Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance

Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors minimize risk for a given level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets. This study sets out to determine the role of the institutional investor in monitoring risk and firm performance. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical study shows a positive association between firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and performance for firms with increasing institutional shareholdings. The study also finds that the significance of this association depends on the institutional investor's ability to influence management, which in turn depends on the size of ownership and whether the investee firm does not have potential business dealings with the investor. We also find that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors engage in promoting short-term performance or exit rather than support long-term value creation. The results are robust while controlling the potential for endogeneity and using sensitivity tests to control for variants of performance and risk. These findings add to the growing body of literature examining institutional ownership and the importance of understanding the role of risk-management in the risk and return relation.

The impact of equity markets and corporate governance on labour market flexibility

Drawing from various literatures, this article explores links between equity markets and labour market flexibility. Various data sources are used to test relationships for a set of OECD countries, controlling for other likely influences on flexibility such as government and industrial relations institutions. The results are generally supportive as regards employment flexibility: equity market trading activity is associated with shorter job tenure, higher activity rates, and greater employment change over the cycle. However, the relationship between equity markets and pay flexibility is less statistically robust to the addition of controls.

Independent Directors and Corporate Governance

The paper examines the reliance placed in the United Kingdom and Australia on the concept of ‘independent directors’ as a mechanism to ensure better (less crisis prone) corporate governance. The article suggests that there is an over emphasis placed on some rather limited psychological evidence that independence in the boardroom produces more critical thinking and informed discussion thus leading to higher quality decision-making. The article offers others evidence, drawn from the material on the psychology of group formation and group discussion, which suggests that this confidence in ‘independence’ is misplaced. The article exposes a misunderstanding between independence as a character trait and independence as a structural concern which goes to the heart of the corporate governance discourse around the benefits of independence.

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

Executive remuneration, financial performance and corporate governance in UK and Spanish listed firms

This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

Intellectual capital disclosures and corporate governance:an empirical examination

Empirical examinations of the links between corporate governance and intellectual capital are underresearched, particularly from the context of emerging economies where corporate governance mechanisms tend to be largely ceremonial due to family dominance. This study aims to address this gap in the intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) literature by undertaking an empirical examination of the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of ICD of Bangladeshi companies. Inter alia, the key findings of this study suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between family ownership and the extent of ICD. This research also found that foreign ownership, board independence, and the presence of audit committees are positively associated with the extent of ICD. Conversely, family duality (i.e., where the positions of CEO and chairperson are occupied by two individuals from the same family) is negatively associated with the extent of ICD.

State control and corporate governance in transition economies:25 years on from 1989

Research Question/Issue - Which forms of state control over corporations have emerged in countries that made a transition from centrally-planned to marked-based economies and what are their implications for corporate governance? We assess the literature on variation and evolution of state control in transition economies, focusing on corporate governance of state-controlled firms. We highlight emerging trends and identify future research avenues. Research Findings/Insights - Based on our analysis of more than 100 articles in leading management, finance, and economics journals since 1989, we demonstrate how research on state control evolved from a polarized approach of public–private equity ownership comparison to studying a variety of constellations of state capitalism. Theoretical/Academic Implications - We identify theoretical perspectives that help us better understand benefits and costs associated with various forms of state control over firms. We encourage future studies to examine how context-specific factors determine the effect of state control on corporate governance. Practitioner/Policy Implications - Investors and policymakers should consider under which conditions investing in state-affiliated firms generates superior returns.

The impact of culture and corporate governance in dividend policy: evidence from emerging and developed countries

The present research aims to analyse the impact of corporate governance and cultural dimensions in dividend policy. The corporate governance and dividend policy have a close relationship, in that both are evidenced in literature to mitigate agency problems. Cultural factors are also related to agency problems. The existence of agency problems and their solutions differs across countries and it is related to the implementation of the mechanisms of governance. So, cultural factors may have influence on corporate governance and dividend policy. Our sample consists in 1 232 companies belonging to the main indices of 38 countries classified as emerging or developed. To measure the quality of firm level corporate governance, we use the ASSET4 Corporate Governance Performance Index, developed by Thomson Reuters, and as proxy of culture we use three cultural dimensions developed by Geert Hofstede, namely uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and indulgence. We obtained significant empirical evidence that firms with high quality of corporate governance pay higher dividends. With regard to cultural factors, we confirm that in countries with high levels of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, the dividend payout ratio is lower. On the other hand, countries with high level of indulgence have higher dividend payout ratio. However, we verify that the impact of cultural effects is minimized when the firms have a high quality level of corporate governance. Additionally, we found that the impact of corporate governance and cultural factors in dividend policy differs when dealing with emerging or developed countries.