Ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims - A law and economics perspective

This research addresses the use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims in domestic settings using law and economics research methodologies. Potential economic benefits from using arbitration, particularly between informed and knowledgeable parties and in international business transactions, are not guaranteed in domestic disputes. Arbitration can potentially be used to manipulate the adjudication process. This research has several findings. There is a lack of information available concerning the use of arbitration to adjudicate tort claims. Proxy measurements concerning the demand for third party adjudication and other legal indicators are a poor substitute for the information hidden behind the veil of arbitration. There is the potential for the strategic use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims by repeat player tortfeasors to domestic tort claims, both individually and in concert with other repeat player firms. These strategic efforts aim to: manipulate enforcement errors for tort claims, avoid procedural rules which have the effect of lowering enforcement errors, enable a unique type of domestic forum arbitrage, shirk from taking due care, capture the economic benefit of using arbitration, manipulate the stock of precedents and production of public goods from courts, collude in these underlying efforts, restrain competition, indirectly fix prices, and other aims which increase the repeat player tortfeasor’s or their industries economic gains related to their underlying contracts and tort disputes. This research also demonstrates how this subject is appropriate for further academic research and why states should be cautious of giving carte blanche to arbitrate all domestic tort claims.

Fiscal policy, foresight and the trade balance in the U.S.

This paper investigates the effects of fiscal policy on the trade balance using a structural factor model. A fiscal policy shock worsens the trade balance and produces an appreciation of the domestic currency but the effects are quantitatively small. The findings match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model, although fiscal policy should not be considered one of the main causes of the large US external deficit. My conclusions differ from those reached using VAR models since the fiscal shock, possibly due to fiscal foresight, is nonfundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs.

Opportunistisen sopimusrikkomuksen ongelmasta, erityisesti Suomen vahingonkorvaus- ja rikoslainsäädännön näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna. Law and Economics -näkökulma.

Tämä pro gradu -tutkielma käsittelee opportunistisen sopimusrikkomuksen ongelmaa erityisesti Suomen vahingonkorvaus- ja rikoslainsäädännön näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna. Tutkielman lähestymistapa on oikeustaloustieteellinen (engl. Law and Economics). Opportunistisella sopimusrikkomuksella tarkoitetaan toimintaa, jossa sopimusosapuoli rikkoo sopimuksen tarkoituksellisesti, pyrkimyksenään tällä toiminnalla saavuttaa enemmän hyötyä kuin sopimuksessa pysymällä. Opportunistinen sopimusrikkomus on mahdollista toteuttaa tilanteessa, jossa sopimusasetelma itsessään antaa mahdollisuuden enemmän hyödyn saavuttamiseen rikkomus toteuttamalla kuin sopimus asianmukaisesti täyttämällä. Suomalaisessa vahingonkorvausjärjestelmässä sovelletaan sopimusrikkomusten osalla positiivisen sopimusedun mukaista vahingonkorvausta, joka hyvittää rikotulle osapuolelle sopimussuhteeseen ryhtymisestä syntyneet kustannukset sekä sopimusrikkomuksen johdosta saamatta jääneen tuoton. Positiivisen sopimusedun soveltaminen ei kuitenkaan ole opportunistisen sopimusrikkomuksen ehkäisemiseksi riittävää, sillä opportunistisesti toimiva sopimusosapuoli voi jäädä rikkomuksensa johdosta voitolle vielä sen jälkeenkin, kun kärsineelle osapuolelle on jo positiivista sopimusetua noudattaen korvattu sopimussuhteessa syntyneet kustannukset sekä rikkomuksen johdosta saamatta jäänyt tuotto. Keskeinen ongelma koskien opportunististen sopimusrikkomustilanteiden syntyä onkin juuri vallitsevan sääntelyn liiallinen keskittyminen rikotun osapuolen kärsimän vahingon kompensoimiseen, ei rikkomustilanteiden synnyn ennaltaehkäisemiseen. Suomen vahingonkorvausjärjestelmää tulisi kehittää suuntaan, jossa järjestelmä paremmin ennaltaehkäisisi opportunististen sopimusrikkomustilanteiden syntyä. Common law -oikeusjärjestelmässä käytössä olevan disgorgement principle -suuntaisen ajattelun, jossa korvauksen perustana toimisi rikkomuksella saatu hyöty kärsityn vahingon sijaan, omaksuminen olisi yksi mahdollinen kehityskulku. Olennaista olisi kuitenkin se, että järjestelmää kehitettäisiin suuntaan, jossa rikkomus ei enää voisi tulla rikkojalle kannattavaksi. Opportunistisen toiminnan kannustimet tulisi lainsäädäntöä tarkistamalla poistaa. Tällä olisi sekä sopimusinstituutiota turvaavaa että vaihdantaa edistävää vaikutusta.

The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract

Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage, considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.

The Law and Economics of the Civil Law of Mandate

Présentation à la Annual Law & Economics Conference 2007, Université de Bologne.

On cultural property and its protection: a law-and-economics comment

The term cultural property seems to have come into vogue after the Second World War as part of efforts to prevent the recurrence of the massive war-time destruction of objects of cultural significance to various groups and, in some cases, to all of humanity. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict symbolises those efforts. Destruction is not the only doomsday scenario for cultural property. Removal of objects from their owners or region of origin is another concern. This, too, had occurred during the Second World War with the nazis’ looting treasures of all kinds from occupied territories, not to mention the massive confiscation of the property of their Jewish victims everywhere. But the concern was older, as Merryman for one shows in the story of the Elgin marbles, brought from Greece to England during the 19th century. This concern has found expression in a 1970 UNESCO treaty and in a 1995 Unidroit Convention seeking to halt international traffic in cultural property.

Indicators of fiscal policy: design and applications for Chile

Includes bibliography

The Law and Economics of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparison between the U.S. and the EU

This doctoral dissertation seeks to assess and address the potential contribution of the hedge fund industry to financial instability. In so doing, the dissertation investigates three main questions. What are the contributions of hedge funds to financial instability? What is the optimal regulatory strategy to address the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability? And do new regulations in the U.S. and the EU address the contribution of hedge funds to financial instability? With respect to financial stability concerns, it is argued that despite their benefits, hedge funds can contribute to financial instability. Hedge funds’ size and leverage, their interconnectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), and the likelihood of herding behavior in the industry can potentially undermine financial stability. Nonetheless, the data on hedge funds’ size and leverage suggest that these features are far from being systemically important. In contrast, the empirical evidence on the interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs and their herding behavior is mixed. Based on these findings, the thesis focuses on one particular aspect of hedge fund regulation: direct vs. indirect regulation. In this respect, a major contribution of the thesis to the literature consists in the explicit discussion of the relationships between hedge funds and other market participants. Specifically, the thesis locates the domain of the indirect regulation in the inter-linkages between hedge funds and prime brokers. Accordingly, the thesis argues that the indirect regulation is likely to address the contribution of hedge funds to systemic risk without compromising their benefits to financial markets. The thesis further conducts a comparative study of the regulatory responses to the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability through studying the EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) and the hedge fund-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

A Law and Economics Analysis of Lobbying Regulation Towards an optimal structure through the Cost Indicator Index

This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide.