Optimal insurance with counterparty default risk

We study the design of optimal insurance contracts when the insurer can default on its obligations. In our model default arises endogenously from the interaction of the insurance premium, the indemnity schedule and the insurer’s assets. This allows us to understand the joint effect of insolvency risk and background risk on efficient contracts. The results may shed light on the aggregate risk retention sched- ules observed in catastrophe reinsurance markets, and can assist in the design of (re)insurance programs and guarantee funds.

Simulation of default events in a CDX and estimation of the spread

The portfolio generating the iTraxx EUR index is modeled by coupled Markov chains. Each of the industries of the portfolio evolves according to its own Markov transition matrix. Using a variant of the method of moments, the model parameters are estimated from a data set of Standard and Poor's. Swap spreads are evaluated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Along with an actuarially fair spread, at least squares spread is considered.

What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market

This paper studies the evolution of the default risk premia for European firms during the years surrounding the recent credit crisis. We employ the information embedded in Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Moody’s KMV EDF default probabilities to analyze the common factors driving this risk premia. The risk premium is characterized in several directions: Firstly, we perform a panel data analysis to capture the relationship between CDS spreads and actual default probabilities. Secondly, we employ the intensity framework of Jarrow et al. (2005) in order to measure the theoretical effect of risk premium on expected bond returns. Thirdly, we carry out a dynamic panel data to identify the macroeconomic sources of risk premium. Finally, a vector autoregressive model analyzes which proportion of the co-movement is attributable to financial or macro variables. Our estimations report coefficients for risk premium substantially higher than previously referred for US firms and a time varying behavior. A dominant factor explains around 60% of the common movements in risk premia. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests a public-to-private risk transfer between the sovereign CDS spreads and corporate risk premia.

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Credit default swap (CDS) prediction model & trading strategy

This project focuses on the study of different explanatory models for the behavior of CDS security, such as Fixed-Effect Model, GLS Random-Effect Model, Pooled OLS and Quantile Regression Model. After determining the best fitness model, trading strategies with long and short positions in CDS have been developed. Due to some specifications of CDS, I conclude that the quantile regression is the most efficient model to estimate the data. The P&L and Sharpe Ratio of the strategy are analyzed using a backtesting analogy, where I conclude that, mainly for non-financial companies, the model allows traders to take advantage of and profit from arbitrages.

Cross sectional default probabilities in european corporate bonds

This study attempts to identify basis-trading opportunities in the European banking sector by comparing two different measures for the market’s assessment of risk: market-observed CDS spreads and model-implied Z-spreads. Using a sample of 10 banks, over a period of 3 years following the European banking crisis, it can be concluded that there were arbitrage opportunities in the sector, as evidenced by the derived negative bases.

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

This paper extends the model of Spolaore (2004) about adjustments in di erent government systems for the context of scal adjustments and sovereign default. We introduce asymmetry between groups in income and preferences towards scal reforms. Default a ects di erently each group and becomes a possibility if reforms are not enacted after public nance solvency shocks, in uencing the political game according to its likelihood. With the extensions, new situations which were not possible with the previous framework arise. After the exposition of the model, the Argentine default in 2001 provides an example of the political con icts addressed by the model.

Differential activation of the default mode network in jet lagged individuals

Long-term exposure to transmeridian flights has been shown to impact cognitive functioning. Nevertheless, the immediate effects of jet lag in the activation of specific brain networks have not been investigated. We analyzed the impact of short-term jet lag on the activation of the default mode network (DMN). A group of individuals who were on a transmeridian flight and a control group went through a functional magnetic resonance imaging acquisition. Statistical analysis was performed to test for differences in the DMN activation between groups. Participants from the jet lag group presented decreased activation in the anterior nodes of the DMN, specifically in bilateral medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex. No areas of increased activation were observed for the jet lag group. These results may be suggestive of a negative impact of jet lag on important cognitive functions such as introspection, emotional regulation and decision making in a few days after individuals arrive at their destination.

Forecasting US bond default ratings allowing for previous and initial state dependence in an ordered probit model

In this paper we investigate the ability of a number of different ordered probit models to predict ratings based on firm-specific data on business and financial risks. We investigate models based on momentum, drift and ageing and compare them against alternatives that take into account the initial rating of the firm and its previous actual rating. Using data on US bond issuing firms rated by Fitch over the years 2000 to 2007 we compare the performance of these models in predicting the rating in-sample and out-of-sample using root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano tests of forecast performance and contingency tables. We conclude that initial and previous states have a substantial influence on rating prediction.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.

Penalties for Patient Charge Evasion (PDF 153 KB)

Penalties for Patient Charge Evasion

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.