974 resultados para Transaction costs economy
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Using a transactions costs framework, we examine the impact of information and communication technologies (mobile phones and radios) use on market participation in developing country agricultural markets using a novel transaction-level data set of Ghanaian farmers. Our analysis of the choice of markets by farmers suggests that market information from a broader range of markets may not always induce farmers to sell in more distant markets; instead farmers may use broader market information to enhance their bargaining power in closer markets. Finally, we find weak evidence on the impact of using mobile phones in attracting farm gate buyers.
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The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transactions costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents decisions of intermediating financial activities at the expense of providing labor services. An equilibrium is shown to exist in the case of real asset structures.
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Mercados são instituições criadas para facilitar uma atividade de comercialização. Isto é possível porque um mercado é constituído por instituições que foram desenhadas para reduzir os custos de transação associados a este processo de troca. A partir dessas duas ideias, esta tese possui três objetivos principais. (i) Analisar por que a literatura de análise de cointegração tem mensurado estes custos de forma imprecisa. A principal razão é certa confusão entre os conceitos de custos de transação, de transporte e de comercialização. (ii) Propor um procedimento para mensurar indiretamente os custos de transação de mercado variáveis combinando os modelos de cointegração com mudança de regime e a estrutura teórica oferecidas pela Nova Economia Institucional. Este procedimento é aplicado para quantificar quanto custa comercializar etanol no mercado internacional usando suas atuais instituições. (iii) Por fim, usando os mesmos modelos e a mesma estrutura teórica, esta dissertação contesta a hipótese de que já existe um mercado internacional de etanol bem desenvolvido, tal qual a literatura tem assumido. De forma semelhante, também é avaliada a hipótese de que a remoção das barreiras comerciais norte-americanas para o etanol brasileiro seria uma condição suficiente para o desenvolvimento deste mercado internacional. Os testes aplicados rejeitam ambas as hipóteses.
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Transaction costs have a random component in the bid-ask spread. Facing a high bid-ask spread, the consumer has the option to wait for better terms oI' trade, but only by carrying an undesirable portfolio balance. We present the best policy in this case. We pose the control problem and show that the value function is the uni que viscosity solution of the relevant variational inequality. Next, a numerical procedure for the problem is presented.
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The intent of this paper is to provide a practitioners insight into the present and foreseeable future of problem of transaction cost economics related to culture and business etiquette that may increase the of complexity of business communication. We will also explore whether it impacts participant's mindsets regarding opportunistic or passive aggressive behavior. We will study the role of culture, ethics, information asymmetry, and legal systems regarding their importance towards the business contracts and lack of knowledge in local environments. We will make connections to contract theory strategies and objectives and recommend business practices. Furthermore, economic theory explores the role of the impossibility of the perfect contract. Historical and present day operational factors are examined for the determination of forward-looking contract law indications worldwide. This paper is intended provide a practitioners view with a global perspective of a multinational, mid-sized and small corporations giving consideration in a non-partisan and non-nationalistic view, yet examines the individual characteristics of the operational necessities and obligations of any corporation. The study will be general, yet cite specific articles to each argument and give adequate consideration to the intricacies of the global asymmetry of information. This paper defends that corporations of any kind and size should be aware of the risk of international business etiquette and cultural barriers that might jeopardize the savings you could obtain from engaging international suppliers.
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Includes bibliography
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No abstract available.
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Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.
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Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.
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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze what transaction costs are acceptable for customers in different investments. In this study, two life insurance contracts, a mutual fund and a risk-free investment, as alternative investment forms are considered. The first two products under scrutiny are a life insurance investment with a point-to-point capital guarantee and a participating contract with an annual interest rate guarantee and participation in the insurer's surplus. The policyholder assesses the various investment opportunities using different utility measures. For selected types of risk profiles, the utility position and the investor's preference for the various investments are assessed. Based on this analysis, the authors study which cost levels can make all of the products equally rewarding for the investor. Design/methodology/approach - The paper notes the risk-neutral valuation calibration using empirical data utility and performance measurement dynamics underlying: geometric Brownian motion numerical examples via Monte Carlo simulation. Findings - In the first step, the financial performance of the various saving opportunities under different assumptions of the investor's utility measurement is studied. In the second step, the authors calculate the level of transaction costs that are allowed in the various products to make all of the investment opportunities equally rewarding from the investor's point of view. A comparison of these results with transaction costs that are common in the market shows that insurance companies must be careful with respect to the level of transaction costs that they pass on to their customers to provide attractive payoff distributions. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, their research question - i.e. which transaction costs for life insurance products would be acceptable from the customer's point of view - has not been studied in the above described context so far.
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This study aimed to analyse the transaction costs of an association of organic farmers located in Goiania, Goias state, Brazil. We analysed the marketing and organisation relations based on data collected at the Association for the Development of Organic Farming in Goias state (ADAO/GO).
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Este estudo objetiva comparar as estruturas internas da Secretaria de Estado de Saúde do Rio de Janeiro (SES/RJ) organizadas para a execução do acompanhamento e controle de contratos de gestão firmados com parceiros privados para prestação de serviços de saúde no estado. As modalidades de contratação abordadas foram: “Gestão Compartilhada”, contratação entre a SES/RJ e empresa privada com base na Lei Nº 8.666 de 21 de junho de 1993 e “Gestão por Organização Social de Saúde (OSS)”, contratação entre a SES/RJ e OSS com base na Lei Nº 6.043 de 19 de setembro de 2011. Visando o cumprimento do marco legal no que tange ao controle dos contratos de gestão, a SES/RJ reformulou estruturas internas, instituindo novas instâncias de acompanhamento de contratos. A premência na implantação dos novos mecanismos de gestão assistencial para atendimento às necessidades de saúde da população fluminense prejudicou a avaliação e possível mensuração de custos de transação. Não obstante os contratos de gestão produzam o bem público maior, qual seja a oferta de serviços de saúde de qualidade à população fluminense, há que se considerar que a eficiência é um princípio expresso na Emenda Constitucional nº 19 de 1998 e deve ser perseguida pela Administração Pública. À luz da Teoria de Custos de Transação, a hipótese deste trabalho é que o Poder Público pode incorrer em perdas desconhecidas com a estrutura de governança de contratos com OSS, se custos de transação não forem mensurados. Para avaliar a pertinência da suposição, é proposta comparação com a estrutura de governança de contratos de Gestão Compartilhada.