Estruturas de governança corporativa e financial distress: há relação entre conselho de administração e empresas em financial distress?

Nesta dissertação foi analisada se há uma relação significante entre estruturas de governança (estrutura e composição de conselho) e financial distress. Este trabalho focou neste tema porque os estudos acadêmicos em governança corporativa e sua relação com financial distress ainda são pouco explorados. Além disso, o tema tem relevância no mundo corporativo, pois entender quais estruturas e composições de conselho seriam mais eficientes para evitar financial distress é interessante para diversos stakeholders, principalmente para os acionistas e os credores. Para verificar a existência dessa relação, foram utilizados dados de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto e foram desenvolvidos modelos logit de financial distress. Sendo a variável resposta financial distress, partiu-se de um modelo base com variáveis financeiras de controle e, por etapas, foram adicionadas novos determinantes e combinações dessas variáveis para montar modelos intermediários. Por fim, o modelo final contou com todas as variáveis explicativas mais relevantes. As variáveis de estudo podem ser classificadas em variáveis de estrutura de governança (DUA, GOV e COF), qualidade do conselho (QUA) e estrutura de propriedade (PRO1 e PRO2). Os modelos base utilizados foram: Daily e Dalton (1994a) e um próprio, desenvolvido para modelar melhor financial distress e sua relação com as variáveis de estrutura de governança. Nos diversos modelos testados foram encontradas relações significativas no percentual de conselheiros dependentes (GOV), percentual de conselheiros da elite educacional (QUA), percentual de ações discriminadas (PRO1) e percentual de ações de acionista estatal relevante (PRO2). Portanto, não se descartam as hipóteses de que mais conselheiros dependentes, menos conselheiros da elite educacional e estrutura de propriedade menos concentrada contribuem para uma situação de financial distress futura. Entretanto, as variáveis dummy de dualidade (DUA) e de conselho fiscal (COF) não apresentaram significância estatística.

Estruturas de governança corporativa e financial distress: há relação entre conselho de administração e empresas em financial distress?

Nesta dissertação foi analisada se há uma relação significante entre estruturas de governança (estrutura e composição de conselho) e financial distress. Este trabalho focou neste tema porque os estudos acadêmicos em governança corporativa e sua relação com financial distress ainda são pouco explorados. Além disso, o tema tem relevância no mundo corporativo, pois entender quais estruturas e composições de conselho seriam mais eficientes para evitar financial distress é interessante para diversos stakeholders, principalmente para os acionistas e os credores. Para verificar a existência dessa relação, foram utilizados dados de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto e foram desenvolvidos modelos logit de financial distress. Sendo a variável resposta financial distress, partiu-se de um modelo base com variáveis financeiras de controle e, por etapas, foram adicionadas novos determinantes e combinações dessas variáveis para montar modelos intermediários. Por fim, o modelo final contou com todas as variáveis explicativas mais relevantes. As variáveis de estudo podem ser classificadas em variáveis de estrutura de governança (DUA, GOV e COF), qualidade do conselho (QUA) e estrutura de propriedade (PRO1 e PRO2). Os modelos base utilizados foram: Daily e Dalton (1994a) e um próprio, desenvolvido para modelar melhor financial distress e sua relação com as variáveis de estrutura de governança. Nos diversos modelos testados foram encontradas relações significativas no percentual de conselheiros dependentes (GOV), percentual de conselheiros da elite educacional (QUA), percentual de ações discriminadas (PRO1) e percentual de ações de acionista estatal relevante (PRO2). Portanto, não se descartam as hipóteses de que mais conselheiros dependentes, menos conselheiros da elite educacional e estrutura de propriedade menos concentrada contribuem para uma situação de financial distress futura. Entretanto, as variáveis dummy de dualidade (DUA) e de conselho fiscal (COF) não apresentaram significância estatística

Creation of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation : hearings ... Seventy-second Congress, first session on S. 1, a bill to provide emergency financing facilities for banks and other financial institutions and for other purposes. December 18, 19, 21, 22, 1931.

Frederic C. Walcott, chairman.

Corporate disclosure : hearings before the Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures and the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, Ninety-third Congress, second session.

Pt. 1. March 21, 26, and 28, 1974 -- pt. 2. April 23, 24, and May 20, 21, 1974 -- pt. 3. June 25, 27, and August 14, 1974.

The influence of financial participation and participation in decision-making on employee job attitudes

This study investigates the direct and indirect effects of financial participation (FP) and participation in decision-making (PDM) on employee job attitudes. The central premise is that both financial participation and participation in decision-making have effects on job attitudes, such as integration, involvement and commitment, perceived pay equity, performance-reward contingencies, satisfaction and motivation. After reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature and testing two theoretical frameworks, developed by Long (1978a) and Florkowski ( 1989), a new model was constructed to consider a combined effects of both FP and PDM, herein referred to as employee participation (EP). The underpinning of the model is based on the assumption that both ( a) the combination of financial participation and participation in decision-making ('employee participation'), and (b) participation in decision-making produce favourable effects on employee job attitudes. The test of the new model showed that employee participation does not produce more favourable effects on employee job attitudes, than does participation in decision-making on its own. The data were gathered from a questionnaire study administered in a large British retail organization that operates two types of ownership schemes - profit-sharing and SAYE schemes.

A comparative analysis of corporate finance in the United States and Japan from 1880 to 1930

This study explained the diversity of corporate financial practices in two nations. Existing studies have emphasized the reliance on equity finance in U.S. firms and bank loans in Japanese firms. In fact, patterns of corporate finance were much more complex. Financial institutions, which were created by national economic policy and regulation, affected corporate financial practices, but corporate financial practices often differed from what policymakers expected. Differences in corporate financial practices between nations also reflected differences in the mixture of industries in each nation. Many factors such as the amount of fixed capital, the process of production, the level of risk, the degree of innovation, and the importance of the industry in the national economy affected corporate financial practices. In addition, corporate financial practices within each nation differed from firm to firm due to managers’ considerations about stock ownership, which would affect their control power; corporate finance was closely related to control over management through ownership. To explain these complexities of corporate financial practices, the study linked corporate finance with the development of financial institutions in the United States and in Japan. While financial institutions affected corporate financial practices, the response of the firms to financial institutions and opportunities were diverse. The study also attempted to grasp variations in corporate financial practices by dealing with companies in three sectors: railroads, public utilities, and manufacturing. Finally, the study examined the structure of firm ownership. Contradictory to the widely held belief that U.S. firms distributed securities more widely to the public than did Japanese firms, many large American firms remained closely held, while some Japanese counterparts built publicly-held corporations.

A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Finance in the United States and Japan From 1880 to 1930

This study explained the diversity of corporate financial practices in two nations. Existing studies have emphasized the reliance on equity finance in U.S. firms and bank loans in Japanese firms. In fact, patterns of corporate finance were much more complex. Financial institutions, which were created by national economic policy and regulation, affected corporate financial practices, but corporate financial practices often differed from what policymakers expected. Differences in corporate financial practices between nations also reflected differences in the mixture of industries in each nation. Many factors such as the amount of fixed capital, the process of production, the level of risk, the degree of innovation, and the importance of the industry in the national economy affected corporate financial practices. In addition, corporate financial practices within each nation differed from firm to firm due to managers’ considerations about stock ownership, which would affect their control power; corporate finance was closely related to control over management through ownership. To explain these complexities of corporate financial practices, the study linked corporate finance with the development of financial institutions in the United States and in Japan. While financial institutions affected corporate financial practices, the response of the firms to financial institutions and opportunities were diverse. The study also attempted to grasp variations in corporate financial practices by dealing with companies in three sectors: railroads, public utilities, and manufacturing. Finally, the study examined the structure of firm ownership. Contradictory to the widely held belief that U.S. firms distributed securities more widely to the public than did Japanese firms, many large American firms remained closely held, while some Japanese counterparts built publicly-held corporations.

The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period : evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable attention among academician, practitioners as well as policy makers because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that corporations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions, which include corporate debt policy. Earlier study on the agency model of the firm widely recognizes that the managerial ownership and external debt play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also found that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 100 Composite Index companies from Brusa Malaysia between 1998 to 2002 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership which serves effective control mechanism on managerial ownership and corporate debt policy as hypothesized. Findings of such evidence suggest that institutional holding thus have played an important role in managers' strategic management decision and reduce agency conflict. In addition, corporate debt policy too is governed by managerial ownership and exhibited a negative relation.

Sources of liquidity commonality, asymmetric information and ownership structure in emerging markets : evidence from the Chinese stock market

Xinwei Zheng examines if common factors of liquidity can be determined by ownership structure measured by asymmetric information in an emerging market that has adopted an order-driven trading system. Using China as a case for the study, I select a broad sample of stocks from two separate Chinese stock exchanges to measure and
analyse the relationship. My empirical evidence seems significant and pervasive. These findings about the Chinese stock market provide useful pointers for understanding commonality in emerging economies and shed critical light
on a new dimension of the working of emerging markets.

Institutional Ownership, Audit Committee and Risk Disclosure – Evidence from Australian Stock Market

This study investigates the influence of institutional ownership and audit committees corporate risk disclosures. Focusing on analysing firms’ risk disclosures make in their 2009 annual reports, our sample constitutes a sample of 66 Australian listed firms. We divide institutional shareholders into dedicated-type institutional block shareholders and transient-type institutional block shareholders. We find that while there is no significant relationship between dedicated-type institutional block shareholders and risk disclosure, there is a positive relationship between transient-type institutional block shareholders and risk disclosures. Our result is consistent with a principal that wields limited monitoring resources while achieving high resource dependency over management. We also find a significant and positive relationship between audit committee independence and risk disclosures, showing the positive role played by audit committee in improving the information transparency and reducing information asymmetry in capital market.

Determinants of ownership concentration in the Chilean stock market

Includes bibliography.

The effects of ownership and stock liquidity on the timing of repurchase transactions

We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership reduces companies' opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases profits from timing OMRs.

Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity : evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

The impact of the Malaysian code on corporate governance: compliance, institutional investors and stock performance

In 2001, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) became an integral part of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules, which requires all listed firms to disclose the extent of compliance with the MCCG. Our panel analysis of 440 firms from 1999 to 2002 finds that corporate governance reform in Malaysia has been successful, with a significant improvement in governance practices. The relationship between ownership by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and corporate governance has strengthened during the period subsequent to the reform, in line with the lead role taken by the EPF in establishing the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group. The implementation of MCCG has had a substantial effect on shareholders' wealth, increasing stock prices by an average of about 4.8%. Although there is no evidence that politically connected firms perform better, political connections do have a significantly negative effect on corporate governance, which is mitigated by institutional ownership.