Strategic bidding methodology for electricity markets using adaptive learning

The very particular characteristics of electricity markets, require deep studies of the interactions between the involved players. MASCEM is a market simulator developed to allow studying electricity market negotiations. This paper presents a new proposal for the definition of MASCEM players’ strategies to negotiate in the market. The proposed methodology is implemented as a multiagent system, using reinforcement learning algorithms to provide players with the capabilities to perceive the changes in the environment, while adapting their bids formulation according to their needs, using a set of different techniques that are at their disposal. This paper also presents a methodology to define players’ models based on the historic of their past actions, interpreting how their choices are affected by past experience, and competition.

The strategic deployment of quality-improvement innovations

Journal of Business, Vol. 78 Issue 3, p1049-1072

Metalearner based on Dynamic Neural Network for Strategic Bidding in electricity Markets

The restructuring of electricity markets, conducted to increase the competition in this sector, and decrease the electricity prices, brought with it an enormous increase in the complexity of the considered mechanisms. The electricity market became a complex and unpredictable environment, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. Software tools became, therefore, essential to provide simulation and decision support capabilities, in order to potentiate the involved players’ actions. This paper presents the development of a metalearner, applied to the decision support of electricity markets’ negotiation entities. The proposed metalearner executes a dynamic artificial neural network to create its own output, taking advantage on several learning algorithms implemented in ALBidS, an adaptive learning system that provides decision support to electricity markets’ players. The proposed metalearner considers different weights for each strategy, depending on its individual quality of performance. The results of the proposed method are studied and analyzed in scenarios based on real electricity markets’ data, using MASCEM - a multi-agent electricity market simulator that simulates market players’ operation in the market.

Contribution to a strategic plan for the implementation of continuous improvement process in an MRO

This Work Project studies the Continuous Improvement and Processes (CIP) department at TAP Maintenance & Engineering. The project has the objective to provide insights to align the activities of the department with the strategy of the organization. For such, two focuses were taken: (i) an internal analysis which highlighted a need for transversal change to ensure the adoption of Continuous Improvement at TAP, and (ii) a process which outlined objectives and projects to be pursued to prioritize CIP’s activities in accordance with the organization’s goals. The outcome includes (a) important recommendations concerning strategic planning and competition evaluation and (b) a process’ output that reflects a balance among factors influencing the priority of projects.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.

Sharing competences in strategic alliances: a case study of the Cosan and Shell biofuel venture

In a competitive world, the way a firm establishes its organizational arrangements may determine the enhancement of its core competences and the possibility of reaching new markets. Firms that find their skills to be applicable in just one type of market encounter constraints in expanding their markets, and through alliances may find a competitive form of value capture. Hybrid forms of organization appear primarily as an alternative to capturing value and managing joint assets when the market and hierarchy modes do not present any yields for the firm's competitiveness. As a result, this form may present other challenging issues, such as the allocation of rights and principal-agent problems. The biofuel market has presented a strong pattern of changes over the last 10 years. New intra-firm arrangements have appeared as a path to participate or survive among global competition. Given the need for capital to achieve better results, there has been a consistent movement of mergers and acquisitions in the Biofuel sector, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. In 2011 there were five major groups in Brazil with a grinding capacity of more than 15 million tons per year: Raízen (joint venture formed by Cosan and Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos Petrobras, ETH, and Bunge. Major oil companies have implemented the strategy of diversification as a hedge against the rising cost of oil. Using the alliance of Cosan and Shell in the Brazilian biofuel market as a case study, this paper analyses the governance mode and challenging issues raised by strategic alliances when firms aim to reach new markets through the sharing of core competences with local firms. The article is based on documentary research and interviews with Cosan's Investor Relations staff, and examines the main questions involving hybrid forms through the lens of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Agency Theory, Resource Based View (RBV), and dynamic capabilities theoretical approaches. One focal point is knowledge "appropriability" and the specific assets originated by the joint venture. Once the alliance is formed, it is expected that competences will be shared and new capabilities will expand the limits of the firm. In the case studied, Cosan and Shell shared a number of strategic assets related to their competences. Raízen was formed with economizing incentives, as well to continue marshalling internal resources to enhance the company's presence in the world energy sector. Therefore, some challenges might be related to the control and monitoring agents' behavior, considering the two-part organism formed by distinctive organizational culture, tacit knowledge, and long-term incentives. The case study analyzed illustrates the hybrid arrangement as a middle form for organizing the transaction: neither in the market nor in the hierarchy mode, but rather a more flexible commitment agreement with a strategic central authority. The corporate governance devices are also a challenge, since the alignment between the parent companies in the joint ventures is far more complex. These characteristics have led to an organism with bilateral dependence, offering favorable conditions for developing dynamic capabilities. However, these conditions might rely on the partners' long-term interest in the joint venture.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

The empirics of spatial competition: evidence from European regions

The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.

MANAGING STRATEGIC CHANGE:New Business Models Applying Wireless Technology as a Source of Competitive Edge

The diffusion of mobile telephony began in 1971 in Finland, when the first car phones, called ARP1 were taken to use. Technologies changed from ARP to NMT and later to GSM. The main application of the technology, however, was voice transfer. The birth of the Internet created an open public data network and easy access to other types of computer-based services over networks. Telephones had been used as modems, but the development of the cellular technologies enabled automatic access from mobile phones to Internet. Also other wireless technologies, for instance Wireless LANs, were also introduced. Telephony had developed from analog to digital in fixed networks and allowed easy integration of fixed and mobile networks. This development opened a completely new functionality to computers and mobile phones. It also initiated the merger of the information technology (IT) and telecommunication (TC) industries. Despite the arising opportunity for firms' new competition the applications based on the new functionality were rare. Furthermore, technology development combined with innovation can be disruptive to industries. This research focuses on the new technology's impact on competition in the ICT industry through understanding the strategic needs and alternative futures of the industry's customers. The change speed inthe ICT industry is high and therefore it was valuable to integrate the DynamicCapability view of the firm in this research. Dynamic capabilities are an application of the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm. As is stated in the literature, strategic positioning complements RBV. This theoretical framework leads theresearch to focus on three areas: customer strategic innovation and business model development, external future analysis, and process development combining these two. The theoretical contribution of the research is in the development of methodology integrating theories of the RBV, dynamic capabilities and strategic positioning. The research approach has been constructive due to the actual managerial problems initiating the study. The requirement for iterative and innovative progress in the research supported the chosen research approach. The study applies known methods in product development, for instance, innovation process in theGroup Decision Support Systems (GDSS) laboratory and Quality Function Deployment (QFD), and combines them with known strategy analysis tools like industry analysis and scenario method. As the main result, the thesis presents the strategic innovation process, where new business concepts are used to describe the alternative resource configurations and scenarios as alternative competitive environments, which can be a new way for firms to achieve competitive advantage in high-velocity markets. In addition to the strategic innovation process as a result, thestudy has also resulted in approximately 250 new innovations for the participating firms, reduced technology uncertainty and helped strategic infrastructural decisions in the firms, and produced a knowledge-bank including data from 43 ICT and 19 paper industry firms between the years 1999 - 2004. The methods presentedin this research are also applicable to other industries.