Límites a la interpretación dinámica de los convenios de doble imposición internacional: el caso ING

El presente trabajo contiene algunas reflexiones críticas sobre el valor hermenéutico de los Comentarios al Convenio Modelo de la OCDE y su interpretación dinámica, más o menos matizada, al hilo de la Sentencia de la Audiencia Nacional de 10 de julio de 2015, dictada en el Caso ING. La interpretación de los convenios de doble imposición internacional ha concitado desde antiguo posturas encontradas tanto en el plano doctrinal como jurisprudencial; discusión que cobra hoy renovada importancia en relación con el soft law en general, y las recomendaciones del Proyecto BEPS de la OCDE, en particular.

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

International tax cooperation and capital mobility

Includes bibliography

Measuring the managerial benefits of tax compliance : a fresh approach

Managerial benefits of tax compliance have been identified by many authors in the tax compliance costs literature; they have however often been ignored when measuring the net effect of tax compliance on business taxpayers because it was believed that the measurement of such benefits was impossible or difficult. This paper first discusses the theoretical issues surrounding the valuation of managerial benefits, including the related tax/ accounting costs overlap problem; it then proposes a fresh approach for measuring managerial benefits. The proposed measurement model incorporates a subjective evaluation of useful accounting information by owner‑managers and objective measurements of accounting costs. Two main components of managerial benefits are identified: the incremental value of managerial accounting information and the savings on reporting costs. A study of small businesses conducted in late 2006, compared accounting practices between tax complying entities (TCEs) and tax compliance free entities (TFEs) and investigated how accounting information was valued by owner-managers in TCEs. The research adopted a mixed methodological design including a major quantitative phase followed by a minor qualitative phase. The results show that while a vast majority of TFEs maintained basic accounting functions, record keeping requirements imposed by tax compliance led to the implementation of more sophisticated accounting systems in TCEs. It was also found that TCE owner-managers assigned a relatively significant value to the managerial accounting information that is generated as a result of record keeping imposed by tax compliance, suggesting that substantial managerial benefits might be derived.

The managerial benefits of tax compliance: perception by small business taxpayers

Research undertaken in 2006 – 2007 investigated the perception of managerial benefits of tax compliance by small business taxpayers. Survey data from a sample of 300 small business taxpayers and responses to semi-structured interviews of owner managers were examined. The study found that a majority of small business taxpayers recognised that tax compliance activities led to better record keeping and to an improved knowledge of their financial affairs. However, there seemed to be a general reluctance by respondents to accept the idea that benefits could be derived as a result of complying with tax. The findings of this study are important as it is the first research that systematically investigated managerial benefits and their perception by small business taxpayers in Australia.