Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.

O impacto da Lei Kandir sobre a economia paulista

Em setembro 1996 o Congresso Nacional aprovou uma lei de desoneração tributária destinada a reduzir o Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços para estimular as exportações de bens primários e semi-elaborados assim como investimentos em bens de capital e serviços. As principais razões para adotar esta desoneração fiscal eram estimular as exportações assim como, alavancar o investimento doméstico. Inicialmente a lei enfrentou enorme resistência política dos governos estaduais desde que ela implicaria em perdas substantivas de arrecadação dos estados. Como resultado, o Governo Federal negociou com os estados um mecanismo de compensação baseado no conceito de seguro-receita. Este projeto pretende avaliar (i) o impacto da lei nas exportações brasileiras e no nível de investimento e (ii) o seu efeito sobre as finanças estaduais decorrentes de uma eventual perda de receita tributária.

Mudanças recentes da Lei Kandir e seu impacto na economia paulista a partir de 1999

Em setembro 1996 o Congresso Nacional aprovou a Lei Complementar nº 87/96 destinada a reduzir o Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços para estimular as exportações de bens primários e semi-elaborados assim como investimentos em bens de capital e serviços. As principais razões para adotar esta desoneração fiscal eram estimular as exportações assim como, alavancar o investimento doméstico. Inicialmente a lei enfrentou enorme resistência política dos governos estaduais desde que ela implicaria em perdas substantivas de arrecadação dos estados. Como resultado, o Governo Federal negociou com os estados um mecanismo de compensação baseado no conceito de seguro-receita. Após editada a lei sofreu um contínuo processo de mudança que culminou com a edição de uma nova lei complementar, (LC 102/00). Este projeto pretende avaliar (i) as sucessivas mudanças na Lei nº 87/96 e (ii) o seu efeito sobre as finanças estaduais decorrentes de uma eventual perda de receita tributária.

Morte e ressurreição da SUDAM: uma análise da decadência e extinção do padrão de planejamento regional na Amazônia

A SUDAM foi extinta em maio de 2001 sob o argumento oficial de que a Instituição estava infiltrada de fraudes e corrupção. Portanto, alegando pressão da opinião pública, o Estado brasileiro extinguiu sumariamente essa Instituição (assim como a SUDENE) e a política de incentivo fiscais que fomentava o desenvolvimento regional no país. Esta tese sustenta a argumentação oposta de que a corrupção não se constituiu em fator determinante para a extinção da SUDAM, mas sim que esse processo decorreu da incapacidade do Estado brasileiro de continuar mantendo o padrão de financeira ocorrente desde os anos oitenta. Inúmeras medidas de política econômica foram tomada pelo Estado que diminuíram os recursos financeiros movimentados pelo Fundo de Investimento da SUDAM, restringindo conseqüentemente a capacidade operacional da Instituição na manutenção dos repasses de recursos para os projetos incentivados e no financiamento de novos projetos na região. Ao se extinguir a SUDAM e a sua política de incentivos fiscais, foi automaticamente extinto o funding sobre o qual se constituiu o padrão de financiamento de desenvolvimento regional concebido desde meados dos anos sessenta e assim sendo, ficou a região sem uma alternativa de financiamento viável e aceitável para o se desenvolvimento. A criação de um novo funding em torno da nova Instituição, a ADA, sem a existência de incentivos fiscais, não se mostrou vantajoso para o capital privado, inviabilizando a demanda por esses recursos. Como alternativa política o governo está se esforçando para criar a SUDAM, mas sem a vinculação dos incentivos fiscais, o que não aconteceu até agora, retardando a ressurreição da Instituição.

O uso da Lei Rouanet como ferramenta produtiva em um plano de comunicação

The Rouanet law is a tax incentive law that allows companies to invest up to 4% of their taxes - based on actual profit - in sponsoring cultural projects previously approved by the Ministry of Culture. By sponsoring these projects, companies can have their name attached to them and, consequently, strengthening their brand and increase its visibility in the market. Whereas this project is aligned to the company vision, its image will be strengthened and the sales will increase. Large companies use the Rouanet Law to sponsor cultural events and have very strong names in the Brazilian market, perhaps worldwide. Examples: Petrobras, Banco do Brasil, Banco Bradesco, BNDES, Usiminas, Vale, among others. The Public Relations professional, who’s responsible for internal and external communication of a company, can use it as a differential of his work, expanding the company's profits with minimum investments, aligning the company's vision to actual practices and using the sponsorship as an agent capable of strengthen its social responsibility and, due to that, to increase the trust of its target audience. This study will address the theoretical and practical aspects of the Rouanet Law and of the public relations professionals, beyond mentioning examples on the subject, with special attention to Petrobras, the largest sponsor of cultural projects in Brazil. The greatest problem of the Rouanet Law is the fact that its sponsored projects are mostly concentrated in the Southeast, specifically in the Rio - São Paulo region. The more popular the Act become, for most places it will spread and Brazil may, after some time, become a world reference in the Cultural point

Remodelagem de uma usina sucroalcooleira para incremento da cogeração de energia com aproveitamento do palhiço

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Mecânica - FEIS

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.

DESENVOLVIMENTO DO TEATRO MUSICAL BRASILEIRO À LUZ DA NOTORIEDADE MIDIÁTICA DAS ADAPTAÇÕES E DOS ARTISTAS

O trabalho tem a proposta de analisar os desdobramentos do teatro musical brasileiro desde a primeira encenação em território nacional de adaptações de espetáculos do Teatro de Revista, gênero originário da França, até as superproduções musicais realizadas nos últimos 16 anos de adaptações de espetáculos americanos. O panorama histórico e analítico será estudado, com ênfase no teatro musical que se utiliza de elementos midiatizados para estar inserido em uma sociedade em que a produção cultural é vista como internacionalizada e mercantilizada. Como forma de marketing, os produtores utilizam-se da notoriedade midiática presente em formatos estrangeiros já consagrados, adaptações renomadas e bem aceitas pelo público, além da fama de celebridades que são escaladas para os musicais. Tudo para a conquista de um patrocinador que, por sua vez, acaba fazendo exigências que interferem de maneira decisiva na montagem dos espetáculos. Em meio a um processo onde são tantos os direcionamentos pré-estabelecidos por patrocinadores, onde se encontra o genuíno teatro musical brasileiro? A pesquisa abrange o ineditismo da presença de temáticas nacionais em formatos estrangeiros e agrega o conjunto de fatores que possibilitam que um roteiro de musical saia do papel e adentre os palcos, tais como as políticas públicas de incentivos fiscais; a ligação de empresas patrocinadoras e suas marcas a musicais; o fato de que, mesmo as produções sendo pagas por dinheiro público, possuírem ingressos que não são a preços populares. Para auxiliar nas conjecturas a serem formadas, será utilizada uma metodologia histórico-descritiva com foco na relação do tema com elementos notórios na mídia, como os artistas e obras a serem adaptadas no palco.

The role of management incentives in successful information systems development and implementation

Because organizations are making large investments in Information systems (IS), efficient IS project management has been found critical to success. This study examines how the use of incentives can improve the project success. Agency theory is used to: identify motivational factors of project success, help the IS owners to understand to what extent management incentives can improve IS development and implementation (ISD/I). The outcomes will help practitioners and researchers to build on theoretical model of project management elements which lead to project success. Given the principal-agent nature of most significant scale of IS development, insights that will allow for greater alignment of the agent’s goals with those of the principal through incentive contracts, will serve to make ISD/I both more efficient and more effective, leading to more successful IS projects.

Taking the Bite Out of Higher Payroll Costs

Congress, in an attempt to help underemployed individuals, has once again passed a job hiring tax incentive program called the Work Incentive Taw Credit. This article will provide a brief review of the law and offer planning tips for hospitality firms which wish to reduce their payroll costs.

DESENVOLVIMENTO DO TEATRO MUSICAL BRASILEIRO À LUZ DA NOTORIEDADE MIDIÁTICA DAS ADAPTAÇÕES E DOS ARTISTAS

O trabalho tem a proposta de analisar os desdobramentos do teatro musical brasileiro desde a primeira encenação em território nacional de adaptações de espetáculos do Teatro de Revista, gênero originário da França, até as superproduções musicais realizadas nos últimos 16 anos de adaptações de espetáculos americanos. O panorama histórico e analítico será estudado, com ênfase no teatro musical que se utiliza de elementos midiatizados para estar inserido em uma sociedade em que a produção cultural é vista como internacionalizada e mercantilizada. Como forma de marketing, os produtores utilizam-se da notoriedade midiática presente em formatos estrangeiros já consagrados, adaptações renomadas e bem aceitas pelo público, além da fama de celebridades que são escaladas para os musicais. Tudo para a conquista de um patrocinador que, por sua vez, acaba fazendo exigências que interferem de maneira decisiva na montagem dos espetáculos. Em meio a um processo onde são tantos os direcionamentos pré-estabelecidos por patrocinadores, onde se encontra o genuíno teatro musical brasileiro? A pesquisa abrange o ineditismo da presença de temáticas nacionais em formatos estrangeiros e agrega o conjunto de fatores que possibilitam que um roteiro de musical saia do papel e adentre os palcos, tais como as políticas públicas de incentivos fiscais; a ligação de empresas patrocinadoras e suas marcas a musicais; o fato de que, mesmo as produções sendo pagas por dinheiro público, possuírem ingressos que não são a preços populares. Para auxiliar nas conjecturas a serem formadas, será utilizada uma metodologia histórico-descritiva com foco na relação do tema com elementos notórios na mídia, como os artistas e obras a serem adaptadas no palco.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.