971 resultados para Uniform Eberlein Compacta
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Consider the problem of scheduling a set of implicit-deadline sporadic tasks to meet all deadlines on a uniform multiprocessor platform where each task may access at most one of |R| shared resources and at most once by each job of that task. The resources have to be accessed in a mutually exclusive manner. We propose an algorithm, GIS-vpr, which offers the guarantee that if a task set is schedulable to meet deadlines by an optimal task assignment scheme that allows a task to migrate only when it accesses or releases a resource, then our algorithm also meets the deadlines with the same restriction on the task migration, if given processors 4 + 6|R| times as fast. The proposed algorithm, by design, limits the number of migrations per job to at most two. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result for resource sharing on uniform multiprocessors with proven performance guarantee.
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Consider the problem of scheduling a set of sporadically arriving tasks on a uniform multiprocessor with the goal of meeting deadlines. A processor p has the speed Sp. Tasks can be preempted but they cannot migrate between processors. We propose an algorithm which can schedule all task sets that any other possible algorithm can schedule assuming that our algorithm is given processors that are three times faster.
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Consider the problem of scheduling a set of sporadically arriving tasks on a uniform multiprocessor with the goal of meeting deadlines. A processor p has the speed Sp. Tasks can be preempted but they cannot migrate between processors. On each processor, tasks are scheduled according to rate-monotonic. We propose an algorithm that can schedule all task sets that any other possible algorithm can schedule assuming that our algorithm is given processors that are √2 / √2−1 ≈ 3.41 times faster. No such guarantees are previously known for partitioned static-priority scheduling on uniform multiprocessors.
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The urgent need to mitigate traffic problems such as accidents, road hazards, pollution and traffic jam have strongly driven the development of vehicular communications. DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communications) is the technology of choice in vehicular communications, enabling real time information exchange among vehicles V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) and between vehicles and infrastructure V2I (Vehicle-Infrastructure). This paper presents a receiving antenna for a single lane DSRC control unit. The antenna is a non-uniform array with five microstrip patches. The obtained beam width, bandwidth and circular polarization quality, among other characteristics, are compatible with the DSRC standards, making this antenna suitable for this application. © 2014 IEEE.
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Wireless communications are widely used for various applications, requiring antennas with different features. Often, to achieve the desired radiation pattern, is necessary to employ antenna arrays, using non-uniform excitation on its elements. Power dividers can be used and the best known are the T-junction and the Wilkinson power divider, whose main advantage is the isolation between output ports. In this paper the impact of this isolation on the overall performance of a circularly polarized planar antenna array using non-uniform excitation is investigated. Results show a huge decrease of the array bandwidths either in terms of return loss or in polarization, without resistors. © 2014 IEEE.
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The rank of a semigroup, an important and relevant concept in Semigroup Theory, is the cardinality of a least-size generating set. Semigroups of transformations that preserve or reverse the order or the orientation as well as semigroups of transformations preserving an equivalence relation have been widely studied over the past decades by many authors. The purpose of this article is to compute the ranks of the monoid
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In this paper we give formulas for the number of elements of the monoids ORm x n of all full transformations on it finite chain with tun elements that preserve it uniform m-partition and preserve or reverse the orientation and for its submonoids ODm x n of all order-preserving or order-reversing elements, OPm x n of all orientation-preserving elements, O-m x n of all order-preserving elements, O-m x n(+) of all extensive order-preserving elements and O-m x n(-) of all co-extensive order-preserving elements.
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IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, MAY 25-28, 2003, Bangkok, Thailand. (ISI Web of Science)
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Wireless communications had a great development in the last years and nowadays they are present everywhere, public and private, being increasingly used for different applications. Their application in the business of sports events as a means to improve the experience of the fans at the games is becoming essential, such as sharing messages and multimedia material on social networks. In the stadiums, given the high density of people, the wireless networks require very large data capacity. Hence radio coverage employing many small sized sectors is unavoidable. In this paper, an antenna is designed to operate in the Wi-Fi 5GHz frequency band, with a directive radiation pattern suitable to this kind of applications. Furthermore, despite the large bandwidth and low losses, this antenna has been developed using low cost, off-the-shelf materials without sacrificing quality or performance, essential to mass production. © 2015 EurAAP.
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Bulletin of the Malaysian Mathematical Sciences Society
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Communications in Algebra
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt".
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This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor
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The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.
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We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.