Representing Afghanistan: The United States and Democracy's Imposition

There is an ongoing mission in Afghanistan; a mission driven by external political forces. At its core this mission hopes to establish peace, to protect the populace, and to install democracy. Each of these goals has remained just that, a goal, for the past eight years as the American and international mission in Afghanistan has enjoyed varied levels of commitment. Currently, the stagnant progress in Afghanistan has led the international community to become increasingly concerned about the viability of a future Afghan state. Most of these questions take root in the question over whether or not an Afghan state can function without the auspices of international terrorism. Inevitably, the normative question of what exactly that government should be arises from this base concern. In formulating a response to this question, the consensus of western society has been to install representative democracy. This answer has been a recurring theme in the post Cold War era as states such as Bosnia and Somalia bear witness to the ill effects of external democratic imposition. I hypothesize that the current mold of externally driven state-building is unlikely to result in what western actors seek it to establish: representative democracy. By primarily examining the current situation in Afghanistan, I claim that external installation of representative democracy is modally flawed in that its process mandates choice. Representative democracy by definition constitutes a government reflective of its people, or electorate. Thus, freedom of choice is necessary for a functional representative democracy. From this, one can deduce that because an essential function of democracy is choice, its implementation lies with the presence of choice. State-building is an imposition that eliminates that necessary ingredient. The two stand as polar opposites that cannot effectively collaborate. Security, governing capacity, and development have all been targeted as measurements of success in Afghanistan. The three factors are generally seen as mutually constitutive; so improved security is seen as improving governing capacity. Thus, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a deteriorating security environment moving forward has demonstrated the inability of the Afghan government to govern. The primary reason for the Afghan government’s deficiencies is its lack of legitimacy among its constituency. Even the use of the term ‘constituency’ must be qualified because the Afghan government has often oscillated between serving the people within its territorial borders and the international community. The existence of the Afghan state is so dependent on foreign aid and intervention that it has lost policy-making and enforcing power. This is evident by the inability of Afghanistan to engage in basic sovereign state activities as maintaining a national budget, conducting elections, providing for its own national security, and deterring criminality. The Afghan state is nothing more than a shell of a government, and indicative of the failings that external state-building has with establishing democracy.

中国と湾岸を結ぶ南アジア -- パキスタン・アフガニスタンの動向と関連させて

Pakistan is geographically situated between China and the Gulf. In order to balance its strategic position against the major security threat of India, Pakistan formed a special and stable strategic alliance with China against common threats since the period of the cold war even though the two countries have neither a political ideology nor political system in common. On the other hand Pakistan established another special relation with Saudi Arabia on the basis of Islamic identity. With its expanding economic capacity, China proposed a project by the name of "new silk road economic corridor" with the intention of expanding and multiplying trade routes with the Middle East and Europe. Within this framework Pakistan is expected to expand the role of an alternative land route that connects the Gulf and China for use if unfavorable emergencies occur in the Malacca route. However, the continuous political uncertainty in Afghanistan after the pullout of US-NATO fighting forces at the end of 2014 and sporadic outbreaks of terrorist acts by Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan have increased China's anxiety regarding Uyghur issues at home. Avoiding military options for the moment, China is trying to find ways to play an active role in the security issues of Afghanistan with help from Pakistan if available. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Pakistani government formed in the general election of 2008 completed its full term and transferred authority to the newly elected government in 2013, something never observed before in Pakistan's history. Coincidently, in Afghanistan the presidential election was carried out peacefully in 2014 in spite of the Taliban threat. Although it is too early to make any definite conclusion, constitutional processes, in spite of their defects, reflected to some extent wishes for normal life of the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan who were disgusted with weak governance and the prevalence of terrorism.

Slaying the Hydra: Al Qaeda's Evolution and America's Plan of Attack

In response to 9/11, the U.S. launched airstrikes in Afghanistan against al Qaeda to diminish its ability to conduct future attacks. Next, the U.S. turned its attention to Iraq. A series of problems and missteps there subsequently created an opportunity for al Qaeda to evolve, aligning itself with active insurgencies and other terrorist groups around the world. This paper identifies the largely preemptive strategies employed by the U.S. and analyzes how those efforts positively and negatively impacted the War on Terror. While some significant gains were made, the results show that al Qaeda remains a threat to the international community and demands more effective U.S. and international counter-radicalization strategies, including diplomacy and aid, to curb its global appeal.

The radical Islamic militants of Central Asia. OSW Report, November 2013

Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia have ceased to be a local phenomenon. The organisations created by those groups (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union) engage in propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and terrorist operations in states distant from their traditional area of interest, such as European Union countries, South Asia and the United States. Their ranks contain not only Central Asian Islamists, but also those from other countries, such as Russia, Pakistan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Turkey and even Myanmar. These organisations’ current activities and forms are multidimensional and complicated, characterised by combat versatility, structural amorphism, operational mobility and simultaneous operations in different fields and theatres. As a result of the universalization of Islamic terrorism, these organisations have been intensifying contacts with other international Islamic terrorist organisations based in Waziristan (mainly al-Qaida, Taliban and the Haqqani Network). A specific system of mutual cooperation has developed between them, involving the specialisation of various terrorist organisations in particular aspects of terrorist activity. The IMU and IJU specialise in the recruitment and training of Islamic radicals from around the world, and have thus become a kind of ‘jihad academy’.

Central Asian Islamism in the spotlight. EUCAM Commentary No. 13, June 2011

In recent years, terrorist actions have increased in Central Asia, especially in the two weakest states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and on the Uzbek side of the Ferghana Valley. The killing of Osama bin Laden by US special forces has raised fears of a possible backlash from his supporters and a new wave of terror across a large area surrounding Afghanistan. Now the Taliban have warned Kazakhstan – Central Asia's most successful economy and largest oil producer which has to date avoided the Islamist violence that has affected its Central Asian neighbours – of the dangers of entering the war on Afghanistan after the Kazakh parliament decided to send troops to join the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) war efforts.

Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? : explaining the decline in support for the war in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany /

Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war.