"Improper" caveats and compensation - section 130 of the Land Title Act 1994

This article examines some questions of statutory interpretation as they apply to section 130 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld)

The use of headings and marginal notes in interpreting Queensland legislation : appearances can be deceptive

This article considers the rules relating to the use of marginal notes and headings in interpreting Queensland legislation, both in its original form and in reprinted legislation. It also examines the application of the principles of construction as to the use of section headings in the interpretation of provisions of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). Finally, it suggests that amendments should be made to the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) in order to clarify the position as to the status of marginal notes and headings in statutory interpretation.

Designing intelligent litigation support tools : The IKBALS perspective

In the legal domain, it is rare to find solutions to problems by simply applying algorithms or invoking deductive rules in some knowledge‐based program. Instead, expert practitioners often supplement domain‐specific knowledge with field experience. This type of expertise is often applied in the form of an analogy. This research proposes to combine both reasoning with precedents and reasoning with statutes and regulations in a way that will enhance the statutory interpretation task. This is being attempted through the integration of database and expert system technologies. Case‐based reasoning is being used to model legal precedents while rule‐based reasoning modules are being used to model the legislation and other types of causal knowledge. It is hoped to generalise these findings and to develop a formal methodology for integrating case‐based databases with rule‐based expert systems in the legal domain.

Reading words into statutes : when Homer nods

The grammatical meaning of a statutory provision may not always gel with the purpose of the statute. The court may strive to give the provision an interpretation at odds with its ordinary and natural meaning to meet the purpose of the legislation. On occasion, this may involve notionally adding words to, or substituting words in, a statutory provision. This process of “reading in” words demands that close attention be paid to the boundary between statutory construction and judicial legislation, particularly where a court is invited to carve out an exception from grammatically clear words. In Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74, Lord Diplock identified three pre-conditions to reading words into a statute. This article analyses the utility of those conditions within the context of the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation and evaluates whether they remain sufficient guideposts for identifying the boundary between interpretation and legislation.

Country of Origin and Internet Publication: Applying the Berne Convention in the Digital Age

Historically, determining the country of origin of a published work presented few challenges, because works were generally published physically – whether in print or otherwise – in a distinct location or few locations. However, publishing opportunities presented by new technologies mean that we now live in a world of simultaneous publication – works that are first published online are published simultaneously to every country in world in which there is Internet connectivity. While this is certainly advantageous for the dissemination and impact of information and creative works, it creates potential complications under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), an international intellectual property agreement to which most countries in the world now subscribe. Under the Berne Convention’s national treatment provisions, rights accorded to foreign copyright works may not be subject to any formality, such as registration requirements (although member countries are free to impose formalities in relation to domestic copyright works). In Kernel Records Oy v. Timothy Mosley p/k/a Timbaland, et al. however, the Florida Southern District Court of the United States ruled that first publication of a work on the Internet via an Australian website constituted “simultaneous publication all over the world,” and therefore rendered the work a “United States work” under the definition in section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, subjecting the work to registration formality under section 411. This ruling is in sharp contrast with an earlier decision delivered by the Delaware District Court in Håkan Moberg v. 33T LLC, et al. which arrived at an opposite conclusion. The conflicting rulings of the U.S. courts reveal the problems posed by new forms of publishing online and demonstrate a compelling need for further harmonization between the Berne Convention, domestic laws and the practical realities of digital publishing. In this chapter, we argue that even if a work first published online can be considered to be simultaneously published all over the world it does not follow that any country can assert itself as the “country of origin” of the work for the purpose of imposing domestic copyright formalities. More specifically, we argue that the meaning of “United States work” under the U.S. Copyright Act should be interpreted in line with the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic law to limit its application to only those works with a real and substantial connection to the United States. There are gaps in the Berne Convention’s articulation of “country of origin” which provide scope for judicial interpretation, at a national level, of the most pragmatic way forward in reconciling the goals of the Berne Convention with the practical requirements of domestic law. We believe that the uncertainties arising under the Berne Convention created by new forms of online publishing can be resolved at a national level by the sensible application of principles of statutory interpretation by the courts. While at the international level we may need a clearer consensus on what amounts to “simultaneous publication” in the digital age, state practice may mean that we do not yet need to explore textual changes to the Berne Convention.

The moral rights of authors and performers: an international and comparative analysis

This book is a comprehensive guide to the development and utilization of authorial moral rights across the key jurisdictions of the English-speaking world and in France and Germany. In recent years, the copyright statutes of the common law countries have been expanded by the introduction of provisions dealing with purely authorial rights - moral rights.
The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers discusses the historical development of the rights in Europe, with particular reference to France and Germany, and shows the growth of moral rights theory and legislative coverage up to the late 1930s. During the 1920s the moral rights of authors became the subject of international protection, particularly through the operation of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The book explores the adoption of moral rights into this and other international instruments, explaining the functions that moral rights were intended to perform.
The author gives detailed accounts of the operation of moral rights in France and Germany today, addressing both statutory interpretation and doctrinal issues. The provision of case studies gives an impression of the rich jurisprudence associated with the rights in these countries.
The book also contains a detailed discussion of the versions of moral rights that have become entrenched in Canada, the UK, the US and Australia, with each country considered independently. It deals separately with the introduction of the rights into each country and their operation and interpretation by courts and commentators. Material on common law analogues to the rights is provided, which indicates alternative actions that practitioners might take. Problems of cross-jurisdictional legal proceedings (especially arising from technological transfer of information) are also addressed, with moral rights protection elsewhere in the world summarized in tabular form.

Wortlautgrenze und Wörterbuch

Kriterien für die Angemessenheit einer Interpretation gibt es in vielen textbezogenen Wissenschaften. Die Juristen sind auf eine angemessene Interpretation des Gesetzes sogar von der Verfassung her verpflichtet. Die Gesetzesbindung soll eingelöst werden mit dem Kriterium der Wortlautgrenze. Wenn man diese Grenze im Wörterbuch finden will, überschätzt man seine Leistung. Wenn man sie ohne Wörterbuch finden will, unterschätzt man diese. Erst wenn man sich klar macht, dass die Wortlautgrenze nicht im Buch steht, sondern im Streit, kann man die Leistung der Wörterbücher richtig schätzen.

A interpretação conforme a constituição na doutrina brasileira: uma análise das relações entre conceitos e os limites à utilização da técnica

O objeto desta pesquisa são as relações entre os conceitos de interpretação conforme a Constituição e os limites à utilização, segundo a doutrina brasileira. O propósito é verificar se e como os diferentes conceitos de interpretação conforme a Constituição empregados pelos autores influenciam seus argumentos em torno dos limites à utilização desse instrumento. Parte-se de um referencial teórico de análise conceitual, ancorado sobretudo nos trabalhos de Brian Bix e Andrew Halpin, para estruturar-se a identificação e a análise dos diferentes conceitos presentes na literatura. Opta-se pela apresentação das ideias dos autores mais influentes na doutrina nacional, selecionados a partir de um critério de número de citações e especialidade da obra. Ao final, conclui-se que: (a) os autores utilizam ao menos nove conceitos diferentes: (i) como interpretação orientada pela Constituição, (ii) integração conforme a Constituição, critério normativo (iii) com e (iv) sem declaração de inconstitucionalidade, (v) interpretação extensiva ou restritiva de acordo com a Constituição, (vi) declaração de inconstitucionalidade da interpretação em concreto, (vii) um tipo de decisão com estrutura específica e (viii) um tipo de dispositivo decisório específico; (ix) um argumento retórico; (b) que os autores geralmente mencionam os mesmos limites, independentemente do conceito que adotam; (c) que, no entanto, os limites não se adequam da mesma forma a todos os conceitos empregados. Sustenta-se que o esclarecimento dessas relações é capaz de aumentar a compreensão sobre o tema, inclusive para os fins de análise da jurisprudência.

Between Principle and Practicality: A Dynamic Realist Examination of Independence in the Canadian Justice System

This work examines independence in the Canadian justice system using an approach adapted from new legal realist scholarship called ‘dynamic realism’. This approach proposes that issues in law must be considered in relation to their recursive and simultaneous development with historic, social and political events. Such events describe ‘law in action’ and more holistically demonstrate principles like independence, rule of law and access to justice. My dynamic realist analysis of independence in the justice system employs a range methodological tools and approaches from the social sciences, including: historical and historiographical study; public administrative; policy and institutional analysis; an empirical component; as well as constitutional, statutory interpretation and jurisprudential analysis. In my view, principles like independence represent aspirational ideals in law which can be better understood by examining how they manifest in legal culture and in the legal system. This examination focuses on the principle and practice of independence for both lawyers and judges in the justice system, but highlights the independence of the Bar. It considers the inter-relation between lawyer independence and the ongoing refinement of judicial independence in Canadian law. It also considers both independence of the Bar and the Judiciary in the context of the administration of justice, and practically illustrates the interaction between these principles through a case study of a specific aspect of the court system. This work also focuses on recent developments in the principle of Bar independence and its relation to an emerging school of professionalism scholarship in Canada. The work concludes by describing the principle of independence as both conditional and dynamic, but rooted in a unitary concept for both lawyers and judges. In short, independence can be defined as impartiality, neutrality and autonomy of legal decision-makers in the justice system to apply, protect and improve the law for what has become its primary normative purpose: facilitating access to justice. While both independence of the Bar and the Judiciary are required to support access to independent courts, some recent developments suggest the practical interactions between independence and access need to be the subject of further research, to better account for both the principles and the practicalities of the Canadian justice system.

Democracy, liberty and the prerogative: the displacement of inherent executive power by statute

This article analyses arguments that the prerogative should be readily displaced by statute, where a statute deals with a subject matter similar to a prerogative. It does so by examining the leading cases on displacement of the prerogative in the United Kingdom and the Australian states, and displacement of the Australian Commonwealth's inherent executive power. The cases do not adopt a single rule but the question of whether a statute will be taken to displace a prerogative is highly dependent of the facts and the provisions of the particular staute.This article defends the current approach to displacement, for three reasons. First, the courts do not allow governments to subvert or ignore statutes by using the prerogative. Secondly, the courts have almost always decided in favour of liberty and against the conferral of coercive powers on government. Thirdly, a single rule could not do justice to all the variables involved in displacement cases. Ordinary principles of statutory interpretation are sufficient to deal with questions of displacement.

Expanding our Constitutional Horizons: A Comprehensive Study of Quasi-Constitutionality in Canada

A number of laws in Canada which uphold rights are referred to as quasi-constitutional by the courts in recognition of their special importance. Quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted through the regular legislative process, although they are being interpreted and applied in a fashion which has become remarkably similar to constitutional law, and are therefore having an important affect over other legislation. Quasi-constitutionality has surprisingly received limited scholarly attention, and very few serious attempts at explaining its significance have been made. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive study of quasi-constitutionality which considers its theoretical basis, its interpretation and legal significance, as well as its similarities to comparable forms of law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part I examines the theoretical basis of quasi-constitutionality and its relationship to the Constitution. As a statutory and common law form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutionality is shown to signify an association with the Canadian Constitution and the foundational principles that underpin it. Part II proceeds to consider the special rules of interpretation applied to quasi-constitutional legislation, the basis of this interpretative approach, and the connection between the interpretation of similar provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation and the Constitution. As a statutory form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutional legislation is given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation which significantly expands the rights which they protect. The theoretical basis of this approach is found in both the fundamental nature of the rights upheld by quasi-constitutional legislation as well as legislative intent. Part III explores how quasi-constitutional statutes affect the interpretation of regular legislation and how they are used for the purposes of judicial review. Quasi-constitutional legislation has a significant influence over regular statutes in the interpretative exercise, which in some instances results in conflicting statutes being declared inoperable. The basis of this form of judicial review is demonstrated to be rooted in statutory interpretation, and as such it provides an interesting model of rights protection and judicial review that is not conflated to constitutional and judicial supremacy.

The principle of legality and contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege

If the principle of legality operates to obscure from Parliament the common law (rights) backdrop against which it legislates, the clarity or rights-sensitivity of that legislation cannot be improved. This undercuts, rather than promotes, the democratic and rule of law values that underpin the modern conception of the principle and its contemporary normative justification. So the courts must strive to give Parliament the clearest possible picture as to the content of the fundamental common law rights it seeks to protect and, depending on the right, freedom, or principle in legislative play, the strength with which the principle will be applied in order to do so. Parliament (and parliamentary counsel) can only ‘squarely confront’ those fundamental rights the existence and content of which was known at the time of legislating. The proposition which, necessarily, follows is that the rule of contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege must be revived when judges apply the principle of legality to the construction of statutes. If the courts are to maintain and take seriously the normative justification for the principle then its application to the construction of statutes can only operate to protect from legislative encroachment those fundamental rights existing at the time the statute was enacted.

The Benefits of Multilingualism for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa

Taking the South African experience as an example, this article considers the interpretive benefits to be reaped from having access to bi- and multilingual versions of a statutory text. The discussion takes place against the backdrop of a history of statutory bi- and multilingualism in the said jurisdiction as well as, at present, constitutional guarantees of language rights and the “parity of esteem” of eleven official languages. It is argued that, if invoked with due discretion and in a non-rigid way, statutory multilingualism can be a boon to statutory and constitutional interpretation. The South African courts – whose traditional approach to statutory inter-pretation has tended to be literalist, formalistic and formulaic – are, generally speaking, to be commended for their supple use of bilingualism as an aid to interpretation over the years. The advent of constitutional multilingualism and the (potential) availability of statutory texts (and the Constitution) in more than two languages, have moreover created conditions conducive to the further development and refinement of reliance on multilingualism in statutory and constitutional interpretation – certain challenges notwithstanding.