Interactive conference voting

We describe and analyze opinion polling results from interactive voting procedures undertaken before and after presentations during the Outcome Measures in Rheumatoid Arthritis Clinical Trials Conference (OMERACT II) in Ottawa, Canada, June 30-July 2, 1994. The scoring procedure was a matched voting design; when a participant used the same keypad at the beginning and end of voting, change within a participant could be estimated. Participants, experienced in the rheumatic diseases included clinicians, researchers, methodologists, regulators, and representatives of the pharmaceutical industry. Patients under consideration were those with any rheumatic diseases. Questions were constructed to evaluate the change in voting behavior expected from the content of the presentation. Statistically significant and substantively important changes were evident in most questions.

Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting : evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 12 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.

Bounded rationality and voting decisions over 160 years : voter behavior and increasing complexity in decision-making

Using a quasi-natural voting experiment encompassing a 160-year period (1848–2009) in Switzerland, we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on trusted parliamentary representatives. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations when making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum is held. We also demonstrate that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they follow the parliamentary recommendations rather than those of interest groups. "Viewed as a geometric figure, the ant’s path is irregular, complex, hard to describe. But its complexity is really a complexity in the surface of the beach, not a complexity in the ant." ([1] p. 51)

Essays in the political economy of voting and reforms

This thesis presents four essays in the political economy of elections and reforms. The first study exploits discontinuities around school entry cut-off dates to show that early childhood conditions can impact the probability to become a top-flight politician. The second study provides empirical estimates of the effect of sequential voting on turnout and bandwagon voting outside the laboratory. The third work describes a novel nonparametric strategy to identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results using British election data. Finally, a study is put forward that examines the political feasibility of reforms.

Utilizing voting systems for ranking user tweets

Twitter is a very popular social network website that allows users to publish short posts called tweets. Users in Twitter can follow other users, called followees. A user can see the posts of his followees on his Twitter profile home page. An information overload problem arose, with the increase of the number of followees, related to the number of tweets available in the user page. Twitter, similar to other social network websites, attempts to elevate the tweets the user is expected to be interested in to increase overall user engagement. However, Twitter still uses the chronological order to rank the tweets. The tweets ranking problem was addressed in many current researches. A sub-problem of this problem is to rank the tweets for a single followee. In this paper we represent the tweets using several features and then we propose to use a weighted version of the famous voting system Borda-Count (BC) to combine several ranked lists into one. A gradient descent method and collaborative filtering method are employed to learn the optimal weights. We also employ the Baldwin voting system for blending features (or predictors). Finally we use the greedy feature selection algorithm to select the best combination of features to ensure the best results.

Kumarina and bidders voting in transfer schemes

Transfer schemes are an alternative means of acquiring control of a company to making a takeover bid under the provisions in Ch 6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The recent decision Re Kumarina Resources Ltd [2013] FCA 549 overturned long-standing practice in relation to a certain type of transfer scheme. If followed, the decision would allow a “bidder” to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of the target shares are shares in another company, and the scheme results in a merger. But the bidder is not allowed to vote where the scheme consideration is cash. The article points out the difficulties arising from this decision and argues that it should not be followed. In providing a “no objection” statement, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has created uncertainty as to the approach it will take towards the bidders being allowed to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of target shares are shares in another company. The article also points out that in providing the no objection statement in Kumarina, ASIC appears to have ignored breaches of s 606(1) of the Corporations Act. There is a pressing need for ASIC to clarify its position and, in particular, whether or not it will provide a no objection statement in respect of future transfer schemes where a bidder (or its parent company) votes at the scheme meeting.

Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.

A new approach to measure tactical voting: evidence from the British elections

Although tactical voting attracts a great deal of attention, it is very hard to measure as it requires knowledge of both individuals’ voting choices as well as their unobserved preferences. In this article, we present a simple empirical strategy to nonparametrically identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results. This approach allows us to study the magnitude and direction of strategic voting as well as to verify which information voters and parties take into account to determine marginal constituencies. We show that tactical voting played a significant role in the 2010 election, mainly for Liberal–Democratic voters supporting Labour. Moreover, our results suggest that voters seem to form their expectations based on a national swing in vote shares rather than newspaper guides published in the main media outlets or previous election outcomes. We also present some evidence that suggests that campaign spending is not driving tactical voting.

A cluster-voting approach for speaker diarization and linking of Australian broadcast news recordings

We present a clustering-only approach to the problem of speaker diarization to eliminate the need for the commonly employed and computationally expensive Viterbi segmentation and realignment stage. We use multiple linear segmentations of a recording and carry out complete-linkage clustering within each segmentation scenario to obtain a set of clustering decisions for each case. We then collect all clustering decisions, across all cases, to compute a pairwise vote between the segments and conduct complete-linkage clustering to cluster them at a resolution equal to the minimum segment length used in the linear segmentations. We use our proposed cluster-voting approach to carry out speaker diarization and linking across the SAIVT-BNEWS corpus of Australian broadcast news data. We compare our technique to an equivalent baseline system with Viterbi realignment and show that our approach can outperform the baseline technique with respect to the diarization error rate (DER) and attribution error rate (AER).

Compulsory Voting, Encouraged Tweeting? Australian Elections and Social Media

This chapter examines patterns in social media activity around Australian elections, focusing primarily on the 2013 federal election and supplemented by extended research into social media and Australian politics between 2007 and 2015. The coverage of Australian elections on social media is analysed from three perspectives: the evolution of the use of online platforms during elections; politician and party social media strategies during the 2013 election, focusing on Twitter; and citizen engagement with elections as demonstrated through election day tweeting practices. The specific context of Australian politics, where voting is compulsory, and the popularity of social media platforms like Twitter makes this case notably different from other Western democracies. It also demonstrates the extended mediation of politics through social media, for politicians and citizens alike.

Valence and spatial explanations for voting in the 2013 Australian election

This paper examines the 2013 Australian federal election to test two competing models of vote choice: spatial politics and valence issues. Using data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, the analysis finds that spatial politics (measured by party identification and self-placement on the left-right spectrum) and valence issues both have significant effects on vote choice. However, spatial measures are more important than valence issues in explaining vote choice, in contrast with recent studies from Britain, Canada and the United States. Explanations for these differences are speculative, but may relate to Australia’s stable party and electoral system, including compulsory voting and the frequency of elections. The consequently high information burden faced by Australian voters may lead to a greater reliance on spatial heuristics than is found elsewhere.

Documenting the inevitable: Voting behaviour at the 2013 Australian election

This chapter uses data from the 2013 Australian Election Study (AES), conducted by Clive Bean, Ian McAllister, Juliet Pietsch and Rachel Gibson (Bean et al. 2014) to investigate political attitudes and voting behaviour in the election. The study was funded by the Australian Research Council and involved a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-completion questionnaire mailed to respondents on the day before the 7 September election. The sample was a systematic random sample of enrolled voters throughout Australia, drawn by the Australian Electoral Commission. Respondents were given the option of returning the completed questionnaire by reply-paid mail or completing the survey online. Non-respondents were sent several follow-up mailings and the final sample size was 3955, representing a response rate of 34 per cent. The data were weighted to reflect population parameters for gender, age, state and vote.

Voting Paths

We consider a variant of the popular matching problem here. The input instance is a bipartite graph $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$, where vertices in $\mathcal{A}$ are called applicants and vertices in $\mathcal{P}$ are called posts. Each applicant ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching $M$ is popular if there is no other matching $M'$ such that the number of applicants who prefer their partners in $M'$ to $M$ exceeds the number of applicants who prefer their partners in $M$ to $M'$. However, the “more popular than” relation is not transitive; hence this relation is not a partial order, and thus there need not be a maximal element here. Indeed, there are simple instances that do not admit popular matchings. The questions of whether an input instance $G$ admits a popular matching and how to compute one if it exists were studied earlier by Abraham et al. Here we study reachability questions among matchings in $G$, assuming that $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$ admits a popular matching. A matching $M_k$ is reachable from $M_0$ if there is a sequence of matchings $\langle M_0,M_1,\dots,M_k\rangle$ such that each matching is more popular than its predecessor. Such a sequence is called a length-$k$ voting path from $M_0$ to $M_k$. We show an interesting property of reachability among matchings in $G$: there is always a voting path of length at most 2 from any matching to some popular matching. Given a bipartite graph $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$ with $n$ vertices and $m$ edges and any matching $M_0$ in $G$, we give an $O(m\sqrt{n})$ algorithm to compute a shortest-length voting path from $M_0$ to a popular matching; when preference lists are strictly ordered, we have an $O(m+n)$ algorithm. This problem has applications in dynamic matching markets, where applicants and posts can enter and leave the market, and applicants can also change their preferences arbitrarily. After any change, the current matching may no longer be popular, in which case we are required to update it. However, our model demands that we switch from one matching to another only if there is consensus among the applicants to agree to the switch. Hence we need to update via a voting path that ends in a popular matching. Thus our algorithm has applications here.

Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting

In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided, for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the POSSIBLE WINNER problem, with number of candidates as the parameter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge 10]. In this paper, we settle this open question for many common voting rules. We show that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule does not admit a polynomial kernel with the number of candidates as the parameter. We show however that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem which is an important special case of the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule, when the number of manipulators is polynomial in the number of candidates. A significant conclusion of our work is that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem is harder than the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem since the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does not admit a polynomial kernel. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.