965 resultados para Special operations (Military science)


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At head of title: Aerospace doctrine.

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"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.

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Includes index.

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"April 1996."

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Mobile ad hoc networking of dismounted combat personnel is expected to play an important role in the future of network-centric operations. High-speed, short-range, soldier-to-soldier wireless communications will be required to relay information on situational awareness, tactical instructions, and covert surveillance related data during special operations reconnaissance and other missions. This article presents some of the work commissioned by the U. K. Ministry of Defence to assess the feasibility of using 60 GHz millimeter-wave smart antenna technology to provide covert communications capable of meeting these stringent networking needs. Recent advances in RF front-end technology, alongside physical layer transmission schemes that could be employed in millimeter-wave soldier-mounted radio, are discussed. The introduction of covert communications between soldiers will require the development of a bespoke directive medium access layer. A number of adjustments to the IEEE 802.11 distribution coordination function that will enable directional communications are suggested. The successful implementation of future smart antenna technologies and direction of arrival-based protocols will be highly dependent on thorough knowledge of transmission channel characteristics prior to deployment. A novel approach to simulating dynamic soldier-to-soldier signal propagation using state-of-the-art animation-based technology developed for computer game design is described, and important channel metrics such as root mean square angle and delay spread for a team of four networked infantry soldiers over a range of indoor and outdoor environments is reported.

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The Military Intelligence (Research) Department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.