Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Use of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting to Mitigate Work Zone Traffic Impacts, 2012

Incentive/disincentive clauses (I/D) are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they exceed the completion time. A previously unanswered question is, “Did the costs of the actual work zone impacts that were avoided justify the incentives paid?” This report answers that question affirmatively based on an evaluation of 20 I/D projects in Missouri from 2008 to 2011. Road user costs (RUC) were used to quantify work zone impacts and included travel delays, vehicle operating costs, and crash costs. These were computed using work zone traffic conditions for partial-closure projects and detour volumes and routes for full-closure projects. Conditions during construction were compared to after construction. Crash costs were computed using Highway Safety Manual methodology. Safety Performance Functions produced annual crash frequencies that were translated into crash cost savings. In considering an average project, the percentage of RUC savings was around 13% of the total contract amount, or $444,389 of $3,464,620. The net RUC savings produced was around $7.2 million after subtracting the approximately $1.7 million paid in incentives. In other words, for every dollar paid in incentives, approximately 5.3 dollars of RUC savings resulted. I/D provisions were very successful in saving RUC for projects with full-closure, projects in urban areas, and emergency projects. Rural, non-emergency projects successfully saved RUC but not at the same level as other projects. The I/D contracts were also compared to all Missouri Department of Transportation contracts for the same time period. The results show that I/D projects had a higher on-time completion percentage and a higher number of bids per call than average projects. But I/D projects resulted in 4.52% higher deviation from programmed costs and possibly more changes made after the award. A survey of state transportation departments and contractors showed that both agreed to the same issues that affect the success of I/D contracts. Legal analysis suggests that liquidated damages is preferred to disincentives, since enforceability of disincentives may be an issue. Overall, in terms of work zone impact mitigation, I/D contracts are very effective at a relatively low cost.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Venture capital financing : screening and contracting under assymetric information

Structure of the Thesis This thesis consists of 5 sections. Section 1 starts with the problem definition and the presentation of the objectives of this thesis. Section 2 introduces a presentation of the theoretical foundations of Venture financing and a review of the main theories developed on Venture investing. It includes a taxonomy of contracting clauses relevant in venture contracting, the conflicts they address, and presents some general observations on contractual clauses. Section 3 presents the research findings on the analysis of a European VC's deal flow and investment screening linked to the prevailing market conditions. Section 4 focuses an empirical study of a European VC's investment process, the criteria it uses to make its investments. It presents empirical findings on the investment criteria over time, business cycles, and investment types. It also links these criteria to the VC's subsequent performance. Finally, section 5 presents an empirical research on the comparison of the legal contracts signed between European and United States Venture Capitalists and the companies they finance. This research highlights some of the contracting practices in Europe and the United States.

Contracting with free software communities

Industry and large Agencies needs ¿agile¿ programming resources, to reinforce their own development staff and take advantage of innovative approaches produced by ¿fresh minds¿ all over the world. At the same time they may be reluctant to engage in classical software development call for tenders and contracts. Such contracts are often ¿trusted¿ by large ICT firms, which will deliver according to their own rigid frameworks (often based on alliances with proprietary software vendors), may propose comfortable quality assurances, but will cover their (real) risks and liability with high contingency costs and will charge for any change request in case the original specifications have not fixed all possible issues. Introducing FLOSS in business implies a new contracting philosophy, based on incentives rather than penalties and liability. Based on 2011 experience with a large Space Agency, Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz pictures the needed legal instruments for a novel approach.

The influence of skeletal muscle cell volume on carbohydrate metabolism in contracting skeletal muscle

This study investigated the regulation of carbohydrate metabolism through changes in skeletal muscle cell volume immediately post contraction and during recovery. Using an established in vitro isolated muscle strip model, soleus (SOL) and extensor digitorum longus (EDL) were dissected from male rats and incubated in an organ bath (perfused with 95% O2; 5% CO2, pH 7.4, temperature 25°C) containing medium- 199 altered to a target osmotic condition (iso-, hypo- or hyper-osmotic; 290, 1 80, 400 mmol/kg). Muscles were stimulated for 10 minutes (40 Hz SOL; 30 Hz EDL) and then either immediately flash frozen or allowed to recover for 20 minutes before subsequent metabolite and enzyme analysis. Results demonstrated a relative water decrease in HYPER vs. HYPOosmotic condition (n=8/group; p<0.05) regardless of muscle type. Specifically, the SOL HYPER condition had elevated metabolite concentrations after 10 minutes of stimulation in comparison to both HYPO and ISO (p<0.05), while EDL muscle did not show any significant difTerences between the HYPER or HYPO conditions. After 20 minutes of recovery, metabolic changes occurred in both SOL and EDL with the SOL HYPER condition showing greater relative changes in metabolite concentrations versus HYPO. The results of the current study have demonstrated that osmotic imbalance induces metabolic change within the skeletal muscle cell and muscle type may influence the mechanisms utilized for cell volume regulation.

Receipt from George Wilson, Contractor and Builder, St. Catharines for contracting work

Receipt from George Wilson, Contractor and Builder, St. Catharines for contracting work, Sept. 30, 1887.

Contracting for innovation under knightian uncertainty

At any given point in time, the collection of assets existing in the economy is observable. Each asset is a function of a set of contingencies. The union taken over all assets of these contingencies is what we call the set of publicly known states. An innovation is a set of states that are not publicly known along with an asset (in a broad sense) that pays contingent on those states. The creator of an innovation is an entrepreneur. He is represented by a probability measure on the set of new states. All other agents perceive the innovation as ambiguous: each of them is represented by a set of probabilities on the new states. The agents in the economy are classified with respect to their attitude towards this Ambiguity: the financiers are (locally) Ambiguity-seeking while the consumers are Ambiguity-averse. An entrepreneur and a financier come together when the former seeks funds to implement his project and the latter seeks new profit opportunities. The resulting contracting problem does not fall within the standard theory due to the presence of Ambiguity (on the financier’s side) and to the heterogeneity in the parties’ beliefs. We prove existence and monotonicity (i.e., truthful revelation) of an optimal contract. We characterize such a contract under the additional assumption that the financiers are globally Ambiguity-seeking. Finally, we re-formulate our results in an insurance framework and extend the classical result of Arrow [4] and the more recent one of Ghossoub. In the case of an Ambiguity-averse insurer, we also show that an optimal contract has the form of a generalized deductible.

Equilibrium Principle in Colombian Public Contracting

Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.

Specialist trade contracting: a review

This book is designed to promote a positive approach to the good management of the relationships between clients, designers, contractors and specialist trade contractors. It covers the integration of specialist contractor design into the overall design; the influences of production processes on design; and management.

Risk under performance-based contracting in the UK construction sector

As a method of procuring the services of the built environment, performance-based contracting (PBC) seeks to link the building supplier to longer term commitments than has traditionally been the case in the construction sector. By rewarding the building producer according to the way that building or structure delivers the users' requirements, rather than according to a list of assembled parts, a number of additional risks are taken by contractors, including fitness for purpose, costs and briefing. The extent to which contractors recognize these risks and their methods of dealing with them vary considerably and are influenced by their attitudes towards risk. As the risks associated with PBC are seen as large, uninsurable, and vulnerable to changing client requirements, the majority of respondents would reject the use of PBC as a method of contracting. Nevertheless, PBC may be used under particular conditions, where rewards are deemed sufficient to compensate for the additional risk to the contractor of undertaking work on the basis of a stream of payments paid over the life of a structure depending on the satisfactory performance of the building or as part of a private finance initiative.

Ownership rights in performance-based contracting: A case study of English law

Clients and contractors need to be aware of the project’s legal environment because the viability of a procurement strategy can be vitiated by legal rules. This is particularly true regarding Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) whose viability may be threatened by rules of property law: while the PBC concept does not require that the contractor transfers the ownership in the building materials used to the client, the rules of property law often lead to an automatic transfer of ownership. But does the legal environment really render PBC unfeasible? In particular, is PBC unfeasible because contractors lose their materials as assets? These questions need to be answered with respect to the applicable property law. As a case study, English property law has been chosen. Under English law, the rule which governs the automatic transfer of ownership is called quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit (whatever is fixed to the soil belongs to the soil). An analysis of this rule reveals that not all materials which are affixed to land become part of the land. This fate only occurs in relation to materials which have been affixed with the intention of permanently improving the land. Five fictitious PBC cases have been considered in terms of the legal status of the materials involved, and several subsequent legal questions have been addressed. The results suggest that English law does actually threaten the feasibility of PBC in some cases. However, it is also shown that the law provides means to circumvent the unwanted results which flow from the rules of property law. In particular, contractors who are interested in keeping their materials as assets can insist on agreeing a property right in the client’s land, i.e. a contractor’s lien. Therefore, the outcome is that English property law does not render the implementation of the PBC concept unfeasible. At a broader level, the results contribute to the theoretical framework of PBC as an increasingly used procurement strategy.