The global financial crisis: what happened and what’s next

Global economic conditions have been deteriorating sharply since mid- September 2008. Lending has dropped abruptly, credit spreads have widened sharply, stock markets have plunged and economies everywhere are stumbling. Governments around the world have undertaken unprecedented measures, including some coordinated intervention. However, global economic prospects remain troubled, and further policy action is required. In order to better understand the task before policy makers as they chart a new direction, this paper examines how the global economy arrived at its current predicament, looking back at the sequence of events that contributed to create havoc in financial markets, as well as the policy response they produced. In light of these events, we examine the impact on Latin American financial markets in particular. The global nature of the current crisis underscores the need for coordinating the policy response at the global level, as well as advancing towards a new international financial architecture that will make possible a more effective response to the build-up of systemic pressures.

Governed by the cycle : direct and inverted interest-rate sensitivity of emerging market corporate debt

An innovative approach to quantify interest rate sensitivities of emerging market corporates is proposed. Our focus is centered at price sensitivity of modeled investment grade and high yield portfolios to changes in the present value of modeled portfolios composed of safe-haven assets, which define risk-free interest rates. Our methodology is based on blended yield indexes. Modeled investment horizons are always kept above one year thus allowing to derive empirical implications for practical strategies of interest rate risk management in the banking book. As our study spans over the period 2002 – 2015, it covers interest rate sensitivity of assets under the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases of the economic cycles. We demonstrate that the emerging market corporate bonds both, investment grade and high yield types, depending on the phase of a business cycle exhibit diverse regimes of sensitivity to interest rate changes. We observe switching from a direct positive sensitivity under the normal pre-crisis market conditions to an inverted negative sensitivity during distressed turmoil of the recent financial crisis, and than back to direct positive but weaker sensitivity under new normal post-crisis conjuncture. Our unusual blended yield-based approach allows us to present theoretical explanations of such phenomena from economics point of view and helps us to solve an old controversy regarding positive or negative responses of credit spreads to interest rates. We present numerical quantification of sensitivities, which corroborate with our conclusion that hedging of interest rate risk ought to be a dynamic process linked to the phases of business cycles as we evidence a binary-like behavior of interest rate sensitivities along the economic time. Our findings allow banks and financial institutions for approaching downside risk management and optimizing economic capital under Basel III regulatory capital rules.

Unfunded pension liabilities and sponsoring firm credit risk: an international analysis of corporate bond spreads

This paper tests empirically whether pension information derived by corporate pension accounting disclosures is priced in corporate bond spreads. The model represents a hybrid of more traditional accounting ratio-based models of credit risk and structural models of bond spreads initiated by Merton (1974). The model is fitted to 5 years of data from 2002 to 2006 featuring companies from the US and Europe. The paper finds that while unfunded pension liabilities are priced in the overall sample, they are not priced as aggressively as traditional leverage. Furthermore, an extended model shows that the pension–credit risk relation is most evident in the US and Germany, where unfunded pension liabilities are priced more aggressively than traditional forms of leverage. No pension–credit risk relation is found in the other countries sampled, notably the UK, Netherlands and France.

Credit and liquidity components of corporate CDS spreads

This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.

Corporate credit risk prediction under stochastic volatility and jumps

This paper examines the impact of allowing for stochastic volatility and jumps (SVJ) in a structural model on corporate credit risk prediction. The results from a simulation study verify the better performance of the SVJ model compared with the commonly used Merton model, and three sources are provided to explain the superiority. The empirical analysis on two real samples further ascertains the importance of recognizing the stochastic volatility and jumps by showing that the SVJ model decreases bias in spread prediction from the Merton model, and better explains the time variation in actual CDS spreads. The improvements are found particularly apparent in small firms or when the market is turbulent such as the recent financial crisis.

The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings

This thesis examines the quality of credit ratings issued by the three major credit rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. If credit ratings are informative, then prices of underlying credit instruments such as fixed-income securities and credit default insurance should change to reflect the new credit risk information. Using data on 246 different major fixed income securities issuers and spanning January 2000 to December 2011, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) spreads do not react to changes in credit ratings. Hence credit ratings for all three agencies are not price informative. CDS prices are mostly determined by historical CDS prices while ratings are mostly determined by historical ratings. We find that credit ratings are marginally more sensitive to CDS than CDS are sensitive to ratings.

Credit risk in covered bonds

Covered bonds are a promising alternative for prime mortgage securitization. In this paper, we explore risk premia in the covered bond market and particularly investigate whether and how credit risk is priced. In extant literature, yield spreads between high-quality covered bonds and government bonds are often interpreted as pure liquidity premia. In contrast, we show that although liquidity is important, it is not the exclusive risk factor. Using a hand-collected data set of cover pool information, we find that the credit quality of the cover assets is an important determinant of covered bond yield spreads. This effect is particularly strong in times of financial turmoil and has a significant influence on the issuer's refinancing cost.

The effects of corporate social performance on the cost of corporate debt and credit ratings

This study investigates the differential impact that various dimensions of corporate social performance have on the pricing of corporate debt as well as the assessment of the credit quality of specific bond issues. The empirical analysis, based on an extensive longitudinal data set, suggests that overall, good performance is rewarded and corporate social transgressions are penalized through lower and higher corporate bond yield spreads, respectively. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on either the bond rating assigned to a specific debt issue or the probability of it being considered to be an asset of speculative grade.

Estudo sobre o efeito de variáveis macro econômico e do spread de credit default swap no risco de evento de crédito soberano

Este trabalho explora a realização de default soberano em função da estrutura de spreads de CDS (Credit Default Swap). Pode-se dizer que os spreads revelam a probabilidade de default de um país. Aplicamos a metodologia proposta neste trabalho para Argentina, Coreia, Equador, Indonésia, México, Peru, Turquia, Ucrânia, Venezuela e Rússia. Nós mostramos que um modelo de um único fator seguindo um processo lognormal captura a probabilidade de default. Também mostramos que as variáveis macro econômicas inflação, desemprego e crescimento não explicam a variável dependente do estudo (probabilidade de default). Cada país reage de maneira diferente a crise econômica que a leva a não honrar seus compromissos com as dívidas contraídas.

Credit ratings and government bonds evidence before, during and after the european debt crisis

Neste projeto, investigamos se as agências de rating e as taxas de juro de longo prazo da dívida soberana tiveram uma influência recíproca antes, durante e após a crise da dívida soberana Europeia. Esta análise é realizada, estimando a relação existente entre os ratings da dívida soberana ou taxas de juro e factores macroeconomicos e estruturais, através de uma diferente aplicação de metodologias utilizadas para este efeito. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que, no período da crise soberana, os ratings e as taxas de juros tiveram um mútuo impacto, sugerindo que as descidas dos ratings podem ter conduzido a profecias auto-realizáveis, levando países relativamente estáveis a um eventual incumprimento

A intervenção estatal sobre o mercado bancário no Brasil por meio dos bancos públicos: a tentativa de redução dos spreads em 2012

As taxas de juros cobradas pelos bancos têm sido alvo constante de críticas por parte da opinião pública e de preocupação por parte do governo. Uma das razões para essas altas taxas, além do nível elevado da taxa básica de juros SELIC, são os altos spreads cobrados pelos bancos. Uma das formas para tentar diminuir esse nível é aumentar a competitividade entre os bancos. Entretanto, uma suposta dificuldade para se atingir um maior nível de competição é o grau de concentração bancária existente hoje no Brasil. Nesse sentido, o governo brasileiro pressionou o mercado bancário para reduzir seus spreads e taxas durante o primeiro semestre de 2012, um período de aparente estabilidade macroeconômica e de forte queda da taxa SELIC. A pressão exercida pelo governo surtiu efeito, inicialmente sobre os bancos públicos, e, posteriormente, sobre os bancos privados, que anunciaram publicamente a redução de taxas para diversas operações. Este trabalho buscou entender as dimensões e origens dos efeitos desse posicionamento do governo sobre os spreads e a rentabilidade dos maiores bancos brasileiros. Como resultado, observou-se a efetividade da atuação governamental na redução do spread ex post, da rentabilidade das operações de crédito (proxy da taxa) e da rentabilidade geral dos bancos públicos e privados. Apesar disso, houve recuo por parte dos bancos privados na concessão de crédito apontando para o poder de mercado dessas instituições e levantando dúvidas sobre a real capacidade da utilização dos bancos públicos para fomentar maior competitividade em um ambiente de incerteza econômica.

US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous Credit Risk

This paper develops a reduced form three-factor model which includes a liquidity proxy of market conditions which is then used to provide implicit prices. The model prices are then compared with observed market prices of credit default swaps to determine if swap rates adequately reflect market risks. The findings of the analysis illustrate the importance of liquidity in the valuation process. Moreover, market liquidity, a measure of investors. willingness to commit resources in the credit default swap (CDS) market, was also found to improve the valuation of investors. autonomous credit risk. Thus a failure to include a liquidity proxy could underestimate the implied autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk is defined as the fractional credit risk which does not vary with changes in market risk and liquidity conditions.

The EU ban on uncovered sovereign credit default swaps: assessing impacts on liquidity, volatility and price discovery

This article addresses the effects of the prohibition against naked CDS buying implemented by the European Union in November 2012. Three aspects of market quality are analyzed: liquidity, volatility, and price informativeness. Overall, our results suggest that the ban produced negative effects on liquidity and price informativeness. First, we find that in territories within the scope of the EU regulation, the bid–ask spreads on sovereign CDS contracts rose after the ban, but fell for countries outside its bounds. Open interest declined for both groups of CDS reference entities in our sample, but significantly more in the constraint group. Price delay increased more prominently for countries affected by the ban, whereas price precision decreased for these countries while increasing for CDSs written on other sovereign reference entities. Most notably, our findings indicate that hese negative effects were more pronounced amid reference entities exhibiting lower credit risk. With respect to volatility, the evidence suggests that the ban was successful in stabilizing the CDS market in that volatility decreased, particularly for contracts written on riskier CDS entities.