Finnis on the authority of law and the common good

This paper seeks to elucidate the role played by the common good in John Finnis's arguments for a generic and presumptive moral obligation to obey the law.1 Finnis's appeal to the common good constitutes a direct challenge to liberal and philosophical anarchist denials of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law.2 It is questionable, however, whether Finnis has presented the strongest possible case for his position. In the first section I outline Finnis's account of the relationship between basic goods, the common good, and the authority of law. Section II demonstrates how Finnis's emphasis upon the instrumental nature of the common good leaves his position vulnerable to Joseph Raz's objections3 that not all cases of law make a moral difference and that governmental authority is often unnecessary to resolve coordination problems. I argue that Raz's critique nonetheless fails adequately to address an alternative defense of the existence of a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law, suggested by some passages in Finnis's work, according to which the common good is integral, rather than merely instrumental, to the good of individuals. In the final section I consider whether Finnis could strengthen his case for a generic and presumptive obligation to obey the law by adopting a more consistently robust—and hence also more contentious—account of the common good.

Leadership in higher education : The normative project of the common good in conditions of globalization, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), and APEX in Malaysia

In this paper, the author discusses the reform agenda undertaken by UniversitiSains Malaysia (USM) to contextualise higher education reform within culturaland social theory. It is important to understand leadership in leading reformwithin a broader and more holistic fashion that takes into account localculture, politics and history. University Sains Malaysia is embarking on what isreferred to as the APEX agenda. The APEX strategy in Malaysia is an importantapproach towards achieving world-class status university institutions. The ApexUniversities will be the nation’s centres of academic distinction. Ensuring andbuilding upon the ethical authority that APEX gives USM, the challenge of leadership in USM is to engage in the forces of globalization and modernizationwhile at the same time take cognizance of the characteristics and demands ofMalaysian culture as central still to the successful mission of USM.

Közjó és demokrácia. Két közgazdaságtani elmélet a demokráciáról (Common good and democracy. Two economic theories of democracy)

A tanulmány a demokrácia két közgazdaságtani elméletét mutatja be. A demokrácia klasszikus elmélete a közjó fogalmára épült: a klasszikus politikai filozófia érvelése szerint a demokrácia intézménye a közjó megvalósulásának eszköze. Schumpeter bírálta a klasszikus elméletet: a közgazdasági szemléletet alkalmazva a közjó értelmezésére leválasztotta a demokráciáról a közjó fogalmát. Schumpeter szerint a demokrácia szubsztantív felfogása nem tartható, ezért ehelyett a demokrácia procedurális értelmezését kínálta fel. Az alkotmányos közgazdaságtan nem fogadja el sem a közjó és demokrácia fogalmainak elválasztását, sem a közjó szubsztantív értelmezését, ehelyett a közjónak és a demokráciának egyaránt procedurális értelmezését javasolja. _____ This essay deals with two economic theories of democracy. The classical doctrine of democracy was built on the concept of the common good, classical political philosophy arguing that the institution of democracy was the instrument for realizing the common good. This theory was criticized by Schumpeter, who applied the method of modern economics to analysis of the concept, which he separated from democracy, arguing that the substantive concept of democracy was untenable, and proposing to replace it with the procedural concept of democracy. Constitutional economics does not accept such separation of the concepts of democracy and the common good, but it does not accept the substantive interpretation of the common good either. Rather, it proposes a procedural concept of both the common good and of democracy.

Healthcare and the Common Good: Restructuring the Economy of Medical Knowledge through Communitarian Political Theory

The pharmaceutical industry wields disproportionate power and control within the medical economy of knowledge where the desire for profit considerably outweighs health for its own sake. Utilizing the theoretical tools of political philosophy, this project restructures the economy of medical knowledge in order to lessen the oligarchical control possessed by the pharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, this project argues that an economy of medical knowledge structured around communitarian political theory lessens the current power dynamic without taking an anti-capitalist stance. Arising from the core commitments of communitarian-liberalism, the production, distribution, and consumption of medical knowledge all become guided processes seeking to realize the common good of quality healthcare. This project also considers two other theoretical approaches: liberalism and egalitarianism. A Medical knowledge economy structured around liberal political theory is ultimately rejected as it empowers the oligarchical status quo. Egalitarian political theory is able to significantly reduce the power imbalance problem but simultaneously renders inconsequential medical knowledge; therefore, it is also rejected.

Perceptions of the common good in planning

There has been plenty of debate in the academic literature about the nature of the common good or public interest in planning. There is a recognition that the idea is one that is extremely difficult to isolate in practical terms; nevertheless, scholars insist that the idea ‘…remains the pivot around which debates about the nature of planning and its purposes turn’ (Campbell & Marshall, 2002, 163–64). At the point of first principles, these debates have broached political theories of the state and even philosophies of science that inform critiques of rationality, social justice and power. In the planning arena specifically, much of the scholarship has tended to focus on theorising the move from a rational comprehensive planning system in the 1960s and 1970s, to one that is now dominated by deliberative democracy in the form of collaborative planning. In theoretical terms, this debate has been framed by a movement from what are perceived as objective and elitist notions of planning practice and decision-making to ones that are considered (by some) to be ‘inter-subjective’ and non-elitist. Yet despite significant conceptual debate, only a small number of empirical studies have tackled the issue by investigating notions of the common good from the perspective of planning practitioners. What do practitioners understand by the idea of the common good in planning? Do they actively consider it when making planning decisions? Do governance/institutional barriers exist to pursuing the common good in planning? In this paper, these sorts of questions are addressed using the case of Ireland. The methodology consists of a series of semi-structured qualitative interviews with 20 urban planners working across four planning authorities within the Greater Dublin Area, Ireland. The findings show that the most frequently cited definition of the common good is balancing different competing interests and avoiding/minimising the negative effects of development. The results show that practitioner views of the common good are far removed from the lofty ideals of planning theory and reflect the ideological shift of planners within an institution that has been heavily neoliberalised since the 1970s.

Joseph McKeen and the soul of Bowdoin College: an analysis of the chapel sermons of Rev. Joseph McKeen, first president of Bowdoin College, as they relate to his call to serve the common good

The Reverend Joseph McKeen (1757-1807) was the first president of Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, USA, (founded 1794). McKeen is famous for his inaugural address in which he calls students to serve the common good. His view of common good is a deeply theological view, coloured by the theological era in which he lived and worked. This study examines the idea of common in the light of McKeen’s college sermons, taking note of the following subjects: Scottish Common Sense Realism; The Nature of True Virtue; The Controversy with Unitarianism; and Science and Mathematics. McKeen’s view of common good is not simply a political view. He is not merely a republican, expressing his views on the future of the republic in a classical political way. He is also, indeed primarily, a pastor and theologian.

The distinctive common good

This paper defends the traditional distinctive notion of the common good against the claim that it is normatively redundant on the aggregative conception. The first two sections of the paper outline the different candidate conceptions of the common good and the normative role of the common good within natural law theories. The paper then considers some difficulties faced by the instrumental and aggregative conceptions, before developing an Aristotelian account of the distinctive conception of the common good and demonstrating its normative significance for a natural law account of political and legal authority.

The weak natural law thesis and the common good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.

Shifting foundations: journalism and the power of the 'common good'

This essay rethinks the relationship between news media and the universal notion of the ‘common good’ as a key foundational concept for journalism studies. It challenges dominant liberal democratic theories of the press linked to the idea of the ‘public good’ to offer a new way of conceptualizing news media’s relationship to civic life that incorporates power and legitimacy in the changing media world. In doing so, it argues current understandings of journalism’s relationship to the common good also require some re-alignment. The essay draws on Pierre Bourdieu to contend the common good can be understood as a global doxa – an unquestionable orthodoxy that operates as if it were objective truth – across wider social space. How this is carried out in practice depends on the specific context in which it is understood. It positions the common good in relation to news media’s symbolic power to construct reality and argues certain elites generate and reinforce their legitimacy by being perceived as central to negotiating understandings of the common good with links to culture, community and shared values.

School choice, religion and the public good

This paper discusses the issue of school choice. I contend that arguments for choice through vouchers based on the perceived benefits of religious schooling is based on a narrow set of research, which is potentially misleading with regards to the role religious schools play in establishing democratic values and the common good. This paper seeks to demonstrate through as comparative discussion of U.S. and Australian examples the problematic nature of arguments for school choice based on the perceived advantages of religious schools.