Systemic risk in dynamical networks with stochastic failure criterion

Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erdos-Renyi network models where each node, representing a bank, can invest either to a single asset (model I) or multiple assets (model II). We use a dynamical network approach to evaluate the collective financial failure -systemic risk- quantified by the fraction of active nodes. The systemic risk can be calculated over any future time period, divided into sub-periods, where within each sub-period banks may contiguously fail due to links to either i) assets or ii) other banks, controlled by two parameters, probability of internal failure p and threshold T-h ("solvency" parameter). The systemic risk decreases with the average network degree faster when all assets are equally distributed across banks than if assets are randomly distributed. The more inactive banks each bank can sustain (smaller T-h), the smaller the systemic risk -for some Th values in I we report a discontinuity in systemic risk. When contiguous spreading becomes stochastic ii) controlled by probability p(2) -a condition for the bank to be solvent (active) is stochasticthe- systemic risk decreases with decreasing p(2). We analyse the asset allocation for the U.S. banks. Copyright (C) EPLA, 2014

Essays on Bank Risk

This PhD Thesis is composed of three chapters, each discussing a specific type of risk that banks face. The first chapter talks about Systemic Risk and how banks get exposed to it through the Interbank Funding Market. Exposures in the said market have Systemic Risk implications because the market creates linkages, where the failure of one party can affect the others in the market. By showing that CDS Spreads, as bank risk indicators, are positively related to their Net Interbank Funding Market Exposures, this chapter establishes the above Systemic Risk Implications of Interbank Funding. Meanwhile, the second chapter discusses how banks may handle Illiquidity Risk, defined as the possibility of having sudden funding needs. Illiquidity Risk is embodied in this chapter through Loan Commitments as they oblige banks to lend to its clients, up to a certain amount of funds at any time. This chapter points out that using Securitization as funding facility, could allow the banks to manage this Illiquidity Risk. To make this case, this chapter demonstrates empirically that banks having an increase in Loan Commitments, may experience an increase in risk profile but such can be offset by an accompanying increase in Securitization Activity. Lastly, the third chapter focuses on how banks manage Credit Risk also through Securitization. Securitization has a Credit Risk management property by allowing the offloading of risk. This chapter investigates how banks use such property by looking at the effect of securitization on the banks’ loan portfolios and overall risk and returns. The findings are that securitization is positively related to loan portfolio size and the portfolio share of risky loans, which translates to higher risk and returns. Thus, this chapter points out that Credit Risk management through Securitization may be have been done towards higher risk taking for high returns.

Explaining Recent Connecticut Bank Failures

Significant numbers of U.S. commercial bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s raise important questions about bank performance. We develop a failure-prediction model for Connecticut banks to examine events in 1991 and 1992. We adopt data envelopment analysis to derive measures of managerial efficiency. Our findings can be briefly stated. Managerial inefficiency does not provide significant information to explain Connecticut bank failures. Portfolio variables do generally contain significant information.

Implementing the AIFMD: Success or failure? ECMI Commentary No. 34, 28 March 2013

This commentary considers the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) by the European Commission. The AIFMD creates an internal market for asset management and as an endeavour to develop market-based finance is an important piece of legislation for the European economy. The author, Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía, considers the implementation of some of the provisions that raised concern among industry participants. He finds that, on balance, a practical and flexible approach to implementation has been followed that should help secure the success of the framework, which at present is still uncertain. The commentary also considers the remuneration guidelines adopted recently by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). It encourages EU and national authorities to commit to the success of the AIFMD framework, as part of a broader effort to develop capital markets and reduce the historical reliance of the European economy on bank finance.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). CEPS Special Report No. 109/May 2015

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

The trajectory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank to the Ministry of the Cities

This paper discusses social housing policy in Brazil since the 1990s by analyzing government programs’ institutional arrangements, their sources of revenues and the formatting of related financial systems. The conclusion suggests that all these arrangements have not constituted a comprehensive housing policy with the clear aim of serving to enhance housing conditions in the country. Housing ‘policies’ since the 1990s – as proposed by Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and ´ Luis Inacio Lula da Silva’s governments (in the latter case, despite much progress towards subsidized investment programs) – have sought to consolidate financial instruments in line with global markets, restructuring the way private interests operate within the system, a necessary however incomplete course of action. Different from rhetoric, this has resulted in failure as the more fundamental social results for the poor have not yet been achieved.

The trajectory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank to the Ministry of the Cities

This paper discusses social housing policy in Brazil since the 1990s by analyzing government programs’ institutional arrangements, their sources of revenues and the formatting of related financial systems. The conclusion suggests that all these arrangements have not constituted a comprehensive housing policy with the clear aim of serving to enhance housing conditions in the country. Housing ‘policies’ since the 1990s – as proposed by Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and ´ Luis Inacio Lula da Silva’s governments (in the latter case, despite much progress towards subsidized investment programs) – have sought to consolidate financial instruments in line with global markets, restructuring the way private interests operate within the system, a necessary however incomplete course of action. Different from rhetoric, this has resulted in failure as the more fundamental social results for the poor have not yet been achieved.

THE DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL WATER AND SANITATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: DEFINING “QUALITY AT ENTRY” OF WORLD BANK PROJECTS.

Over the past 15 years, the number of international development projects aimed at combating global poverty has increased significantly. Within the water and sanitation sector however, and despite heightened global attention and an increase in the number of infrastructure projects, over 800 million people remain without access to appropriate water and sanitation facilities. The majority of donor aid in the water supply and sanitation sector of developing countries is delivered through standalone projects. The quality of projects at the design and preparation stage is a critical determinant in meeting project objectives. The quality of projects at early stage of design, widely referred to as quality at entry (QAE), however remains unquantified and largely subjective. This research argues that water and sanitation infrastructure projects in the developing world tend to be designed in the absence of a specific set of actions that ensure high QAE, and consequently have relatively high rates of failure. This research analyzes 32 cases of water and sanitation infrastructure projects implemented with partial or full World Bank financing globally from 2000 – 2010. The research uses categorical data analysis, regression analysis and descriptive analysis to examine perceived linkages between project QAE and project development outcomes and determines which upstream project design factors are likely to impact the QAE of international development projects in water supply and sanitation. The research proposes a number of specific design stage actions that can be incorporated into the formal review process of water and sanitation projects financed by the World Bank or other international development partners.