The home stigma : adverse selection in ADRs and the home capital market environment

We investigate whether characteristics of the home country capital environment, such as information disclosure and investor rights protection continue to affect ADRs cross-listed in the U.S. Using microstructure measures as proxies for adverse selection, we find that characteristics of the home markets continue to be relevant, especially for emerging market firms. Less transparent disclosure, poorer protection of investor rights and weaker legal institutions are associated with higher levels of information asymmetry. Developed market firms appear to be affected by whether or not home business laws are common law or civil law legal origin. Our finding contributes to the bonding literature. It suggests that cross-listing in the U.S. should not be viewed as a substitute for improvement in the quality of local institutions, and attention must be paid to improve investor protection in order to achieve the full benefits of improved disclosure. Improvement in the domestic capital market environment can attract more investors even for U.S. cross-listed firms.

Impact of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on initial public offering prospectus earnings forecasts

Commencing 13 March 2000, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) introduced changes to the regulation of corporate fundraising in Australia. In particular, it effected a reduction in the litigation risk associated with initial public offering prospectus disclosure.We find that the change is associated with a reduction in forecast frequency and an increase in forecast value relevance, but not with forecast error or bias. These results confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk affect the level but not the quality of disclosure. They also suggest that the reforms’ objectives of reducing fundraising costs while improving investor protection, have been achieved.

Essays on Corporate Governance and the Quality of Disclosed Earnings: Across Transitional Europe

A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance systems around the world. An important insight from this literature is that corporate governance mechanisms address the excessive use of managerial discretionary powers to get private benefits by expropriating the value of shareholders. One possible way of expropriation is to reduce the quality of disclosed earnings by manipulating the financial statements. This lower quality of earnings should then be reflected by the stock price of firm according to value relevance theorem. Hence, instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance on the firm’s market value, it is important to understand the causes of the lower quality of accounting earnings. This thesis contributes to the literature by increasing knowledge about the extent of the earnings management – measured as the extent of discretionary accruals in total disclosed earnings - and its determinants across the Transitional European countries. The thesis comprises of three essays of empirical analysis of which first two utilize the data of Russian listed firms whereas the third essay uses data from 10 European economies. More specifically, the first essay adds to existing research connecting earnings management to corporate governance. It testifies the impact of the Russian corporate governance reforms of 2002 on the quality of disclosed earnings in all publicly listed firms. This essay provides empirical evidence of the fact that the desired impact of reforms is not fully substantiated in Russia without proper enforcement. Instead, firm-level factors such as long-term capital investments and compliance with International financial reporting standards (IFRS) determine the quality of the earnings. The result presented in the essay support the notion proposed by Leuz et al. (2003) that the reforms aimed to bring transparency do not correspond to desired results in economies where investor protection is lower and legal enforcement is weak. The second essay focuses on the relationship between the internal-control mechanism such as the types and levels of ownership and the quality of disclosed earnings in Russia. The empirical analysis shows that the controlling shareholders in Russia use their powers to manipulate the reported performance in order to get private benefits of control. Comparatively, firms owned by the State have significantly better quality of disclosed earnings than other controllers such as oligarchs and foreign corporations. Interestingly, market performance of firms controlled by either State or oligarchs is better than widely held firms. The third essay provides useful evidence on the fact that both ownership structures and economic characteristics are important factors in determining the quality of disclosed earnings in three groups of countries in Europe. Evidence suggests that ownership structure is a more important determinant in developed and transparent countries, while economic determinants are important determinants in developing and transitional countries.

L'encadrement des fonds de couverture au Canada: une réflexion sur les principaux enjeux

Dans un contexte d'instabilité économique, force est de constater que les remises en question du libéralisme économique s'intensifient, mettant ainsi l'accent sur l'importance de la réglementation pour la protection des investisseurs ainsi que l'efficience des marchés financiers. Souvent associés aux conséquences d'un manque d'encadrement, les fonds de couverture représentent des cibles de choix pour ceux qui cherchent à expliquer l'effondrement majeur des marchés, tout en prônant un interventionnisme accru des autorités gouvernementales. Pour mieux comprendre les tenants et aboutissants de cette industrie, la présente étude propose une vue d'ensemble des caractéristiques fondamentales des fonds de couverture, tant sous l'angle de leur structure organisationnelle que de leur encadrement réglementaire. À cet égard, il importe de jauger les principaux enjeux découlant des règles applicables à l'administration d'un fonds, particulièrement sur le plan de la transparence informationnelle et au niveau de la gouvernance interne. Ces deux éléments constituant les pierres angulaires de la présente analyse, notre étude offrira finalement une réflexion sur l'approche réglementaire à privilégier, et ce, en tenant compte des particularités des fonds de couverture. Dans un même ordre d'idées, le rôle des divers intermédiaires professionnels sera abordé afin d'élargir notre compréhension de la question sous étude. L'objet de cette étude n'est pas d'apporter une solution complète et définitive à ces enjeux, mais bien d'offrir des pistes de réflexions pouvant servir de balises à une étude subséquente de la question, laquelle devra par ailleurs tenir compte du rôle assumé par les fonds de couverture ainsi que du statut particulier qu'ils occupent sur les marchés financiers.

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

Essais en économie avec frictions financières

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats.

Composición de Juntas directivas y desempeño de las firmas:evidencia para Colombia

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Will the PRIPs' KID live up to its promise to protect investors? ECMI Commentary No. 33, 6 July 2012

Unveiled by the European Commission on July 3rd, the proposed Regulation on key information documents (KID) for packaged retail investment products (PRIPs) represents a step forward in enhancing the protection of retail investors and advancing the single market for financial services. While acknowledging in this Commentary that the KID is a commendable effort, ECMI/CEPS researcher Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía observes that pre-contractual disclosure is just one of the pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of investor protection and regrets that other pieces, such as MiFID and the IMD, are not so ambitiously constructed.

The effect of the national setting on employment practice: the case of downsizing

Although there is now a sizeable body of academic literature that tries to explain cross-country differences in terms of corporate control, capital market development, investor protection and politics, there is as yet very little literature on the degrees of protection accorded to other corporate stakeholders such as employees, based on a systematic comparison of firm level evidence. We find that both theories of legal origin and the varieties of capitalism approach are poor predictors of the relative propensity of firms to make redundancies in different settings. However, the political orientation of the government in place and even more so the nature of the electoral system are relatively good explanators of this propensity. In other words, political structures and outcomes matter more than more rigid institutional features such as legal origin. We explore the reasons for this, drawing out the implications for both theory and practice.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

CEPAL Review no.88

Celso Furtado’s contributions to structuralism and their relevance today / Ricardo Bielschowsky. -- Has investor protection been rendered obsolete by the Argentine crisis? / Michael Mortimore and Leonardo Stanley. -- The rights-based approach in development policies and strategies / Victor Abramovich. -- Can the Latin American and Caribbean countries emulate the Irish model of FDI attraction? / Ruth Rios-Morales and David O’Donovan. -- The slow comeback of industrial policies in Latin America and the Caribbean / Wilson Peres. -- A low-growth model: informality as a structural constraint / Mario Cimoli, Annalisa Primi and Maurizio Pugno. -- The Argentine labour market in a financially globalized world / Mario Damill and Roberto Frenkel. -- Social precarity in Mexico and Argentina: trends, manifestations and national trajectories / María Cristina Bayón. -- The Fiscal Covenant in Guatemala: lessons learned from the negotiations / Juan Alberto Fuentes K. and Maynor Cabrera. -- Changes in Chile’s production structure, 1986-1996: output and industrial interdependence / José Miguel Albala-Bertrand. -- Guidelines for contributors to the CEPAL Review. -- CEPAL Review on the Internet. -- Recent ECLAC publications.

Esforço de modernidade do mercado de capitais no Brasil: o novo mercado

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

La consulenza in materia di investimenti

Il lavoro propone un’analisi critica delle disciplina italiana ed europea della consulenza in materia di investimenti. Si considerano innanzitutto le problematiche generali del rapporto tra cliente e intermediario nella prestazione della consulenza, con particolare riferimento ad asimmetrie informative e conflitti di interesse. Si discute, in particolare, il tradizionale paradigma regolamentare fondato sulla trasparenza: le indicazioni della finanza comportamentale suggeriscono, infatti, un intervento normativo più deciso, volto a caratterizzare in maniera fiduciaria la relazione tra cliente e intermediario. Dopo aver analizzato, alla stregua dei modelli teorici illustrati in precedenza, l’evoluzione storica della disciplina della consulenza nell’ordinamento italiano, si sottolinea il ruolo svolto dall’autorità di vigilanza nella sistematizzazione dell’istituto, nel contempo rilevando, tuttavia, la complessiva insufficienza delle norme vigenti al fine di un’adeguata tutela dell’investitore. Si esamina poi la disciplina introdotta dalla MiFID, con specifica attenzione alle implicazioni sistematiche dell’estensione della nozione di consulenza operata dalle autorità di vigilanza: la nuova configurazione del servizio ha determinato un’intensificazione dei doveri fiduciari imposti agli intermediari, testimoniando un superamento del paradigma di trasparenza e un percorso indirizzato verso un approccio maggiormente interventista sul lato dell’offerta. Le conclusioni sono, peraltro, nel senso di uno sviluppo solo parziale di tale processo, risultando dubbio il valore per il cliente di una consulenza non indipendente e potenzialmente esposta, soprattutto negli intermediari polifunzionali, al conflitto di interessi. Particolare enfasi viene posta sulla necessità di introdurre un’effettiva consulenza indipendente, pur nelle difficoltà che la relativa disciplina incontra, anche in ragione delle caratteristiche specifiche del mercato, nell’ordinamento italiano.

Saving for Retirement and Investing for Growth. Report of the CEPS-RCMI Task Force on Long-term Investing and Retirement Savings. CEPS Task Force Report, September 2013

Europe is facing a double challenge: a significant need for long-term investments – crucial levers for economic growth – and a growing pension gap, both of which call for resolute action. Crucially, at a time when low interest rates and revised prudential standards strain the ability of life insurers and pension funds to offer guaranteed returns, Europe lacks a framework ensuring the quality and accessibility of long-term investment solutions for small retail investors and defined contribution pension plans. This report considers the potential to steer household financial wealth – accounting for over 60% of total financial wealth in Europe – towards long-term investing, which would achieve two goals at once: higher growth and higher pensions. It follows a holistic approach that considers both solution design – how to gear product structuring towards long-term investing – and market structure – how to engineer a competitive market setting that is able to deliver high-quality and cost-efficient solutions. The report also considers prudential rules for insurers and pension funds and the potential to build a single market for less-liquid funds, occupational and personal pensions, with improved investor protection. It urges policy-makers to act aggressively to deliver more inclusive, efficient and resilient retail investment markets that are better equipped and more committed to deliver value over the long-term for beneficiaries.