Constructing a ‘moment of crisis’ and its adequate solution

The rejection of the European Constitution marks an important crystallization point for debate about the European Union (EU) and the integration process. The European Constitution was envisaged as the founding document of a renewed and enlarged European Union and thus it was rather assumed to find wide public support. Its rejection was not anticipated. The negative referenda in France and the Netherlands therefore led to a controversial debate about the more fundamental meaning and the consequences of the rejection both for the immediate state of affairs as well as for the further integration process. The rejection of the Constitution and the controversy about its correct interpretation therefore present an intriguing puzzle for political analysis. Although the treaty rejection was taken up widely in the field of European Studies, the focus of existing analyses has predominantly been on explaining why the current situation occurred. Underlying these approaches is the premise that by establishing the reasons for the rejection it is possible to derive the ‘true’ meaning of the event for the EU integration process. In my paper I rely on an alternative, discourse theoretical approach which aims to overcome the positivist perspective dominating the existing analyses. I argue that the meaning of the event ‘treaty rejection’ is not fixed or inherent to it but discursively constructed. The critical assessment of this concrete meaning-production is of high relevance as the specific meaning attributed to the treaty rejection effectively constrains the scope for supposedly ‘reasonable’ options for action, both in the concrete situation and in the further European integration process more generally. I will argue that the overall framing suggests a fundamental technocratic approach to governance from part of the Commission. Political struggle and public deliberation is no longer foreseen as the concrete solutions to the citizens’ general concerns are designed by supposedly apolitical experts. Through the communicative diffusion and the active implementation of this particular model of governance the Commission shapes the future integration process in a more substantial way than is obvious from its seemingly limited immediate problem-solving orientation of overcoming the ‘constitutional crisis’. As the European Commission is a central actor in the discourse production my analysis focuses on the specific interpretation of the situation put forward by the Commission. In order to work out the Commission’s particular take on the event I conducted a frame analysis (according to Benford/Snow) on a body of key sources produced in the context of coping with the treaty rejection.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

European Union Leadership and Enlargement in 2014. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 14, July 2014

On July 15, 2014 the European Parliament confirmed the new European Commission President. An absolute majority was needed for this purpose, and the 422 votes “For” cleared the 376-vote threshold in the legislative body of 751 members. A Grand Coalition has been formed among the three largest political parties: the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliances of Socialists Democrats (S&D), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Considering policy decisions going forward, the European Union (EU) faces the pressing question: Will there be more, less, or similar power from the EU? There are a greater number voices from across the political spectrum contributing to the democratic plurality. European leaders may regain trust by acknowledging that future governance will not be “business as usual” as the reform agenda gets underway. 2014 has been an exciting and important year in European politics. “This time is different” was the motto for the European Parliament’s election campaign. This essay analyzes recent EU political trends with the new Commission leadership and the Parliamentary elections results. The Parliamentary elections, held in late May, and the new European Commission, planned to be in place in the autumn, influence the leadership direction of the 28-member bloc. Additionally, this year on July 1 Croatia celebrated the first anniversary of joining the EU in 2013. Leading the way for candidate countries, Croatia embraces the democratic politics and capitalist market economics embodied by the EU. The greater number of seats held by newer political parties in the European Parliament demonstrates increasing plurality in the EU democracy. The Parliamentary elections have taken place every 5 years since 1979. In this eighth legislative session, the EPP and the S&D remain the largest parties represented, with 221 and 191 seats respectively. As the EU has evolved, a greater number of voices influence politics. The ongoing point of contention on a host of policies is national sovereignty in relation to pooled sovereignty in the EU. The European Parliament is important for democracy in EU governance since it is the direct link from the national citizens to their elected leaders at the supranational level. The representatives of the European Commission are appointed by the national governments of Member States, and their heads of government are the representatives to the European Council. These three political institutions – the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council – together with other important institutions, including the European Court of Justice Luxembourg, form the EU. The new European Commission President is Jean-Claude Juncker, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Luxembourg (1995-2013). After being nominated by the European Council on June 27, his candidacy was voted on by the European Parliament on July 15, according to the guidelines of the Lisbon Treaty. The leadership for the President of the European Commission has been an important issue, considering Britain’s deliberations on whether or not to stay in the EU in the face of a future national referendum. Voting on June 27, among the European Council on the nomination of Commission President-Designate Juncker, was 26 in favor and 2 opposed. Only Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, joined David Cameron, the prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK), with a negative vote (Spiegel and Parker 2014). The UK had not been supportive, being concerned that Juncker embraces the policies of a federalist, prioritizing an ever-closer union above the interests of individual Member States. Historically, since joining the predecessor institution of the European Economic Community in 1973, the UK has had a relatively independent attitude about participation in the EU.

Military implications of NATO enlargement and post-conflict Iraq : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, April 10, 2003.

Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.

The Franco-German motor before the eastern enlargement: the causes of its decline

The Franco-German axis has been a transcendent force behind the European integration ever since the early years of the EEC. Nevertheless, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the perception of a progressive distancing between France and Germany as far as the EU politics is concerned, has increased. There has not been a definitive break in Franco-German relations. However, the influence of the Franco-German axis in the EU has been reduced in the 90s. Finally, in the Nice IGC (December 2000), the misunderstandings of these two “big” states about their weight in the Council, almost caused the failure to conclude the Treaty of Nice, clearing the way for the Eastern enlargement. The traditional balance between France and Germany has been eroded. Germany has consolidated its role of leadership in the EU, and above all towards the candidate countries. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the fifth enlargement as one of the causes of the decline of the Franco-German axis as the motor of the process of European integration.

Rules of origin : from analysis to reform

General Introduction This thesis can be divided into two main parts :the first one, corresponding to the first three chapters, studies Rules of Origin (RoOs) in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs); the second part -the fourth chapter- is concerned with Anti-Dumping (AD) measures. Despite wide-ranging preferential access granted to developing countries by industrial ones under North-South Trade Agreements -whether reciprocal, like the Europe Agreements (EAs) or NAFTA, or not, such as the GSP, AGOA, or EBA-, it has been claimed that the benefits from improved market access keep falling short of the full potential benefits. RoOs are largely regarded as a primary cause of the under-utilization of improved market access of PTAs. RoOs are the rules that determine the eligibility of goods to preferential treatment. Their economic justification is to prevent trade deflection, i.e. to prevent non-preferred exporters from using the tariff preferences. However, they are complex, cost raising and cumbersome, and can be manipulated by organised special interest groups. As a result, RoOs can restrain trade beyond what it is needed to prevent trade deflection and hence restrict market access in a statistically significant and quantitatively large proportion. Part l In order to further our understanding of the effects of RoOs in PTAs, the first chapter, written with Pr. Olivier Cadot, Celine Carrère and Pr. Jaime de Melo, describes and evaluates the RoOs governing EU and US PTAs. It draws on utilization-rate data for Mexican exports to the US in 2001 and on similar data for ACP exports to the EU in 2002. The paper makes two contributions. First, we construct an R-index of restrictiveness of RoOs along the lines first proposed by Estevadeordal (2000) for NAFTA, modifying it and extending it for the EU's single-list (SL). This synthetic R-index is then used to compare Roos under NAFTA and PANEURO. The two main findings of the chapter are as follows. First, it shows, in the case of PANEURO, that the R-index is useful to summarize how countries are differently affected by the same set of RoOs because of their different export baskets to the EU. Second, it is shown that the Rindex is a relatively reliable statistic in the sense that, subject to caveats, after controlling for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, it accounts for differences in utilization rates at the tariff line level. Finally, together with utilization rates, the index can be used to estimate total compliance costs of RoOs. The second chapter proposes a reform of preferential Roos with the aim of making them more transparent and less discriminatory. Such a reform would make preferential blocs more "cross-compatible" and would therefore facilitate cumulation. It would also contribute to move regionalism toward more openness and hence to make it more compatible with the multilateral trading system. It focuses on NAFTA, one of the most restrictive FTAs (see Estevadeordal and Suominen 2006), and proposes a way forward that is close in spirit to what the EU Commission is considering for the PANEURO system. In a nutshell, the idea is to replace the current array of RoOs by a single instrument- Maximum Foreign Content (MFC). An MFC is a conceptually clear and transparent instrument, like a tariff. Therefore changing all instruments into an MFC would bring improved transparency pretty much like the "tariffication" of NTBs. The methodology for this exercise is as follows: In step 1, I estimate the relationship between utilization rates, tariff preferences and RoOs. In step 2, I retrieve the estimates and invert the relationship to get a simulated MFC that gives, line by line, the same utilization rate as the old array of Roos. In step 3, I calculate the trade-weighted average of the simulated MFC across all lines to get an overall equivalent of the current system and explore the possibility of setting this unique instrument at a uniform rate across lines. This would have two advantages. First, like a uniform tariff, a uniform MFC would make it difficult for lobbies to manipulate the instrument at the margin. This argument is standard in the political-economy literature and has been used time and again in support of reductions in the variance of tariffs (together with standard welfare considerations). Second, uniformity across lines is the only way to eliminate the indirect source of discrimination alluded to earlier. Only if two countries face uniform RoOs and tariff preference will they face uniform incentives irrespective of their initial export structure. The result of this exercise is striking: the average simulated MFC is 25% of good value, a very low (i.e. restrictive) level, confirming Estevadeordal and Suominen's critical assessment of NAFTA's RoOs. Adopting a uniform MFC would imply a relaxation from the benchmark level for sectors like chemicals or textiles & apparel, and a stiffening for wood products, papers and base metals. Overall, however, the changes are not drastic, suggesting perhaps only moderate resistance to change from special interests. The third chapter of the thesis considers whether Europe Agreements of the EU, with the current sets of RoOs, could be the potential model for future EU-centered PTAs. First, I have studied and coded at the six-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS) .both the old RoOs -used before 1997- and the "Single list" Roos -used since 1997. Second, using a Constant Elasticity Transformation function where CEEC exporters smoothly mix sales between the EU and the rest of the world by comparing producer prices on each market, I have estimated the trade effects of the EU RoOs. The estimates suggest that much of the market access conferred by the EAs -outside sensitive sectors- was undone by the cost-raising effects of RoOs. The chapter also contains an analysis of the evolution of the CEECs' trade with the EU from post-communism to accession. Part II The last chapter of the thesis is concerned with anti-dumping, another trade-policy instrument having the effect of reducing market access. In 1995, the Uruguay Round introduced in the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) a mandatory "sunset-review" clause (Article 11.3 ADA) under which anti-dumping measures should be reviewed no later than five years from their imposition and terminated unless there was a serious risk of resumption of injurious dumping. The last chapter, written with Pr. Olivier Cadot and Pr. Jaime de Melo, uses a new database on Anti-Dumping (AD) measures worldwide to assess whether the sunset-review agreement had any effect. The question we address is whether the WTO Agreement succeeded in imposing the discipline of a five-year cycle on AD measures and, ultimately, in curbing their length. Two methods are used; count data analysis and survival analysis. First, using Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions, the count of AD measures' revocations is regressed on (inter alia) the count of "initiations" lagged five years. The analysis yields a coefficient on measures' initiations lagged five years that is larger and more precisely estimated after the agreement than before, suggesting some effect. However the coefficient estimate is nowhere near the value that would give a one-for-one relationship between initiations and revocations after five years. We also find that (i) if the agreement affected EU AD practices, the effect went the wrong way, the five-year cycle being quantitatively weaker after the agreement than before; (ii) the agreement had no visible effect on the United States except for aone-time peak in 2000, suggesting a mopping-up of old cases. Second, the survival analysis of AD measures around the world suggests a shortening of their expected lifetime after the agreement, and this shortening effect (a downward shift in the survival function postagreement) was larger and more significant for measures targeted at WTO members than for those targeted at non-members (for which WTO disciplines do not bind), suggesting that compliance was de jure. A difference-in-differences Cox regression confirms this diagnosis: controlling for the countries imposing the measures, for the investigated countries and for the products' sector, we find a larger increase in the hazard rate of AD measures covered by the Agreement than for other measures.

China´s Economic Security Police Towards ASEAN From

After the economic reforms of 1978, China started rising very fast and started engaging other countries in the region which has served to increase its confidence in the region. In the post cold war period, China was seen as a big threat for the region because of its claims on the South China Sea. Nevertheless, this image was eliminated when China engaged ASEAN and other multilateral and regional organizations. This paper is studying China’s economic and security policies towards ASEAN. Globalization Theory is the theory being used to explain the nature of China-ASEAN relations. This research paper argues that China’s rise is promoting peace in the region. With the engagement policy, China started promoting trade and security co operations based on mutual benefits and dialogues for the peaceful resolutions of the disputes in the region. This contributed greatly to improve China’s image in the region. Additionally, China’s posture during the economic crises of 1997 also greatly contributed to improve its image. Thus, the rise of China is providing opportunity to the other countries in East Asia. Chapter One: Background On China-ASEAN Relations The use of Soft Power and engagement policy by the Chinese government has helped to change China’s image in the region. By using these policies China has been able to clear the feeling of suspicion and mistrust among the Asian states. China has increased its participation in multilateral and regional organizations, such as ASEAN. Due to this China has been able to promote economic and security co-operation among countries in the region. Thus, from being a potential threat China became a potential co-operative partner. Chapter Two: A Look into ASEAN ASEAN was originally formed on 8th August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Nevertheless, ASEAN was not the first regional group created to act as forum for dialogue between the leaders of different countries. Thought, it is the only one which could work in the region. The aim of the foundation of ASEAN was to promote peace and stability in the Abstract 2 region and also contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. For this reason, China did not engage ASEAN until 1990. However, in 1978 with the establishment of the open up policy China started engaging other countries. It started building trust among its neighboring countries by using soft power. By 1992, China formalized its diplomatic ties with ASEAN as a group. The diplomatic ties between China and ASEAN focus on multilateralism and co-operation as the best way for a more peaceful Asia and the search for common security. Thus, security in the region is promoted through economic co-operation among the states. Therefore the relation between China – ASEAN emphasizes the five principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefits in economic co-operation, dialogue promoting trust and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter Three: China-ASEAN Economic Relations Since 1978 The economic reform of 1978 has greatly contributed to the economic development of China. After the adoption of the open up policy, China has been able to establish economic and trade relations with the outside world. The realist school of thought had predicted that Asia will not be stable in the post cold war period. Nevertheless, this has not been the case in Asia. China is growing peacefully with the co-operation of countries in the region. China is establishing strong ties with its neighboring countries. China and ASEAN relations focus on mutual benefit instead of being a zero sum game. Thus these relations are aimed at encouraging trust and economic co-operation in the region. China and ASEAN have agreed on Free Trade to assure that the two parties benefit from the co-operation. The ACFTA will have a great impact on economic, political and security issues. This will enable China to increase its influence in Asia and counterbalance the influences that Japan and U.S have in the region. Chapter Four: China ASEAN Relations in the Security Perspective This Chapter is about China and ASEAN relations on security issue. The new security issues of the post cold war period need to be solved in multilateral way. China as a major power in the region, through its engagement policy has solved most Abstract 3 of the disputes in the region using multilateral means. China has also found ways to solve the dispute over Spratly Islands peacefully, through dialogue using ASEAN. Additionally, China signed the Treaty of Amity in 2003, promoted security initiatives through ARF, Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and documents covering non-traditional security threats, economic co-operation and agricultural co-operation in November 2002, and the Joint Declaration on Strategic. Chapter Five: Finding and Analysis This chapter provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the date collected throughout this research. It provides an analysis of how the rise of China is promoting peace in the region. China has been promoting mutual beneficial trade and security co-operation which has increased its influence in the region. China has also been able to solve most of the territorial and border dispute in the region through ASEAN. Thus, ASEAN has amended China’s relations with other countries in the region. Therefore, China’s foreign policy in the region has a big impact in shaping the dynamic relations in East Asia. Conclusion and Recommendations This paper concluded that the relationships between China and ASEAN are contributing to peace in the region. After China engaged ASEAN, it has been able to promote multilateral trade based on mutual benefit. This is clearly emphasized by the CAFTA. Additionally, China has solved most of the dispute in the region. It has also found way for a peaceful resolution of the dispute over Spratly Island. Nowadays, the ASEAN countries don’t see China as a threat to the region. Nevertheless, they’ve adopted deterrence measures such as establishing diplomatic relations with other big powers in the region to assure that the region continues to grow peacefully. Concerning this deterrence measures, I recommend as another way for a continued peaceful growth, the resolution of the outstanding dispute.