiblen und unplausiblen Informationen beruht. Das Ziel von Studie 2 war die Prüfung der Hypothese, dass epistemisches Monitoring keinen evaluativen Mindset erfordert. Im Gegensatz zu den Befunden anderer Autoren (Wiswede, Koranyi, Müller, Langner, & Rothermund, 2013) zeigte sich in dieser Studie ein Kompatibilitätseffekt des aufgaben-irrelevanten Wahrheitsgehaltes auf die Antwortlatenzen in einer vollständig nicht-evaluativen Aufgabe. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass epistemisches Monitoring nicht von einem evaluativen Mindset, möglicherweise aber von der Tiefe der Verarbeitung abhängig ist. Studie 3 beleuchtete das Verhältnis von Verstehen und Validieren anhand einer Untersuchung der Online-Effekte von Plausibilität und Vorhersagbarkeit auf Augenbewegungen beim Lesen kurzer Texte. Zusätzlich wurde die potentielle Modulierung dieser Effeke durch epistemische Marker, die die Sicherheit von Informationen anzeigen (z.B. sicherlich oder vielleicht), untersucht. Entsprechend der Annahme eines schnellen und nicht-strategischen epistemischen Monitoring-Prozesses zeigten sich interaktive Effekte von Plausibilität und dem Vorhandensein epistemischer Marker auf Indikatoren früher Verstehensprozesse. Dies spricht dafür, dass die kommunizierte Sicherheit von Informationen durch den Monitoring-Prozess berücksichtigt wird. Insgesamt sprechen die Befunde gegen eine Konzeptualisierung von Verstehen und Validieren als nicht-überlappenden Stufen der Informationsverarbeitung. Vielmehr scheint eine Bewertung des Wahrheitsgehalts oder der Plausibilität basierend auf dem Weltwissen – zumindest in gewissem Ausmaß – eine obligatorische und nicht-strategische Komponente des Sprachverstehens zu sein. Die Bedeutung der Befunde für aktuelle Modelle des Sprachverstehens und Empfehlungen für die weiterführende Forschung zum Vehältnis von Verstehen und Validieren werden aufgezeigt.

Knowledge practices in design: The role of visual representations as 'epistemic objects'

We use a detailed study of the knowledge work around visual representations to draw attention to the multidimensional nature of `objects'. Objects are variously described in the literatures as relatively stable or in flux; as abstract or concrete; and as used within or across practices. We clarify these dimensions, drawing on and extending the literature on boundary objects, and connecting it with work on epistemic and technical objects. In particular, we highlight the epistemic role of objects, using our observations of knowledge work on an architectural design project to show how, in this setting, visual representations are characterized by a `lack' or incompleteness that precipitates unfolding. The conceptual design of a building involves a wide range of technical, social and aesthetic forms of knowledge that need to be developed and aligned. We explore how visual representations are used, and how these are meaningful to different stakeholders, eliciting their distinct contributions. As the project evolves and the drawings change, new issues and needs for knowledge work arise. These objects have an `unfolding ontology' and are constantly in flux, rather than fully formed. We discuss the implications for wider understandings of objects in organizations and for how knowledge work is achieved in practice.

Policy ‘framing’ and evidence-based planning: ‘epistemic communities’ in the multi-jurisdictional environment of an enlarged Europe

The following paper builds on ongoing discussions over the spatial and territorial turns in planning, as it relates to the dynamics of evidence-based planning and knowledge production in the policy process. It brings this knowledge perspective to the organizational and institutional dynamics of transformational challenges implicit in the recent enlargement of the EU. Thus it explores the development of new spatial ideas and planning approaches, and their potential to shape or ‘frame’ spatial policy through the formulation of new institutional arrangements and the de-institutionalization of others. That is, how knowledge is created, contested, mobilized and controlled across governance architectures or territorial knowledge channels. In so doing, the paper elaborates and discusses a theoretical framework through which the interplay of knowledge and policymaking can be conceptualized and analyzed.