Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

The F test for comparing two normal variances: correct and incorrect calculation of the two-sided p-value?

This article illustrates that not all statistical software packages are correctly calculating a p-value for the classical F test comparison of two independent Normal variances. This is illustrated with a simple example, and the reasons why are discussed. Eight different software packages are considered.

Small time two-sided LIL behavior for Lévy processes at zero

We wish to characterize when a Lévy process X t crosses boundaries b(t), in a two-sided sense, for small times t, where b(t) satisfies very mild conditions. An integral test is furnished for computing the value of sup t→0|X t |/b(t) = c. In some cases, we also specify a function b(t) in terms of the Lévy triplet, such that sup t→0 |X t |/b(t) = 1.

Strategic adoption in a two-sided market : a study of college applications in Brazil

This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.

Optimal two-sided tests for instrumental variables regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors

This paper considers two-sided tests for the parameter of an endogenous variable in an instrumental variable (IV) model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. We develop the nite-sample theory of weighted-average power (WAP) tests with normal errors and a known long-run variance. We introduce two weights which are invariant to orthogonal transformations of the instruments; e.g., changing the order in which the instruments appear. While tests using the MM1 weight can be severely biased, optimal tests based on the MM2 weight are naturally two-sided when errors are homoskedastic. We propose two boundary conditions that yield two-sided tests whether errors are homoskedastic or not. The locally unbiased (LU) condition is related to the power around the null hypothesis and is a weaker requirement than unbiasedness. The strongly unbiased (SU) condition is more restrictive than LU, but the associated WAP tests are easier to implement. Several tests are SU in nite samples or asymptotically, including tests robust to weak IV (such as the Anderson-Rubin, score, conditional quasi-likelihood ratio, and I. Andrews' (2015) PI-CLC tests) and two-sided tests which are optimal when the sample size is large and instruments are strong. We refer to the WAP-SU tests based on our weights as MM1-SU and MM2-SU tests. Dropping the restrictive assumptions of normality and known variance, the theory is shown to remain valid at the cost of asymptotic approximations. The MM2-SU test is optimal under the strong IV asymptotics, and outperforms other existing tests under the weak IV asymptotics.

One-sided and two-sided Green's functions

We discuss the one-sided Green's function, associated with an initial value problem and the two-sided Green's function related to a boundary value problem. We present a specific calculation associated with a differential equation with constant coefficients. For both problems, we also present the Laplace integral transform as another methodology to calculate these Green's functions and conclude which is the most convenient one. An incursion in the so-called fractional Green's function is also presented. As an example, we discuss the isotropic harmonic oscillator.

The Role of Online Platforms for Media Markets – Two‐Dimensional Spatial Competition in a Two‐Sided Market

We analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two-dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space. Consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions. For integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner's dilemma. Specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions. This is in contrast to the maximum–minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition. We show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets.

Operator, organizational, direct support, and general support maintenance for shelter, tactical, expandable, two-sided (NSN 5411-01-136-9838).

"1 April 1986."

On q–Analogues of Caputo Derivative and Mittag–Leffler Function

Mathematics Subject Classification: 33D60, 33E12, 26A33

On Quasi-Normality of Two-Sided Multiplication

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 47B47, 47B10, 47A30.

One-sided tolerance interval in a two-way balanced nested model with mixed effects

In many research areas (such as public health, environmental contamination, and others) one deals with the necessity of using data to infer whether some proportion (%) of a population of interest is (or one wants it to be) below and/or over some threshold, through the computation of tolerance interval. The idea is, once a threshold is given, one computes the tolerance interval or limit (which might be one or two - sided bounded) and then to check if it satisfies the given threshold. Since in this work we deal with the computation of one - sided tolerance interval, for the two-sided case we recomend, for instance, Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [5]. Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [4] performed the computation of upper tolerance limit in balanced and unbalanced one-way random effects models, whereas Fonseca et al [3] performed it based in a similar ideas but in a tow-way nested mixed or random effects model. In case of random effects model, Fonseca et al [3] performed the computation of such interval only for the balanced data, whereas in the mixed effects case they dit it only for the unbalanced data. For the computation of twosided tolerance interval in models with mixed and/or random effects we recomend, for instance, Sharma and Mathew [7]. The purpose of this paper is the computation of upper and lower tolerance interval in a two-way nested mixed effects models in balanced data. For the case of unbalanced data, as mentioned above, Fonseca et al [3] have already computed upper tolerance interval. Hence, using the notions persented in Fonseca et al [3] and Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [4], we present some results on the construction of one-sided tolerance interval for the balanced case. Thus, in order to do so at first instance we perform the construction for the upper case, and then the construction for the lower case.

Comparison of different numerical methods for the solution of the time-fractional reaction-diffusion equation with variable diffusion coefficient

In this work we perform a comparison of two different numerical schemes for the solution of the time-fractional diffusion equation with variable diffusion coefficient and a nonlinear source term. The two methods are the implicit numerical scheme presented in [M.L. Morgado, M. Rebelo, Numerical approximation of distributed order reaction- diffusion equations, Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 275 (2015) 216-227] that is adapted to our type of equation, and a colocation method where Chebyshev polynomials are used to reduce the fractional differential equation to a system of ordinary differential equations

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.