Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them; The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian Republic? OSW Study 3/2001

Ukraine and Russia: Among all of the countries that border Ukraine, the Russian Federation is its most important partner. Ukraine's relations with Moscow are the key issue of its foreign policy to such an extent that each option of the Ukrainian foreign policy is first and foremost a choice as to the shape of its relations with Russia. This is mainly a consequence of Ukraine's geographic and geopolitical situation, the legacy of many centuries of political, economic and cultural bonds between these two countries, as well as Russia's inevitably dominant position in their mutual relations. Belarus: Belarus has not broken off its bonds with Moscow after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Throughout the whole period of the Belarussian independence we can observe the country's strong political, economic and military dependence on Russia. This dependence allows Russia to control, and even shape, the processes that take place in Belarus in all the areas mentioned.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. OSW Study 23/2006

The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration.

The menace of a 'brown' Russia: Ethnically motivated xenophobia - symptoms, causes and prospects for the future. OSW Study 29/2008

This paper focuses on the ethnic dimension of xenophobia, as understood as aversion, fear or hostility vis-a-vis members of other nationalities, as well as the related radical nationalist ideas founded on the concept of the dominant (and often discriminatory) role of the Russians in the Russian Federation, with reference to racism or neo-Nazism. This text primarily presents xenophobia as an enormous social problem in today's Russia, which is not being addressed at the moment, but is instead being exploited by both the authorities and radical nationalist groups. This paper attempts to describe and understand the causes of xenophobia and the reasons for the popularity of extremely nationalist views among ethnic Russians. It also seeks to estimate the scale of the problem and the potential threat it may create in the future. The first part describes the different manifestations of xenophobia in present-day Russia. It identifies the groups most exposed to ethnically motivated violence and persecution, as well as the most xenophobic communities, and discusses the scale of the problem and its specific characteristics in the context of Russian reality. The second part looks into the underlying causes of xenophobic sentiments among Russians, while the last chapters delve into the authorities' attitude towards the problem and seek to answer the question of whether radical nationalist ideas may in future come to dominate Russia's political scene.

The 'tribal areas' of the Caucasus: The North Caucasus - an enclave of 'alien civilisation' within the Russian Federation. OSW Study 34/2010

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

Russia marks the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism: What significance does it have in an epoch of global confrontation? OSW Commentary No. 171, 20 May 2015

The Victory Day celebrations held in Russia on 9 May 2015 were special for marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II but the particular international and domestic context they were set in was of yet greater importance. The element which set the celebrations in 2015 apart from those in the preceding years was how the military and moral aspects of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany was made part of the current geopolitical confrontation with the West concerning the Ukrainian crisis. The escalation of the aggressive rhetoric on Europe and the USA and accusations that the West is destabilising the international situation and striving for conflict was accompanied by a display of the increasing military power of the Russian Federation; the display itself was stronger than has been seen in preceding years. This was a clear sign that Moscow is ready to protect its national interests in the area of foreign policy by any means. At the same time, the creation of an atmosphere of threat and stoking patriotic feelings was intended to mobilise the Russian public around the political leadership while the country’s economic problems are deteriorating further.

Information Guide: Russia. March 2016

A guide to information sources on the Russian Federation, with hyperlinks to information within European Sources Online and on external websites (For other language versions of this record click on the original url)

The Hospitality Gap: Bridging Russia into the 21st Century

The new intemationalization of the field of hospitality management has led to increased opportunities in the Russian Federation. At the same time, there are major challenges to be overcome. This article describes what needs to be accomplished to be successful at business in this New World Order.

Cross Section and Parity-Violating Spin Asymmetries of W(+/-) Boson Production in Polarized p plus p Collisions at root s=500 Gev

Large parity-violating longitudinal single-spin asymmetries A(L)(e+) = 0.86(-0.14)(+0.30) and Ae(L)(e-) = 0.88(-0.71)(+0.12) are observed for inclusive high transverse momentum electrons and positrons in polarized p + p collisions at a center-of-mass energy of root s = 500 GeV with the PHENIX detector at RHIC. These e(+/-) come mainly from the decay of W(+/-) and Z(0) bosons, and their asymmetries directly demonstrate parity violation in the couplings of the W(+/-) to the light quarks. The observed electron and positron yields were used to estimate W(+/-) boson production cross sections for the e(+/-) channels of sigma(pp -> W(+)X) X BR(W(+) -> e(+) nu(e)) = 144.1 +/- 21.2(stat)(-10.3)(+3.4)(syst) +/- 21.6(norm) pb, and sigma(pp -> W(-)X) X BR(W(-) -> e(-) (nu) over bar (e)) = 3.17 +/- 12.1(stat)(-8.2)(+10.1)(syst) +/- 4.8(norm) pb.

Azimuthal Anisotropy of pi(0) Production in Au plus Au Collisions at root s(NN)=200 GeV: Path-Length Dependence of Jet Quenching and the Role of Initial Geometry

We have measured the azimuthal anisotropy of pi(0) production for 1 < p(T) < 18 GeV/c for Au + Au collisions at root s(NN) = 200 GeV. The observed anisotropy shows a gradual decrease for 3 less than or similar to p(T) less than or similar to 7-10 GeV/c, but remains positive beyond 10 GeV/c. The magnitude of this anisotropy is underpredicted, up to at least similar to 10 GeV/c, by current perturbative QCD (PQCD) energy-loss model calculations. An estimate of the increase in anisotropy expected from initial-geometry modification due to gluon saturation effects and fluctuations is insufficient to account for this discrepancy. Calculations that implement a path-length dependence steeper than what is implied by current PQCD energy-loss models show reasonable agreement with the data.

Elliptic and Hexadecapole Flow of Charged Hadrons in Au plus Au Collisions at root s(NN)=200 GeV

Differential measurements of the elliptic (upsilon(2)) and hexadecapole (upsilon(4)) Fourier flow coefficients are reported for charged hadrons as a function of transverse momentum (p(T)) and collision centrality or number of participant nucleons (N(part)) for Au + Au collisions at root s(NN) = 200 GeV/ The upsilon(2,4) measurements at pseudorapidity vertical bar eta vertical bar <= 0.35, obtained with four separate reaction-plane detectors positioned in the range 1.0 < vertical bar eta vertical bar < 3.9, show good agreement, indicating the absence of significant Delta eta-dependent nonflow correlations. Sizable values for upsilon(4)(p(T)) are observed with a ratio upsilon(4)(p(T), N(part))/upsilon(2)(2)(p(T), N(part)) approximate to 0.8 for 50 less than or similar to N(part) less than or similar to 200, which is compatible with the combined effects of a finite viscosity and initial eccentricity fluctuations. For N(part) greater than or similar to 200 this ratio increases up to 1.7 in the most central collisions.

Transverse momentum dependence of eta meson suppression in Au plus Au collisions at root s(NN)=200 GeV

New measurements by the PHENIX experiment at the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider for. production at midrapidity as a function of transverse momentum ((PT)) and collision centrality in root s(NN) = 200 GeV Au + Au and p + p collisions are presented. They indicate nuclear modification factors (R(AA)) which are similar in both magnitude and trend to those found in earlier pi(0) measurements. Linear fits to R(AA) as a function of (PT) in 5-20 GeV/c show that the slope is consistent with zero within two standard deviations at all centralities, although a slow rise cannot be excluded. Having different statistical and systematic uncertainties, the pi(0) and eta measurements are complementary at high (PT); thus, along with the extended (PT) range of these data they can provide additional constraints for theoretical modeling and the extraction of transport properties.