An analysis of the timeliness and nature of profit warnings in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

The global financial crisis (GFC) has severely impacted the financial position and performance of many companies internationally. Because of its severity and associated increase in uncertainty it challenges the effectiveness of existing disclosure regulation. Australia provides a unique environment in which to test the effects of the GFC on corporate disclosure because statutory rules mandate the timely disclosure of ‘price-sensitive’ information (ASX Rule 3.1) by listed entities. Exploiting this institutional setting we investigate the determinants and timeliness of profit warnings issued by the top 500 ASX-listed firms with profit declines in the 2009 fiscal year. Our findings show that firms behave differently with regard to the issuance of profit warnings: larger and more indebted firms are more likely to issue a profit warning and tend to be timelier; surprisingly, poorer performing firms tend to release the news more quickly and this might be attributed to an increasing threat of litigation. Our analysis of profit warning determinants shows interesting results with the presence of asset impairments hindering the early disclosure of profit warnings. Our findings are novel for two main reasons: first, we provide insights into the impact of global financial crisis on profit warning behaviour; second, we are the first to examine the differential impact of alternative features of profit warnings on disclosure timeliness. The findings have implications for regulators in determining compliance with continuous disclosure rules and more broadly, for market participants in interpreting profit warnings.

Participative behaviour of organisational leaders: The perspective of the Bhutanese corporate sector

Explored in this study are the participative behaviour of organisational leaders in the emerging for-profit sector in Bhutan. Leaders engage primarily in verbal participative behaviour with subordinates when making organisational decisions especially if they believe in the importance of the contribution of participation to organization effectiveness. Leaders who believe in high power distance however are less likely to engage in both verbal participative behaviour and consultative participative behaviour. The research contributes to our understanding of participative decision making by identifying dimensions of participative behavior in the context of emerging economies.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in junior and mid-tier Australian resources companies operating in developing nations - beyond the public relations offensive

NIt is now widely accepted that corporations have a responsibility to benefit society, as well as generate profit. This study used institutional theory to explore how the complex and contested notion of corporate social responsibility is understood and practiced by junior and mid-tier Australian resources companies operating in the world's most impoverished countries. The study found that CSR meaning and practice in this large but little researched group of companies was shaped by complex pressures at the global, industry, organisational and individual levels. Importantly, the study also revealed striking contradictions and ambiguities between participants' CSR aspirations and their actions and accountability.

Corporate philanthropy, reputation risk management and shareholder value: A study of Australian corporate giving

This study examines the role of corporate philanthropy in the management of reputation risk and shareholder value of the top 100 ASX listed Australian firms for the three years 2011-2013. The results of this study demonstrate the business case for corporate philanthropy and hence encourage corporate philanthropy by showing increasing firms’ investment in corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax, increases the likelihood of an increase in shareholder value. However, the proviso is that firms must also manage their reputation risk at the same time. There is a negative association between corporate giving and shareholder value (Tobin’s Q) which is mitigated by firms’ management of reputation. The economic significance of this result is that for every cent in the dollar the firm spends on corporate giving, Tobin’s Q will decrease by 0.413%. In contrast, if the firm increase their reputation by 1 point then Tobin’s Q will increase by 0.267%. Consequently, the interaction of corporate giving and reputation risk management is positively associated with shareholder value. These results are robust while controlling for potential endogeneity and reverse causality. This paper assists both academics and practitioners by demonstrating that the benefits of corporate philanthropy extend beyond a gesture to improve reputation or an attempt to increase financial performance, to a direct collaboration between all the factors where the benefits far outweigh the costs.

Corporate social responsibilities of Indian public sector enterprises-a case study of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL)

The high level of public accountability attached to Public Sector Enterprises as a result of public ownership makes them socially responsible. The Committee of Public Undertakings in 1992 examined the issue relating to social obligations of Central Public Sector Enterprises and observed that ``being part of the `State', every Public Sector enterprise has a moral responsibility to play an active role in discharging the social obligations endowed on a welfare state, subject to the financial health of the enterprise''. It issued the Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines in 2010 where all Central Public Enterprises, through a Board Resolution, are mandated to create a CSR budget as a specified percentage of net profit of the previous year. This paper examines the CSR activities of the biggest engineering public sector organization in India, Bharath Heavy Electricals Limited. The objectives are twofold, one, to develop a case study of the organization about the funds allocated and utilized for various CSR activities, and two, to examine its status with regard to other organizations, the 2010 guidelines, and the local socio-economic development. Secondary data analysis results show three interesting trends. One, it reveals increasing organizational social orientation with the formal guidelines in place. Two, Firms can no longer continue to exploit environmental resources and escape from their responsibilities by acting separate entities regardless of the interest of the society and Three the thrust of CSR in public sector is on inclusive growth, sustainable development and capacity building with due attention to the socio-economic needs of the neglected and marginalized sections of the society.

The corporate social responsibility movement and law's empire: Is there a conflict?

At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and ethically unacceptable outcomes.1 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility. Following Cadbury’s2 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility can become so nebulous as to be relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.3 It will also illustrate how corporate responsibility can and must be supported by legal measures. Secondly, this paper will consider the potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory approach.4 Finally, this paper will place the current interest in corporate social responsibility within the broader debate on the relationship between law and non-legally enforceable norms and will present some reflections on the norm debate arising from this consideration of the CSR movement.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance in Victorian Britain

Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.

Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them.

L'effet des dons des entreprises privées sur les organisations-non-productrices-de-profit : le cas des universités de Montréal

Les dons effectués par les entreprises privées auprès d’organismes communautaires à but non lucratif semblent avoir des effets à long terme sur ces derniers. Ces entreprises cherchent à la fois à semer le bien dans les communautés dans lesquelles elles interviennent, mais également à améliorer leur image au sein de celles-ci. Les organismes communautaires oscillent donc entre le devoir de servir leurs usagers du mieux qu’ils le peuvent, en respectant leur mission avec la plus grande diligence, et les nombreuses conditions qui se rattachent aux dons reçus. Ils doivent travailler avec un financement octroyé à court terme, de nombreuses mesures évaluatives ainsi que les volontés de donateurs parfois indiscrets. Il en résulte une identité qui se rapproche de plus en plus de celle des entreprises privées. L’étude dans ce mémoire tente d’évaluer si les usagers des quatre universités principales de Montréal adoptent une identité mercantiliste et comment ils évaluent leur rôle au sein de leurs établissements d’enseignement. Ces étudiants assumeraient un rôle davantage engagé envers les entreprises donatrices, à la fois au sein de leur institution et dans la société en général. Ils revêtiraient une identité conforme à ce qu’attend une entreprise qui effectue un don de manière intéressée en consommant de leurs biens et services.

Internal rents and corporate property management: a study into the use of internal rents in UK corporate organisations

Research in the late 1980s showed that in many corporate real estates users were not fully aware of the full extent of their property holdings. In many cases, not only was the value of the holdings unknown, but there was uncertainty over the actual extent of ownership within the portfolio. This resulted in a large number of corporate occupiers reviewing their property holdings during the 1990s, initially to create a definitive asset register, but also to benefit from an more efficient use of space. Good management of corporately owned property assets is of equal importance as the management of other principal resources within the company. A comprehensive asset register can be seen as the first step towards a rational property audit. For the effective, efficient and economic delivery of services, it is vital that all property holdings are utilised to the best advantage. This requires that the property provider and the property user are both fully conversant with the value of the property holding and that an asset/internal rent/charge is made accordingly. The advantages of internal rent charging are twofold. Firstly, it requires the occupying department to “contribute” an amount to the business equivalent to the open market rental value of the space that it occupies. This prevents the treating of space as a free good and, as individual profit centres, each department will then rationalise its holdings to minimise its costs. The second advantage is from a strategic viewpoint. By charging an asset rent, the holding department can identify the performance of its real estate holdings. This can then be compared to an internal or external benchmark to help determine whether the company has adopted the most efficient tenure pattern for its properties. This paper investigates the use of internal rents by UK-based corporate businesses and explains internal rents as a form of transfer pricing in the context of management and responsibility accounting. The research finds that the majority of charging organisations introduced internal rents primarily to help calculate true profits at the business unit level. However, less than 10% of the charging organisations introduced internal rents primarily to capture the return on assets within the business. There was also a sizeable element of the market who had no plans to introduce internal rents. Here, it appears that, despite academic and professional views that internal rents are beneficial in improving the efficient use of property, opinion at the business and operational level has not universally accepted this proposition.

Stakeholders and strategic planning in non-profit organisations : case studies in complexity and conflict

The experiences of two Australian non-profit member-benefit associations as they attempt to develop strategic plans are explored, with emphasis on the influence of the many stakeholders in this process. We conclude that
corporate strategic planning is a complex, conflict-ridden, and largely
unsuccessful process in non-profit member-benefit associations because of the number and commitment of stakeholders. Therefore we suggest that future research should focus on clarifying whether such corporate management techniques are actually appropriate for all non-profit organisations, and, if they are, how non-profit organisations can best manage the process, taking into account the values and needs of stakeholders.

Corporate governance, board responsibilities and financial performance : the National Bank of Australia

This paper examines board responsibilities and accountability by management and Board of Directors in relation to the National Australia Bank's (NABs) performance. The NAB, an international financial service provider within the top thirty most profitable banks in the world, is compared with the Australian major banks. The evidence suggests that NABs poor performance was consistent with a lack of accountability, poor corporate governance and board dysfunction associated with fraudulent currency trading and the subsequent AUD360 million foreign currency losses. The NAB's performance is investigated by utilising accounting-based measures of profitability and cost efficiency as proxies for performance. Following the foreign currency trading losses in 2004 the NAB under-performed the other major Australian banks in terms of profits, cost to income ratio and growth in assets. In terms of profitability and cost efficiency NAB had the lowest ROE and ROA with a 19.7% fall in net profit and the highest cost to income ratio of 5 7.4% of any of the five largest banks. This case study provides an Australian example of poor corporate governance and suggests that financial institutions and regulators can learn from the NAB's experience. Failure to have top-down accountability can have significant impact on over-all performance, profitability and reputation. In particular, it suggests that management and Boards need to review their risk management procedures and regulators need to be more pro-active in their prudential oversight of financial institutions.

Corporate social responsibility reporting : a business strategy by Australian banks?

The growth of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting reflects society's expectations for business to set higher ethical standards and to undertake business in a way that meets the profit imperative (the bottom line). Additionally, the community expects socially and environmentally responsible behaviour practices; the so-called triple bottom line approach. The paper briefly reviews the development of corporate social responsibility reporting from the perspective of two large Australian banks and attempts to understand their motivation for voluntary disclosure. Stakeholder theory and game theory provide a means to analyse why banks undertake CSR reporting. The paper compares Westpac and National Australia Bank's CSR reporting over the period 2004-2005 utilising external rating agencies and CSR reports to determine the extent of disclosure in relation to employees, environment, community and customers. The paper concludes with a discussion of the pros and cons of CSR, the role of regulation and recommendations for future policy direction.