Pricing of Liquidity Risks in London Stock Exchange

This thesis aims to investigate pricing of liquidity risks in London Stock Exchange. Liquidity Adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model i.e. LCAPM developed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) is being applied to test the influence of various liquidity risks on stock returns in London Stock Exchange. The Liquidity Adjusted Capital Asset Pricing model provides a unified framework for the testing of liquidity risks. All the common stocks listed and delisted for the period of 2000 to 2014 are included in the data sample. The study has incorporated three different measures of liquidity – Percent Quoted Spread, Amihud (2002) and Turnover. The reason behind the application of three different liquidity measures is the multi-dimensional nature of liquidity. Firm fixed effects panel regression is applied for the estimation of LCAPM. However, the results are robust according to Fama-Macbeth regressions. The results of the study indicates that liquidity risks in the form of (i) level of liquidity, (ii) commonality in liquidity (iii) flight to liquidity, (iv) depressed wealth effect and market return as well as aggregate liquidity risk are priced at London Stock Exchange. However, the results are sensitive to the choice of liquidity measures.

Liquidity in commercial property markets: deconstructing the transaction process

This paper draws from a wider research programme in the UK undertaken for the Investment Property Forum examining liquidity in commercial property. One aspect of liquidity is the process by which transactions occur including both how properties are selected for sale and the time taken to transact. The paper analyses data from three organisations; a property company, a major financial institution and an asset management company, formally a major public sector pension fund. The data covers three market states and includes sales completed in 1995, 2000 and 2002 in the UK. The research interviewed key individuals within the three organisations to identify any common patterns of activity within the sale process and also identified the timing of 187 actual transactions from inception of the sale to completion. The research developed a taxonomy of the transaction process. Interviews with vendors indicated that decisions to sell were a product of a combination of portfolio, specific property and market based issues. Properties were generally not kept in a “readiness for sale” state. The average time from first decision to sell the actual property to completion had a mean time of 298 days and a median of 190 days. It is concluded that this study may underestimate the true length of the time to transact for two reasons. Firstly, the pre-marketing period is rarely recorded in transaction files. Secondly, and more fundamentally, studies of sold properties may contain selection bias. The research indicated that vendors tended to sell properties which it was perceived could be sold at a ‘fair’ price in a reasonable period of time.

Broker use and the cost of liquidity in commercial real estate investment

Purpose – Commercial real estate is a highly specific asset: heterogeneous, indivisible and with less information transparency than most other commonly held investment assets. These attributes encourage the use of intermediaries during asset acquisition and disposal. However, there are few attempts to explain the use of different brokerage models (with differing costs) in different markets. This study aims to address this gap. Design/methodology/approach – The study analyses 9,338 real estate transactions in London and New York City from 2001 to 2011. Data are provided by Real Capital Analytics and cover over $450 billion of investments in this period. Brokerage trends in the two cities are compared and probit regressions are used to test whether the decision to transact with broker representation varies with investor or asset characteristics. Findings – Results indicate greater use of brokerage in London, especially by purchasers. This persists when data are disaggregated by sector, time or investor type, pointing to the role of local market culture and institutions in shaping brokerage models and transaction costs. Within each city, the nature of the investors involved seems to be a more significant influence on broker use than the characteristics of the assets being traded. Originality/value – Brokerage costs are the single largest non-tax charge to an investor when trading commercial real estate, yet there is little research in this area. This study examines the role of brokers and provides empirical evidence on factors that influence the use and mode of brokerage in two major investment destinations.

Liquidity and the drivers of search, due diligence and transaction times for UK commercial real estate investments

Trading commercial real estate involves a process of exchange that is costly and which occurs over an extended and uncertain period of time. This has consequences for the performance and risk of real estate investments. Most research on transaction times has occurred for residential rather than commercial real estate. We study the time taken to transact commercial real estate assets in the UK using a sample of 578 transactions over the period 2004 to 2013. We measure average time to transact from a buyer and seller perspective, distinguishing the search and due diligence phases of the process, and we conduct econometric analysis to explain variation in due diligence times between assets. The median time for purchase of real estate from introduction to completion was 104 days and the median time for sale from marketing to completion was 135 days. There is considerable variation around these times and results suggest that some of this variation is related to market state, type and quality of asset, and type of participants involved in the transaction. Our findings shed light on the drivers of liquidity at an individual asset level and can inform models that quantify the impact of uncertain time on market on real estate investment risk.

Liquidity review: dimensions, causes, measures and empirical applications in real estate markets

Liquidity is a fundamentally important facet of investments, but there is no single measure that quantifies it perfectly. Instead, a range of measures are necessary to capture different dimensions of liquidity such as the breadth and depth of markets, the costs of transacting, the speed with which transactions can occur and the resilience of prices to trading activity. This article considers how different dimensions have been measured in financial markets and for various forms of real estate investment. The purpose of this exercise is to establish the range of liquidity measures that could be used for real estate investments before considering which measures and questions have been investigated so far. Most measures reviewed here are applicable to public real estate, but not all can be applied to private real estate assets or funds. Use of a broader range of liquidity measures could help real estate researchers tackle issues such as quantification of illiquidity premiums for the real estate asset class or different types of real estate, and how liquidity differences might be incorporated into portfolio allocation models.

The Aiyagari model with liquidity shoch

Neste trabalho é desenvolvida uma versão do modelo de Aiyagari (1994) com choque de liquidez. Este modelo tem Huggett (1993) e Aiyagari (1994) como casos particulares, mas esta generalização permite dois ativos distintos na economia, um líquido e outro ilíquido. Usar dois ativos diferentes implica em dois retornos afetando o "market clearing", logo, a estratégia computacional usada por Aiyagari e Hugget não funciona. Consequentemente, a triangulação de Scarf substitui o algoritmo. Este experimento computacional mostra que o retorno em equilíbrio do ativo líquido é menor do que o retorno do ilíquido. Além disso, pessoas pobres carregam relativamente mais o ativo líquido, e essa desigualdade não aparece no modelo de Aiyagari.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Essays on Asset Trade

The overreaching methodology of my Ph.D. thesis is to substitute noise traders with rational traders. I do so by considering liquidity asymmetry between informed trader and uninformed traders. Liquidity asymmetry creates a motive for trade. Under this new setup, I study the impact of asset trade on the real economy, represented by a firm with an investment opportunity, in chapter 1 ("Efficient Asset Trade - A Model with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Liquidity Needs"). I find conditions for which asset trade leads to inefficient investment. Chapter 2 ("(In)Efficient Asset Trade and a Rationale for a Tobin Tax") characterizes a tax which can restore efficient investment. In chapter 3, I show that finitely repeated trade, as in Kyle (1985) and Ostrovsky (2012), does not necessarily lead to information revelation if traders are fully rational.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei (The role of corporate liquidity management under secured debt financing Results of the bargaining approach)

A szerző azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy a vállalat működése során a likvid eszközök mekkora arányát tartsa fenn. A kérdést a finanszírozás szemszögéből veti fel, mivel a hitelezés okozta korlátok jelentősen befolyásolják a likvid eszköz tartalékolásának motivációit. A cikk a vállalkozói-hitelezői információs kapcsolat háromféle esetében mutatja be az eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelek adósságszolgálatát meghatározó tényezőket. Elsőként a teljes információs viszony melletti stratégiákkal meghatározott adósságszolgálatot vizsgálja, majd a második típusú információs kapcsolatban a nem megfigyelhető vállalkozói erőfeszítéseket feltételezve adja meg az adósságszolgálat fizetésének ex ante és ex post egyensúlyát. Harmadikként, a nem igazolható vállalati adatok feltevése mellett teljes és részleges eszközfedezetre is meghatározza az optimális vállalkozói likviditási politikát, és tárgyalja az itt fennálló ellentéteket. Megmutatja, hogy részleges eszközfedezet mellett 1. újratárgyalható a hitelszerződés, és a stratégiai adósságszolgálatot nem lehet elkerülni, 2. a likviditásoptimalizálásnak nincs ex post Pareto-egyensúlyi megoldása, ugyanis a hitelszerződésben részt vevő felek alkuereje határozza meg a vállalat likviditásának szintjét. / === / This paper investigates what the liquid asset ratio for firms should be. Financing constraints significantly influence motivations for liquidity hoarding. The article shows the determinants of secured debt services for three different information cases of a lender-borrower relationship. First, it examines the strategic debt service under full information, and then, assuming non-observable entrepreneurial efforts, it gives the ex ante and ex post equilibria of the strategic debt service. The third case supposes non-verifiable firm information; this provides the optimal corporate liquidity policy and explains the contrary propositions. It shows that under not fully secured collateral, 1. the debt contract is renegotiable; the lender cannot avoid the strategic debt service, 2. there is no ex post optimal Pareto efficient solution to liquidity policy, because the corporate liquidity ratio is determined by the bargaining power of the partners in the debt contract.

Three Essays in Empirical Asset Pricing

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 led to extraordinary government intervention in firms and markets. The scope and depth of government action rivaled that of the Great Depression. Many traded markets experienced dramatic declines in liquidity leading to the existence of conditions normally assumed to be promptly removed via the actions of profit seeking arbitrageurs. These extreme events motivate the three essays in this work. The first essay seeks and fails to find evidence of investor behavior consistent with the broad 'Too Big To Fail' policies enacted during the crisis by government agents. Only in limited circumstances, where government guarantees such as deposit insurance or U.S. Treasury lending lines already existed, did investors impart a premium to the debt security prices of firms under stress. The second essay introduces the Inflation Indexed Swap Basis (IIS Basis) in examining the large differences between cash and derivative markets based upon future U.S. inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It reports the consistent positive value of this measure as well as the very large positive values it reached in the fourth quarter of 2008 after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. It concludes that the IIS Basis continues to exist due to limitations in market liquidity and hedging alternatives. The third essay explores the methodology of performing debt based event studies utilizing credit default swaps (CDS). It provides practical implementation advice to researchers to address limited source data and/or small target firm sample size.

Why do so few hold stocks : theory and evidence

This study develops a life-cycle model where investors make investment decisions in a realistic environment. Model results show that personal illiquid projects (housing and children), fixed costs (once-off/per-period participation costs plus variable/fixed transaction costs) and endogenous risky human capital (with permanent, transitory and disastrous shocks) together are able to address both the non-participation puzzle and the age-effects puzzle. Empirical implications of the model are examined using Heckman’s two-step method with the latest five Surveys of Consumer Finance (SCF). Regression results show that liquidity, informational cost and human capital are indeed the major determinants of participation and asset allocation decisions at different stages of an investor’s life.