Key derivation function based on stream ciphers

A key derivation function (KDF) is a function that transforms secret non-uniformly random source material together with some public strings into one or more cryptographic keys. These cryptographic keys are used with a cryptographic algorithm for protecting electronic data during both transmission over insecure channels and storage. In this thesis, we propose a new method for constructing a generic stream cipher based key derivation function. We show that our proposed key derivation function based on stream ciphers is secure if the under-lying stream cipher is secure. We simulate instances of this stream cipher based key derivation function using three eStream nalist: Trivium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit. The simulation results show these stream cipher based key derivation functions offer efficiency advantages over the more commonly used key derivation functions based on block ciphers and hash functions.

Crossword puzzle attack on NLS

NLS is one of the stream ciphers submitted to the eSTREAM project. We present a distinguishing attack on NLS by Crossword Puzzle (CP) attack method which is introduced in this paper. We build the distinguisher by using linear approximations of both the non-linear feedback shift register (NFSR) and the nonlinear filter function (NLF). Since the bias of the distinguisher depends on the Konst value, which is a key-dependent word, we present the graph showing how the bias of distinguisher vary with Konst. In result, we estimate the bias of the distinguisher to be around O(2^−30). Therefore, we claim that NLS is distinguishable from truly random cipher after observing O(2^60) keystream words. The experiments also show that our distinguishing attack is successful on 90.3% of Konst among 2^32 possible values. We extend the CP attack to NLSv2 which is a tweaked version of NLS. In result, we build a distinguisher which has the bias of around 2− 48. Even though this attack is below the eSTREAM criteria (2^−40), the security margin of NLSv2 seems to be too low.

Multiple modular additions and crossword puzzle attack on NLSv2

NLS is a stream cipher which was submitted to the eSTREAM project. A linear distinguishing attack against NLS was presented by Cho and Pieprzyk, which was called Crossword Puzzle (CP) attack. NLSv2 is a tweak version of NLS which aims mainly at avoiding the CP attack. In this paper, a new distinguishing attack against NLSv2 is presented. The attack exploits high correlation amongst neighboring bits of the cipher. The paper first shows that the modular addition preserves pairwise correlations as demonstrated by existence of linear approximations with large biases. Next, it shows how to combine these results with the existence of high correlation between bits 29 and 30 of the S-box to obtain a distinguisher whose bias is around 2^−37. Consequently, we claim that NLSv2 is distinguishable from a random cipher after observing around 2^74 keystream words.

Algebraic attacks on clock-controlled cascade ciphers

In this paper, we mount the first algebraic attacks against clock controlled cascade stream ciphers. We first show how to obtain relations between the internal state bits and the output bits of the Gollmann clock controlled cascade stream ciphers. We demonstrate that the initial states of the last two shift registers can be determined by the initial states of the others. An alternative attack on the Gollmann cascade is also described, which requires solving quadratic equations. We then present an algebraic analysis of Pomaranch, one of the phase two proposals to eSTREAM. A system of equations of maximum degree four that describes the full cipher is derived. We also present weaknesses in the filter functions of Pomaranch by successfully computing annihilators and low degree multiples of the functions.