The devolution of indigenous local government authority in Queensland: Opportunities for statutory planning

Government policy change to self detennination over the past two decades has gradually given rise to various structures of Indigenous self government across Australia. Indigenous Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are the governing structure which receive the greatest devolution of State authority, especially those found in Queensland and the Northern Territory. Their statutory basis has developed over a relatively short period of time and is still very much evolving. This paper explores what opportunities exist for Indigenous LGAs to adopt statutory planning mechanisms.

The US experience in contracting out security and lessons for other countries

The United States has gone further than any country in the "privatization of security". Other countries may find the economic or financial logic in the use of contractors persuasive. The US experience with contracting out security, particularly in Iraq, was problematic, and can serve as a cautionary tale in order that other countries might learn how to avoid the pitfalls.

Modeling the Diffusion of Energy Performance Contracting

The Portuguese Energy Policy considers the development of a commercially viable and competitive market for energy performance contracting (EPC) as a main mechanism to achieve the objectives of energy efficiency improvement. This paper proposes a study to investigate how to achieve widespread adoption of energy performance contracting by means of system dynamics modelling and simulation. To explore and gather insights on this question, a system dynamics model representing the system of the Portuguese EPC market at industry level will be created. The simulation of that model will provide a helpful basis for analysing and explaining the development of key variables, and accelerating learning on the managerial, organizational and political adaptation processes that foster the diffusion of EPC adoption. The first phase of this research project aims at identifying and analysing the key factors and critical cause-effect relations that drive the adoption of EPC. With this purpose, a qualitative content analysis on relevant documents was performed and a set of interviews was conducted. That data was analysed to capture the critical variables and its interrelation to formulate a preliminary representation of the system structure as stock and flow diagrams.

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent simulation of bilateral contracting in competitive electricity markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff.

Clustering medical tourism in Algarve: setting the first steps for the the health authority

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The influence of traditional authority on voting behavior in Mozambique

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The flora of British India /By J. D. Hooker assisted by various botanists. Published under the authority of the secretary of state for India in council.

v.1 (1875)

The flora of British India /By J. D. Hooker assisted by various botanists. Published under the authority of the secretary of state for India in council.

v.2 (1879)

The flora of British India /By J. D. Hooker assisted by various botanists. Published under the authority of the secretary of state for India in council.

v.3 (1882)