Organizational responses to a changing aid environment: the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

As a major European donor, German government development assistance faces a series of challenges. Recent political changes have raised expectations for demonstrable health outcomes as a result of German development assistance; there has been a deepened commitment to collaboration with other bilateral and multilateral donors; and partner countries are increasingly open to new approaches to development. German development assistance also reflects a new ethos of partnership and the shift to programmatic and sector based development approaches. At the same time, its particular organizational structure and administrative framework highlight the extent of structural and systems reforms required of donors by changing development relationships, and the tensions created in responding to these. This paper examines organizational changes within the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit) (GTZ), aimed at increasing its Regional, Sectoral, Managerial and Process competence as they affect health and related sectors. These include the decentralization of GTZ, the trend to integration of projects, the increasing focus on policy and health systems reform, increased inter-sectoral collaboration, changes in recruitment and training, new perspectives in planning and evaluation and the introduction of a quality management programme. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd.

Public hearings as a tool to improve participation in regulatory policies: case study of the National Agency of Electric Energy

The participation of citizens in public policies is an opportunity not only to educate them, but also to increase their empowerment. However, the best way for deploying participatory policies, defining their scope and approach, still remains an open and continuous debate. Using as a case study the Brazilian National Agency of Electric Energy (Aneel), with its public hearings about tariff review, this paper aims at analyzing the democratic aspects of these hearings and challenges the hypothesis of many scholars about the social participation bias in this kind of procedure. This study points out a majority participation of experts, contrasting with the political content of discussions. And, this way, it contributes to a critical analysis of the public hearings as a participatory tool, indicating their strengths and their aspects which deserve a special attention.

Seller, buyer and VPP agents behavior on a simulated electricity market

Competitive electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. MASCEM is an electricity market simulator able to model market players and simulate their operation in the market. As market players are complex entities, having their characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting with other players, a multi-agent architecture is used and proved to be adequate. MASCEM players have learning capabilities and different risk preferences. They are able to refine their strategies according to their past experience (both real and simulated) and considering other agents’ behavior. Agents’ behavior is also subject to its risk preferences.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

IPH response to DHSSPS and Food Standards Agency (NI) Front of Pack Labelling consultation

From 2016, it will be mandatory for most pre-packed food to carry nutrition labelling.  This provides an opportunity to review the provision of additional nutrition labelling that is provided voluntarily on the front of packs.  The Governments across the UK are committed to the provision of nutritional information to help consumers make better informed food choices. Key points from IPH response Obesity and related chronic conditions are already very prevalent and are expected to increase over the next decade, placing greater financial burden on health care services. Helping consumers to make informed choices about their diet is an important aspect of tackling obesity. Providing clear consistent and easy to understand front of pack (FoP) nutrition information is important in helping consumers to make healthy choices. IPH would support FoP nutrition information using the traffic light labelling scheme and High/Medium/Low text. FoP nutrition labelling should be supported by a public information campaign to educate consumers about portion sizes and recommended daily intakes of fat, sugar and salt. IPH would support a nutrition labelling approach which empowers and enables consumers to take responsibility for their own health through informed dietary choices. The FoP traffic light labelling scheme has the potential to encourage healthier product formulation as manufacturers pursue market share. This in turn would contribute to wider availability of healthier products.

IPH response to Health and Social Care Board and Public Health Agency Community Development Strategy

The Health and Social Care Board (HSCB) and the Public Health Agency (PHA) launched a new Community Development Strategy for public consultation.  The HSCB and PHA want to see strong, resilient communities where everyone has good health and wellbeing, places where people look out for each other and have community pride in where they live. The HSCB and PHA seek a number of benefits from implementing this strategy including; a reduction in health and wellbeing inequalities, which also means addressing the social factors that affect health; strengthening partnership working with service users, the community and voluntary sectors and other organisations; strengthening families and communities; supporting volunteering and making best use of our resources. Key points from the IPH summary include IPH welcome the Community Development Strategy as an approach to enhance health and wellbeing and tackle health inequalities in Northern Ireland.   IPH recommend the current three strategy documents (Full and summary versions and the Performance Management Framework) are merged into one document for greater clarity. Reference to the Performance Management Framework is required in the main body of the text is to ensure good practice is implemented. IPH welcome the focus on tackling health inequalities using community development approaches however the contribution of community development approaches needs to be highlighted. HIA is a tool to support community engagement and provides a mechanism for HSCB and PHA to support the implementation of this strategy.

IPH responds to Consultation on Food Standards Agency Strategy 2010 to 2015

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) promotes co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It aims to improve health by working to combat health inequalities and influence public policies in favour of health. IPH promotes co-operation in research, training, information and policy in order to contribute to policies which tackle inequalities in health. IPH welcomes the Food Standards Agency Strategy for 2010 to 2015 and the opportunity to comment on the publication. We restrict our comments to the “Healthy Eating for All” aspect of FSA’s purpose with particular reference to local development in Northern Ireland.