Para um (novo) modelo de intervenção penal na União Europeia: uma reflexão a partir do princípio de legalidade como limite material de atuação da Procuradoria Europeia

Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências Jurídicas (área de especialização em Ciências Jurídicas - Públicas)

Preliminary study of cooperation in hybrid ad-hoc networks

In this paper, we present a first approach to evolve a cooperative behavior in ad hoc networks. Since wireless nodes are energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay requests. On the other hand, if all nodes decide not to expend energy in relaying, then network throughput will drop dramatically. Both these extreme scenarios are unfavorable to the interests of a user. In this paper we deal with the issue of user cooperation in ad hoc networks by developing the algorithm called Generous Tit-For-Tat. We assume that nodes are rational, i.e., their actions are strictly determined by self-interest, and that each node is associated with a minimum lifetime constraint. Given these lifetime constraints and the assumption of rational behavior, we study the added behavior of the network.

Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy

Free‐riding is often associated with self‐interested behaviour. However if there is a global mixed pollutant, free‐riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self‐interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self‐interested fashion.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

Behavioral Assumptions and Management Ability: A Tentative Test

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions in training managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with an emphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) leads future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicit safeguarding, crowding out instinctive contractual heuristics and signaling a 'bad' type to potential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because of their diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set of cooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentative confirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the core courses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates. Controlling for the average quality of their students and some other schools' characteristics, average salaries are significantly greater for those schools whose core MBA courses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based on economics or technical disciplines.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Behavioral assumptions and management ability

The paper explores the consequences that relying on different behavioral assumptions intraining managers may have on their future performance. We argue that training with anemphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) is goodfor technical posts but may also lead future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicitsafeguarding, crowding out instinctive relational heuristics and signaling a bad human type topotential partners. In contrast, human assumptions used in management theories, because oftheir diverse, implicit and even contradictory nature, do not conflict with the innate set ofcooperative tools and may provide a good training ground for such tools. We present tentativeconfirmatory evidence by examining how the weight given to behavioral assumptions in the corecourses of the top 100 business schools influences the average salaries of their MBA graduates.Controlling for the self-selected average quality of their students and some other schools characteristics, average salaries are seen to be significantly greater for schools whose core MBAcourses contain a higher proportion of management courses as opposed to courses based oneconomics or technical disciplines.

Work motivation and pro-social behavior in the delivery of public services : theoretical and empirical insights

This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to study the work motivation of employees in the delivery of public services. The questioning on work motivation in public services in not new but it becomes central for governments which are now facing unprecedented public debts. The objective of this research is twofold : First, we want to see if the work motivation of employees in public services is a continuum (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations cannot coexist) or a bi-dimensional construct (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously). The research in public administration literature has focused on the concept of public service motivation, and considered motivation to be uni-dimensional (Perry and Hondeghem 2008). However, no study has yet tackled both types of motivation, the intrinsic and extrinsic ones, in the same time. This dissertation proposes, in Part I, a theoretical assessment and an empirical test of a global work motivational structure, by using a self-constructed Swiss dataset with employees from three public services, the education sector, the security sector and the public administrative services sector. Our findings suggest that work motivation in public services in not uni-dimensional but bi-dimensional, the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously and can be positively correlated (Amabile et al. 1994). Our findings show that intrinsic motivation is as important as extrinsic motivation, thus, the assumption that employees in public services are less attracted by extrinsic rewards is not confirmed for this sample. Other important finding concerns the public service motivation concept, which, as theoretically predicted, represents the major motivational dimension of employees in the delivery of public services. Second, the theory of public service motivation makes the assumption that employees in public services engage in activities that go beyond their self-interest, but never uses this construct as a determinant for their pro-social behavior. In the same time, several studies (Gregg et al. 2011 and Georgellis et al. 2011) bring evidence about the pro-social behavior of employees in public services. However, they do not identify which type of motivation is at the origin of this behavior, they only make the assumption of an intrinsically motivated behavior. We analyze the pro-social behavior of employees in public services and use the public service motivation as determinant of their pro-social behavior. We add other determinants highlighted by the theory of pro-social behavior (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), by Le Grand (2003) and by fit theories (Besley and Ghatak 2005). We test these determinants on Part II and identify for each sector of activity the positive or the negative impact on pro-social behavior of Swiss employees. Contrary to expectations, we find, for this sample, that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors have a positive impact on pro-social behavior, no crowding-out effect is identified in this sample. We confirm the hypothesis of Le Grand (2003) about the positive impact of the opportunity cost on pro-social behavior. Our results suggest a mix of action-oriented altruism and out-put oriented altruism of employees in public services. These results are relevant when designing incentives schemes for employees in the delivery of public services.

Contexts and typologies in the analysis of welfare state legitimacy : a social psychological approach to political opinion formation

This dissertation analyses public opinion towards the welfare state across 29 European countries. Based on an interdisciplinary approach combining social psychological, sociological, and public opinion approaches to political opinion formation, it investigates how social position and shared beliefs shape perceived legitimacy of welfare institutions, and how social contexts impact on the processes of opinion formation. Drawing on social representations theory, as well as socialization and self-interest approaches, the dissertation analyses the role of social position in lay support for institutional solidarity. Normative beliefs-defined as preferred views regarding the organisation of social relations-mediate the effect of social position on welfare support. In addition, drawing on public opinion literature, the dissertation analyses opinion formation as a function of country-level structural (e.g., level of social spending, unemployment) and ideological factors (e.g., level of meritocracy). The dissertation comprises two theoretical and four empirical chapters. Three of the empirical chapters use data from the European Social Survey 2008. Using multilevel and typological approaches, the dissertation contributes to welfare attitude literature by showing that normative beliefs, such as distrust or egalitarianism, function as underlying mechanisms that link social position to policy attitudes (Chapter 3), and that characteristics of the national contexts influence the processes of political opinion formation (Chapters 3 and 4). Chapter 5 proposes and predicts a typology of the relationship between attitudes towards solidarity and attitudes towards control, reflecting the two central domains of government intervention. Finally, Chapter 6 examines welfare support in the realm of action and social protest, using data from a survey on Spanish Indigados activists. The findings of this dissertation inform contemporary debates about welfare state legitimacy and retrenchment. - Cette thèse avait pour but d'analyser l'opinion publique envers l'Etat social dans 29 pays européens. Basée sur une approche interdisciplinaire qui combine des perspectives psycho-sociales, sociologiques et d'opinion publique sur la formation d'opinion politique, la thèse étudie comment la position sociale et les croyances partagées façonnent la légitimité perçue des institutions de l'Etat social, et comment les contextes sociaux influencent les processus de formation d'opinion. Basée sur la théorie des représentations sociales, ainsi qu'une approche de socialisation et d'intérêt propre, cette thèse analyse le rôle des positions sociales dans le soutien envers la solidarité institutionnelle. Les croyances normatives-définies comme les visions préférées de l'organisation des rapports sociaux-médiatisent l'effet de la position sociale sur le soutien pour l'Etat social. De plus, s'inspirant de la littérature sur l'opinion publique, la thèse analyse la formation d'opinion en fonction des facteurs structurels (ex. le taux de dépenses sociales, le chômage) et idéologiques (ex. le degré de méritocratie). Cette thèse est composée de deux chapitres théoriques et quatre chapitres empiriques. Trois chapitres empiriques utilisent des données provenant de l'enquête European Social Survey 2008. Appliquant des approches multi-niveux et typoloqiques, la thèse contribue à la littérature sur les attitudes envers l'Etat social en montrant que les croyances normatives, telles que la méfiance ou l'égalitarisme, fonctionnent comme des mécanismes sous-jacents qui relient la position sociale aux attitudes politiques (Chapitre 3), et que les caractéristiques des contextes nationaux influencent les processus de formation d'opinion politique (Chapitres 3 et 4). Le chapitre 5 propose et prédit une typologie sur le rapport entre les attitudes envers la solidarité et celles envers le contrôle, renvoyant à deux domaines centraux de régulation étatique. Enfin, le chapitre 6 examine le soutien à l'Etat social dans le domaine de l'action protestataire, utilisant des données d'une enquête menée auprès des militants espagnols du mouvement des Indignés. Les résultats de cette thèse apportent des éléments qui éclairent les débats contemporains sur la légitimité de l'Etat social et son démantèlement.

The social disembedding of business theory and practice. A (neo-)institutional analysis of the homo economicus and corporate social responsibility, and the inherent responsibility of business scholars

Aim Structure of the Thesis In the first article, I focus on the context in which the Homo Economicus was constructed - i.e., the conception of economic actors as fully rational, informed, egocentric, and profit-maximizing. I argue that the Homo Economicus theory was developed in a specific societal context with specific (partly tacit) values and norms. These norms have implicitly influenced the behavior of economic actors and have framed the interpretation of the Homo Economicus. Different factors however have weakened this implicit influence of the broader societal values and norms on economic actors. The result is an unbridled interpretation and application of the values and norms of the Homo Economicus in the business environment, and perhaps also in the broader society. In the second article, I show that the morality of many economic actors relies on isomorphism, i.e., the attempt to fit into the group by adopting the moral norms surrounding them. In consequence, if the norms prevailing in a specific group or context (such as a specific region or a specific industry) change, it can be expected that actors with an 'isomorphism morality' will also adapt their ethical thinking and their behavior -for the 'better' or for the 'worse'. The article further describes the process through which corporations could emancipate from the ethical norms prevailing in the broader society, and therefore develop an institution with specific norms and values. These norms mainly rely on mainstream business theories praising the economic actor's self-interest and neglecting moral reasoning. Moreover, because of isomorphism morality, many economic actors have changed their perception of ethics, and have abandoned the values prevailing in the broader society in order to adopt those of the economic theory. Finally, isomorphism morality also implies that these economic actors will change their morality again if the institutional context changes. The third article highlights the role and responsibility of business scholars in promoting a systematic reflection and self-critique of the business system and develops alternative models to fill the moral void of the business institution and its inherent legitimacy crisis. Indeed, the current business institution relies on assumptions such as scientific neutrality and specialization, which seem at least partly challenged by two factors. First, self-fulfilling prophecy provides scholars with an important (even if sometimes undesired) normative influence over practical life. Second, the increasing complexity of today's (socio-political) world and interactions between the different elements constituting our society question the strong specialization of science. For instance, economic theories are not unrelated to psychology or sociology, and economic actors influence socio-political structures and processes, e.g., through lobbying (Dobbs, 2006; Rondinelli, 2002), or through marketing which changes not only the way we consume, but more generally tries to instill a specific lifestyle (Cova, 2004; M. K. Hogg & Michell, 1996; McCracken, 1988; Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001). In consequence, business scholars are key actors in shaping both tomorrow's economic world and its broader context. A greater awareness of this influence might be a first step toward an increased feeling of civic responsibility and accountability for the models and theories developed or taught in business schools.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

Three essays in behavioral and experimental economics

The present PhD dissertation consists of three papers, organized in chapters, in the field of behavioral economics. This discipline studies economic behavior of individuals subject to limitations, such as bounded self-interest and bounded willpower. The behavior studied in the present thesis ranges from the complex decision to register as an organ donor, decision¬making in the presence of uncertainty and the decision to give money to a charitable organization. The first chapter aims at testing the effectiveness of an active-decision (AD) mechanism on the decision to become an organ donor in Switzerland, using field experiments. We found that stimulating participants' reflection on the topic of organ donation had a negative effect on the decision to become an organ donor. Moreover, a non-binding commitment nudge reduces putting off the decision, but does not lead to donation rates higher than in the control group. The results suggest that AD may be far more limited than previously thought and raise doubts about the efficacy of engaging potential donors to reflect on the topic of organ donation. Beyond carrying for others, behavioral economics also recognizes that individuals do not evaluate outcomes in absolute terms but rather by comparing them to some reference levels, called reference points. Above the reference points, economic outcomes are perceived as gains, while below these levels the same outcomes are felt as losses. The last two chapters analyze the importance of reference points in the evaluation of economic outcomes. Using a laboratory experiment where subjects played two consecutive lotteries, Chapter 2 studies the speed of adjustment of the reference point. We find that varying the probability of winning the first lottery has no effect on subjects' risk behavior regarding the second lottery. This result indicates a very fast adjustment of the reference point to the latest information. Chapter 3 investigates whether reference points are relevant for charitable preferences. Using actual donation decisions of participants in a laboratory experiment, the results suggest that reference points are not crucial for shaping charitable giving. -- Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en trois articles, organisés en chapitres, dans le domaine de l'économie comportementale. Cette discipline étudie le comportement d'agents économiques sujets à des limitations, telles qu'un égoïsme limité et une volonté limitée. Le comportement étudié dans cette thèse va de la décision complexe de devenir donneur d'organes, la prise de décision en présence d'incertitude à la décision de donner de l'argent à une oeuvre caritative. Le premier chapitre vise à tester l'efficacité d'un mécanisme de « décision active » (active decision, AD) sur la décision de devenir donneur d'organes en Suisse, et ce en recourant à deux expériences hors-laboratoire. Les résultats montrent que stimuler la réflexion des participants sur le don d'organes a un effet négatif sur la décision de devenir donneur. De plus, un mécanisme qui encourage les participants à prendre une décision sur le champ réduit la tendance à procrastiner, mais ne mène pas à un taux de donneurs plus élevé par rapport à un groupe de contrôle. Les résultats suggèrent que le mécanisme AD est bien plus limité que ce qui a été supposé jusqu'à maintenant. De plus, ils suscitent le doute quant à l'efficacité de stimuler la réflexion de potentiels donneurs sur le sujet du don d'organes. En plus de se soucier des autres, l'économie comportementale admet également que les individus n'évaluent pas les résultats de façon absolue, mais en comparant ceux-ci à des niveaux de références, souvent appelés points de référence. Au-dessus de ces points de référence, les résultats sont perçus en tant que gains, tandis qu'en-dessous ces mêmes résultats sont considérés comme des pertes. Les deux derniers chapitres analysent l'importance des points de référence dans diverses situations. A l'aide d'une expérience en laboratoire dans laquelle les participants participent à deux loteries consécutives, le chapitre 2 étudie la vitesse d'ajustement du point de référence. Le résultat montre que varier la probabilité de gagner la première loterie n'a aucun effet sur le comportement en matière de risques concernant la deuxième loterie. Cela indique un ajustement très rapide du point de référence. Le chapitre 3 vise à déterminer si les points de référence ont un rôle majeur concernant les préférences caritatives. Les données relatives aux décisions de don des participants d'une expérience en laboratoire montrent que les points de référence n'influencent pas significativement le don caritatif.