Why do individuals behave differently in commons dilemmas?: The case of alpine farmers using common property pastures in Grindelwald, Switzerland

The sustainable use of common-pool resources depends on users’ behaviour with regards to appropriation and provision. Most knowledge about behaviour in such situations comes from experimental research. As experiments take place in confined environments, motivational drivers and actions in the field might differ. This paper analyses farmers’ use of common property pastures in Grindelwald, Switzerland. Binary logistic regression is applied to survey data to explore the effect of farmers’ attributes on livestock endowment, appropriation and provision behaviour. Furthermore, Q methodology is used to assess the impact of broader contextual variables on the sustainability of common property pastures. It is shown that the strongest associations exist between (a) socio-economic attributes and change in livestock endowment; (b) norms and appropriation behaviour; and (c) area and pay-off and provision behaviour. Relevant contextual variables are the economic value of the resource units, off-farm income opportunities, and the subsidy structure. We conclude that with increasing farm size farmers reduce the use and maintenance of common property. Additionally, we postulate that readiness to maintain a resource increases with appropriation activities and the net returns generated from appropriation.

Common service resources in a free society; attempt at a frame of reference.

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Comportamento legislativo e gasto público : as respostas distributivistas ao problema do common pool

Analisa um aspecto específico da teoria distributivista dos estudos legislativos, tal como apresentada originalmente a partir de David Mayhew: a tendência a gerar gastos fiscais subótimos (superiores ao custo total dos impostos utilizados para financiá-los).

A Nobel Prize for governance and institutions : Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom

This paper reviews the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics jointly awarded to Oliver Williamson for his work on governance in organizations and the boundaries of the firm, and to Elinor Ostrom for her work on the governance of common pool resources. We review the careers and the research contributions of Williamson and Ostrom to the theory and analysis of economic institutions of governance. Both winners of this Prize for 'economic governance' are thoroughly deserved, yet like the Hayek- Myrdal Prize of 1974 their respective approaches, methods and findings are almost diametrically opposed. Williamson offers a top-down contracts-based solution to the incentive problems of opportunism in corporate governance, whereas Ostrom offers a bottom-up communication-based solution to the governance opportunities of community resources. We offer some critical comments on Williamson's analytic work and discussion of the potential for further application of Ostrom's case-study based experimental methodology. We conclude with a suggested third nominee to make better sense of how these two great scholars' works fit together, namely George Richardson'

Devolution of forest-related rights: Comparative analyses of six developing countries

The study focused on the different ways that forest-related rights can be devolved to the local level according to the current legal frameworks in Laos, Nepal, Vietnam, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania. The eleven case studies represented the main ways in which forest-related rights can be devolved to communities or households in these countries. The objectives of this study were to 1) analyse the contents and extent of forest-related rights that can be devolved to the local level, 2) develop an empirical typology that represents the main types of devolution, and 3) compare the cases against a theoretical ideal type to assess in what way and to what extent the cases are similar to or differ from the theoretical construct. Fuzzy set theory, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and ideal type analysis were used in analysing the case studies and in developing an empirical typology. The theoretical framework, which guided data collection and analyses, was based on institutional economics and theories on property rights, common pool resources and collective action. On the basis of the theoretical and empirical knowledge, the most important attributes of rights were defined as use rights, management rights, exclusion rights, transfer rights and the duration and security of the rights. The ideal type was defined as one where local actors have been devolved comprehensive use rights, extensive management rights, rights to exclude others from the resource and rights to transfer these rights. In addition, the rights are to be secure and held perpetually. The ideal type was used to structure the analysis and as a tool against which the cases were analysed. The contents, extent and duration of the devolved rights varied greatly. In general, the results show that devolution has mainly meant the transfer of use rights to the local level, and has not really changed the overall state control over forest resources. In most cases the right holders participate, or have a limited role in the decision making regarding the harvesting and management of the resource. There was a clear tendency to devolve the rights to enforce rules and to monitor resource use and condition more extensively than the powers to decide on the management and development of the resource. The empirical typology of the cases differentiated between five different types of devolution. The types can be characterised by the devolution of 1) restricted use and control rights, 2) extensive use rights but restricted control rights, 3) extensive rights, 4) insecure, short term use and restricted control rights, and 5) insecure extensive rights. Overall, the case studies conformity to the ideal type was very low: only two cases were similar to the ideal type, all other cases differed considerably from the ideal type. The restricted management rights were the most common reason for the low conformity to the ideal type (eight cases). In three cases, the short term of the rights, restricted transfer rights, restricted use rights or restricted exclusion rights were the reason or one of the reasons for the low conformity to the ideal type. In two cases the rights were not secure.

Governing the local networks in Indian agrarian societies-an MAS perspective

In a networked society, governing advocacy groups and networks through decentralized systems of policy implementation has been the interest of governance network literature. This paper addresses the topic of governing networks in the context of Indian agrarian societies by taking the case example of a welfare scheme for the Indian rural poor. We explore context-specific regulatory dynamics through the situated agent based architectural framework. The effects of various regulatory strategies that can be adopted by governing node are tested under various action arenas through experimental design. Results show the impact of regulatory strategies on the resource dependencies and asymmetries in the network relationships. This indicates that the optimal feasible regulatory strategy in networked society is institutionally rational and is context dependent. Further, we show that situated MAS architecture is a natural fit for institutional understanding of the dynamics (Ostrom et al. in Rules, games, and common-pool resources, 1994).

Is the Current Regulation of the VIII Division European Anchovy Optimal?

This paper sets out to assess the workability of the regulation currently in force in the European anchovy fishery of the VIII division. Particular attention is paid to the importance of the institutional regime in the allocation of natural resources. The study uses a bio-economic approach and takes into account the fact that, not only the European Union and the individual countries involved, but also some of the resource users or appropriators intervene in its management. In order to compare the effectiveness of the rules which, at the various levels, have been set up to restrict exploitation of the resource, the anchovy fishery is simulated in two extreme situations: open access and sole ownership. The results obtained by effective management will then be contrasted with those obtained from the maximum and zero profit objectives related with the two above-mentioned scenarios. Thus, if the real data come close to those derived from the sole ownership model it will have to be acknowledged that the rules at present in force are optimal. If, on the other hand, the situation more closely approach the results obtained from the open access model, we will endeavour in our conclusions to provide suggestions for economic policy measures that might improve the situation in the fishery.

Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

How Locally Designed Access and Use Controls Can Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons in a Mexican Small-Scale Fishing Community

The Seri people, a self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in the Gulf of California, Mexico, have ownership rights to fishing grounds where they harvest highly valuable commercial species of bivalves. Outsiders are eager to gain access, and the community has devised a set of rules to allow them in. Because Seri government officials keep all the economic benefits generated from granting this access for themselves, community members create alternative entry mechanisms to divert those benefits to themselves. Under Hardin’s model of the tragedy of the commons, this situation would eventually lead to the overexploitation of the fishery. The Seri people, however, are able to simultaneously maintain access and use controls for the continuing sustainability of their fishing grounds. Using insights from common- pool resources theory, I discuss how Seri community characteristics help mediate the conflict between collective action dilemmas and access and use controls.

Biological and ecological mechanisms supporting marine self-governance: The Seri Callo de Hacha Fishery in Mexico

My goal was to describe how biological and ecological factors give shape to fishing practices that can contribute to the successful self-governance of a small-scale fishing system in the Gulf of California, Mexico. The analysis was based on a comparison of the main ecological and biological indicators that fishers claim to use to govern their day-to-day decision making about fishing and data collected in situ. I found that certain indicators allow fishers to learn about differences and characteristics of the resource system and its units. Fishers use such information to guide their day-to-day fishing decisions. More importantly, these decisions appear unable to shape the reproductive viability of the fishery because no indicators were correlated to the reproductive cycle of the target species. As a result, the fishing practices constitute a number of mechanisms that might provide short-term buffering capacity against perturbations or stress factors that otherwise would threaten the overall sustainability and self-governance of the system. The particular biological circumstances that shape the harvesting practices might also act as a precursor of self-governance because they provide fishers with enough incentives to meet the costs of organizing the necessary rule structure that underlies a successful self-governance system.

Institutional designs of customary fisheries management arrangements in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Mexico

There are considerable efforts by governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academia to integrate marine conservation initiatives and customary practices, such as taboos that limit resource use. However, these efforts are often pursued without a fundamental understanding of customary institutions. This paper examines the operational rules in use and the presence of institutional design principles in long-enduring and dynamic customary fisheries management institutions in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Mexico. Rather than a "blue print" for devising long-enduring institutions, this study relies on the design principles as a starting point to organize an inquiry into the institutional diversity found in customary governance regimes. Three important trends emerged from this comparative analysis: (1) despite it being notoriously difficult to define boundaries around marine resources, almost 3/4 of the cases in this study had clearly defined boundaries and membership; (2) all of the customary institutions were able to make and change rules, indicating a critical degree of flexibility and autonomy that may be necessary for adaptive management; (3) the customary institutions examined generally lacked key interactions with organizations operating at larger scales, suggesting that they may lack the institutional embeddedness required to confront some common pool resources (CPR) challenges from the broader socioeconomic, institutional and political settings in which they are embedded. Future research will be necessary to better understand how specific institutional designs are related to social and ecological outcomes in commons property institutions. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd.