Incentives to underprice

an initial public offering, the choices made by issuers, such as the offer price, might not appear to be wealth maximizing. In this article, we argue that the choices are strategic. Based on the model developed by Barry (1989), we show that the average change in the issuer's wealth (4.52 per cent) is lower than the average loss implied by underpricing (12.09 per cent). Our results support the notion that the choices issuers make at the offering generate a compensatory benefit in the aftermarket. That the issuer may well not suffer a net wealth loss from the offering is in accordance with continued initial public offering activity.

Financial incentives and advanced construction procurement systems

Construction clients often use financial incentives to encourage stakeholder motivation and commitment to voluntary higher-order project goals. Despite the increased use of financial incentives, there is little literature addressing means of optimizing outcomes. Using a case study methodology, the examination of a successful Australian construction project demonstrates the features of a positively geared procurement approach that promotes the effectiveness of financial incentives. The research results show that if the incentive system is perceived to be fair and is applied to reward exceptional performance, and not to manipulate, then contractors are more likely to be positively motivated.

Motivating construction organisations through incentives : a case study for client-side project managers

Client-side project managers face challenges in motivating project organisations to pursue exceptional design and construction performance. One approach to improving the motivation of project organisations is by offering a financial incentive reward for the achievement of voluntary performance standards above the minimum required standard. However, little investigation has been undertaken into the features of a successful incentive system as a part of an overall procurement strategy. In response to a lack of information available to client-side project managers tasked with the initial design of an incentive system, the paper explores motivation under a successful incentive and identifies key learnings for client-side project managers to consider when designing incentives. Our findings are based on the results of a large Australian case study which is interpreted against a conceptual framework based on both economic and psychological perspectives of motivation. The results suggest that motivation towards incentive goals is influenced by the value the project organisations place on the incentive reward as a commercial opportunity to increase their profit margins. However, perhaps more important are the relationship management processes that promote commitment to the project; and pride in the achievement of project goals. In the case study, these processes intensified the direct motivational effect of the incentive reward on offer. The findings also highlight the importance of ensuring that incentive goals and performance measurement processes remain relevant to the organisations throughout a project to continuously encourage motivation under changing project conditions.

Client recommendations for financial incentives on construction projects

Purpose: To provide recommendations for construction clients who design and implement financial incentive mechanisms (FIMs) on projects. ---------- Methodology: Four large Australian building projects commissioned by government clients under managing contractor contracts and completed between 2001 and 2005 were examined to explore the ‘drivers’ that promoted motivation toward financial incentive goals. The results were triangulated across data sources, projects and stakeholder types. ---------- Findings: FIM design should incorporate: 1. flexibility to modify goals and measurement procedures over time, 2. multiple goals covering different project areas, 3. distribution of rewards across all the key organizations contributing to team performance (e.g. potentially not just the contractor, but the subcontractors and consultants) and a reward amount sufficient to be valued by potential recipients. FIM benefits are maximized through the following complementary procurement initiatives: 4. equitable contract risk allocation, 5. early contractor involvement in design, 6. value-driven tender selection, 7. relationship workshops, and 8. future work opportunities.---------- Research Limitations: This paper provides practical recommendations to industry and hence does not emphasize theoretical aspects.---------- Practical Implications: The uptake of these recommendations is likely to increase the impact of FIMs on motivation and improve project and industry outcomes. Although the study focuses on government clients of building projects, all the recommendations would seem to apply equally to private-sector clients and to non-building projects.---------- Originality: In order to improve motivation and reward high performance, clients are increasingly using FIM in their construction contracts. Despite the rising use of financial incentives, there is a lack of comprehensive construction-specific knowledge available to help clients maximize outcomes. The study addresses this gap in the literature.

Evaluation of financial incentives as a quality improvement strategy in the public hospital context : clinician attitudes, design variables, and economic costs

In 2008, a three-year pilot ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) program, known as ‘Clinical Practice Improvement Payment’ (CPIP) was introduced into Queensland Health (QHealth). QHealth is a large public health sector provider of acute, community, and public health services in Queensland, Australia. The organisation has recently embarked on a significant reform agenda including a review of existing funding arrangements (Duckett et al., 2008). Partly in response to this reform agenda, a casemix funding model has been implemented to reconnect health care funding with outcomes. CPIP was conceptualised as a performance-based scheme that rewarded quality with financial incentives. This is the first time such a scheme has been implemented into the public health sector in Australia with a focus on rewarding quality, and it is unique in that it has a large state-wide focus and includes 15 Districts. CPIP initially targeted five acute and community clinical areas including Mental Health, Discharge Medication, Emergency Department, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Stroke. The CPIP scheme was designed around key concepts including the identification of clinical indicators that met the set criteria of: high disease burden, a well defined single diagnostic group or intervention, significant variations in clinical outcomes and/or practices, a good evidence, and clinician control and support (Ward, Daniels, Walker & Duckett, 2007). This evaluative research targeted Phase One of implementation of the CPIP scheme from January 2008 to March 2009. A formative evaluation utilising a mixed methodology and complementarity analysis was undertaken. The research involved three research questions and aimed to determine the knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of clinicians; identify improvements to the design, administration, and monitoring of CPIP; and determine the financial and economic costs of the scheme. Three key studies were undertaken to ascertain responses to the key research questions. Firstly, a survey of clinicians was undertaken to examine levels of knowledge and understanding and their attitudes to the scheme. Secondly, the study sought to apply Statistical Process Control (SPC) to the process indicators to assess if this enhanced the scheme and a third study examined a simple economic cost analysis. The CPIP Survey of clinicians elicited 192 clinician respondents. Over 70% of these respondents were supportive of the continuation of the CPIP scheme. This finding was also supported by the results of a quantitative altitude survey that identified positive attitudes in 6 of the 7 domains-including impact, awareness and understanding and clinical relevance, all being scored positive across the combined respondent group. SPC as a trending tool may play an important role in the early identification of indicator weakness for the CPIP scheme. This evaluative research study supports a previously identified need in the literature for a phased introduction of Pay for Performance (P4P) type programs. It further highlights the value of undertaking a formal risk assessment of clinician, management, and systemic levels of literacy and competency with measurement and monitoring of quality prior to a phased implementation. This phasing can then be guided by a P4P Design Variable Matrix which provides a selection of program design options such as indicator target and payment mechanisms. It became evident that a clear process is required to standardise how clinical indicators evolve over time and direct movement towards more rigorous ‘pay for performance’ targets and the development of an optimal funding model. Use of this matrix will enable the scheme to mature and build the literacy and competency of clinicians and the organisation as implementation progresses. Furthermore, the research identified that CPIP created a spotlight on clinical indicators and incentive payments of over five million from a potential ten million was secured across the five clinical areas in the first 15 months of the scheme. This indicates that quality was rewarded in the new QHealth funding model, and despite issues being identified with the payment mechanism, funding was distributed. The economic model used identified a relative low cost of reporting (under $8,000) as opposed to funds secured of over $300,000 for mental health as an example. Movement to a full cost effectiveness study of CPIP is supported. Overall the introduction of the CPIP scheme into QHealth has been a positive and effective strategy for engaging clinicians in quality and has been the catalyst for the identification and monitoring of valuable clinical process indicators. This research has highlighted that clinicians are supportive of the scheme in general; however, there are some significant risks that include the functioning of the CPIP payment mechanism. Given clinician support for the use of a pay–for-performance methodology in QHealth, the CPIP scheme has the potential to be a powerful addition to a multi-faceted suite of quality improvement initiatives within QHealth.

Elections 2.0 : reflections on the 2010 federal election and the future of Australian electoral law

This article analyses the 2010 federal election and the impact the internet and social media had on electoral law, and what this may mean for electoral law in the future. Four electoral law issues arising out of the 2010 election as a result of the internet are considered, including online enrolment, regulation of online advertising and comment, fundraising and the role of lobby groups, especially when it comes to crowdsourcing court challenges. Finally, the article offers some suggestions as to how the parliament and the courts should respond to these challenges.

Motivating construction organisations through incentives : a case study for client managers

Client-side project manager face challenges in motivating project organisations to pursue exceptional design and construction performance. One approach to improving the motivation of project organisations is by offering a financial incentive reward for the achievement of voluntary performance standards above the minimum required standard. However, little investigation has been undertaken into the features of a successful incentive system as a part of an overall procurement strategy. In response to a lack of information available to client-side project managers tasked with the initial design of an incentive system, the paper explores motivation undera successful incentive and identifies key learnings for client-side project managers to consider when designing incentives. Our findings are based on the results of a large Australian case study which is interpreted against a conceptual framework based on both economic and psychological perspectives of motivation. The results suggest the motivation towards incentive goals is influenced by the value the project organisations place on the incentive reward as a commercial opportunity to increase their profit margins. However, perhaps more important are the relationship management processes that promote commitment to the project; and pride in the achievement of project goals. In the case study, these processes intensified the direct motivational effect of the incentive reward on offer. The findings also highlight the importance of ensuring that incentive goals and performance measurement processes remain relevant to the organisation throughout a project to continuously encourage motivation under changing project conditions.

Powering innovation through tax concessions : the changing research and development tax incentives

The changing R&D Tax Concession has been touted as the biggest reform to business innovation policy in over a decade. But, is it a changing tax for changing times? This paper addresses this question and further asks ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’. To answer this question, the paper argues that rather than substantive tax reform, the proposed measures simply alter the criteria and means by which companies become eligible for a Federal Government subsidy for qualifying R&D activity. It further argues that when considered as part of the broader innovation agenda, the R&D Tax Concession should be evaluated as a government spending program in the same way as any direct spending on innovation. When this is done, the tax regime is arguably only the administrative policy instrument by which the subsidy is delivered. However, it is proposed that this may not be best practice to distribute those funds fairly, efficiently, and without distortion, while at the same time maintaining adequate government control and accountability. Finally, in answering the question of ‘what’s tax got to do with it?’ the paper concludes that the answer is ‘very little’.

Politicians as experts, electoral control, and fiscal restraints

We establish an argument for fiscal restraints which is based on the idea that politicians are experts in the meaning of the credence good literature. A budget maximizing politician is better informed than the electorate about the necessary spending to ensure the states ability to provide services for the economy. Voters, being able to observe the budget but not the necessary level of spending, attenuate the government’s spending level via electoral control. A fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government will choose if the level of spending ensuring the politicians reelection is not sufficient to ensure the state’s ability to provide services to the economy. We determine when such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the opposition in situations where very high levels of spending are required.

Electoral behaviour in the 2010 Australian federal election

All elections are unique, but the Australian federal election of 2010 was unusual for many reasons. It came in the wake of the unprecedented ousting of the Prime Minister who had led the Australian Labor Party to a landslide victory, after eleven years in opposition, at the previous election in 2007. In a move that to many would have been unthinkable, Kevin Rudd’s increasing unpopularity within his own parliamentary party finally took its toll and in late June he was replaced by his deputy, Julia Gillard. Thus the second unusual feature of the election was that it was contested by Australia’s first female prime minister. The third unusual feature was that the election almost saw a first-term government, with a comfortable majority, defeated. Instead it resulted in a hung parliament, for the first time since 1940, and Labor scraped back into power as a minority government, supported by three independents and the first member of the Australian Greens ever to be elected to the House of Representatives. The Coalition Liberal and National opposition parties themselves had a leader of only eight months standing, Tony Abbott, whose ascension to the position had surprised more than a few. This was the context for an investigation of voting behaviour in the 2010 election....